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ABSTRACT 
 
The Influence of Women's Status on Fertility Behavior Between Taiwan and China—A 
Multilevel Analysis. (May 2005) 
Jin-Kai Godfrey Li, B.A., National Chengchi University; 
M.S., Soochow University 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Dudley L. Poston, Jr. 
 
 
Since 1949 Taiwan and China have been governed by different political regimes. 
Nevertheless, after more than fifty years, research shows that women in both societies 
now enjoy significantly higher social status and have lower fertility rates. Despite well-
documented literature on the relationship between fertility and women’s status in Taiwan 
and China, no systematic empirical research has compared the two. This dissertation was 
designed to investigate the effects of women’s status on fertility and sterilization 
behaviors in China and Taiwan by means of multi-level analysis focusing on women’s 
education levels and employment status as predictors at both the individual and 
aggregate levels. To examine the influence of enforced policy, in China’s models, 
variables were added about whether the participants had a government-issued one-child 
certificate or had complied with the childbirth quota set by local authorities.  
Most results are consistent with our hypotheses. At the macro level, female college 
graduation rate is significant in Taiwan but not in China. One-child certificate rate is 
significantly correlated with provincial-level number of Child Ever Born (CEB). At the 
 
 iv
micro level of Poisson and logistic models, women with status are significantly more 
likely to have smaller numbers of CEB and lower sterilization usage. Survival analysis 
that simultaneously analyzed time duration and event occurrence showed dynamic 
effects of women’s status on the probability of a first, second and third childbirth. 
The Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM) method shows both some 
direct and some interactive effects of contextual variables on fertility and contraceptive 
behaviors. In both countries, wives’ educational levels showed the greatest numbers of 
significant correlations with the dependent variables. Both Western socioeconomically 
based demographic transition theory and Asian planned demographic transition theory in 
China receive empirical support in the findings. 
Methodological and policy implications for future studies are discussed. The 
findings of this dissertation, particularly the micro-macro linkages, contribute to an 
explanation of how higher women’s status and lower fertility rates across the two 
regimes emerged from both common and disparate processes. This dissertation also 
illustrates how multi-level investigations of fertility and women’s status could be 
implemented in other parts of the world. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Throughout most of the world, women do not have equal status with men. 
Compared with men, women have very limited opportunities in most spheres of 
economic and social activity (Sadik 1984). Further, a close relationship has been 
observed between various aspects of women’s status in society and concomitant 
demographic patterns of fertility, mortality and migration. This observed correlation has 
been shown to be especially prominent with regard to fertility and its associated social 
consequences (United Nations 1975). It has long been argued that the low status of 
women--including subordination to the control of males and exclusion from access to 
various societal resources and income-generating opportunities--is an important obstacle 
to demographic modernization. Improvements in the social status of women are often 
depicted as preconditions to the achievement of lower mortality and fertility rates. 
Historically, the position of women in China has been connected to the structure 
of the family. As a consequence of patriarchal familial values, inequality between men 
and women has long been securely institutionalized in Chinese society. For example, 
women have been forbidden to hold religious office, to own property, and even to have 
their names written in the ancestral books. Women’s subordination in the family has 
lasted for centuries. Their social status has been dictated by norms that they devote 
themselves to the needs of their families. Both single and married women were 
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subjected to countless constraining expectations. Women were expected to reproduce 
male offspring, to perform virtually all household chores, and to obey their in-laws. 
Their lives were constrained by obedience, forbearance and tolerance, and suffered from 
the polygamous marriages of their husbands.  For disobedience to their husbands or their 
in-laws, they could be banished from their families. As victims of social tradition, 
women had only one means to improve their social status: giving birth to male offspring. 
Since 1949 when the civil war ended between the Capitalist Kuomintang Party 
and the Communist Party, Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) and China (People 
Republic of China, PRC) have been separately ruled by different regimes. After more 
than fifty years, currently there are few differences in women's status between those two 
areas. Although research shows that both sides have made progress in women's status, 
immense room for improvement remains. Most of the traditional restrictions on women 
are no longer present. Women’s equal rights have been declared and are protected by 
laws in both regimes (State Council Press Office. 1994a). In 1985, China’s 70 percent 
employment rate for women was the highest in the world, and there is evidence this 
contributed to greater equality in attitudes about marital roles, whether or not actual 
changes occurred in marital-role behaviors (Farris 2000). Tuan (1989) opines that only a 
revolution can bring about such extensive and rapid changes for Chinese women because 
almost all women of working age are employed; this high rate of employment, Tuan 
surmises, may be due in part to the extensive use of contraception. Phan (1997) 
attributes the reasons for declining fertility in the PRC to improvement in the social 
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status of women since 1949 and to improvement in educational opportunities--
particularly for women--plus economic development. 
In Taiwan, women’s enhanced status is seen in rising educational levels, 
increased participation in the work force, enhanced legal rights, and expanded control 
over life decisions such as how to spend one’s wages, whom to marry, where to live, and 
how many children to bear.  In Taiwan, Chiang (1990) acknowledges the historical 
improvement in the status of women since the 1950s in spite of many impediments to 
change. Fricke and associates (1994) examined the period between marriage and first 
childbearing and found that the experience of work outside the home was associated 
with a fivefold increase in the duration of that period across the cohorts from 1955-1984. 
They also found a fourfold increase in the period between the birth of a first and second 
child. 
Levels of fertility and women’s status are related, because a woman’s frequent 
pregnancy and child rearing necessarily confine her to the home and prevent her 
socializing outside the home. Such confinement can cause qualitative changes in 
lifestyle, values, level of aspiration, motivation, degree of modernization, and access to 
potential roles. Those resultant constraints tend to diminish the status of women and 
their quality of life. Poston (1998) states that Taiwan and China have encountered 
dramatic reductions in their fertility rates in the past forty years, from total fertility rates 
(TFRs) of greater than six in the early 1950's to TFRs in the late 1990s of less than two 
(Figure 1.1). Conspicuously, both countries began and ended their fertility transitions at 
almost the exact same times and levels. 
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Source: Poston (1998) 
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Figure 1.1 Total Fertility Rates: China and Taiwan, 1950-1997 
 
In the social sciences, research targets are often conceptually hierarchical. In
other words, the dependent variables of individual characteristics are grouped into larg
units and contexts, such as schools, neighborhoods, cities, and so forth. If the theories 
hypothesize that the behaviors of interest will be influenced by both the person’s 
characteristics and those of the context, then the independent variables we 
ed in should refer to the characteristics of both the individuals and the higher 
order units (de Leeuw 1992, p. xiii). Contextual studies investigate the relationsh
between social structure and individuals, a major concern of sociology (Huber 1991)
The original and most famous of these studies is Emile Durkheim's classic study Suicide
(1951), in which he concluded that the reason people commit suicide cannot totally be 
attributed to their own psychological factors. DiPrete and Forristal argue: 
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 “The idea that individuals respond to the social context is a defining claim of th
sociological discipline, which is found in Marx’s work on political economy, in 
Durkheim’s studies of the impact of community on anomie and suicide, in Weber’s 
research on how the religious community shapes economic behavior, in Merton’s work 
on communities, relative deprivation, and social comparison theory, and in Berelson and 
his colleagues’ research on the
e 
 effect of social context on voting” (1994, p. 331). 
, 
) defines 
uld go 
ily 
ced and interacted with the 
individ f 
 
Work in this area has been done by political scientists analyzing the contextual 
effect of neighborhoods on voting behavior; well known classics are Huckfeldt (1986)
Lazarsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet (1944), and Lipset (1963). Huckfeldt (1986
contextual effect as "instances in which individual behavior is affected by the presence 
of a social property in a population regardless of whether the individual possesses the 
property in question" (p. 5).   
Freedman (1974) suggested that in demographic studies, researchers sho
beyond the characteristics of individuals in order to understand fertility behavior and 
should analyze fertility decisions within the social context (the community 
characteristics) in which the individual lives. Besides research on how characteristics of 
villages affect fertility behavior (Entwisle et al. 1984, 1996, 1997), Mason, Wong and 
Entwisle (1983) examined how differences in socioeconomic development and fam
planning across fifteen developing countries influen
ual-level relationship between women’s educational attainment and the number o
children born. Since the social and economic characteristics of an area influence the 
degree to which women perceive, approve and achieve the goal of having a small family
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(Rosen and LaRaia 1972), an important question is whether community characteristics
that identify the individual’s normative environment may intensify or hamper the 
microrelationship between fertility and education. 
In this dissertation, I will examine the effects of variables at the aggregat
on the relationship between individual characteristics and women’s fertility behaviors.  I 
will principally use multilevel contextual analysis to a
 
e level 
ddress those concerns. Education 
and em
 
s for the 
 
 to 
lity, the dependent variables of CEB and sterilization 
status w l 
ployment status are the main indicators of women’s status. The focus is on the 
aggregate effect of women's status in Chinese provinces and Taiwanese counties on 
women’s fertility behavior, as well as the interactive effects of those macro-level 
variables with individual variables. In addition, I will look at the micro-level to 
determine whether individual women’s working status and education level affect their 
fertility activities under controlling macro variables. 
The fertility outcomes analyzed here are children ever born (CEB), sterilization 
usage, the duration between marriage and first birth, the duration between first child and
second birth, and the duration between second child and third birth. First, Poisson 
models for CEB, logistic models for sterilization usage, and survival analysi
three durations will be estimated for individual women. Then, the macro-level CEB and
sterilization rate will be regressed with the macro-level women’s status. In order
understand the degree to which individual effects, contextual effects and their interactive 
influences have an impact on ferti
ill be analyzed by Hierarchical Generalized Linear Models (HGLM). Individua
data are from the 1992 Seventh KAP (Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice of 
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Contraception) Survey for Taiwan (TPIFP 1992) and the 1988 China Woman Fertility 
Survey (SFPCC 1989) for China. Macro-level data are from the Taiwan-Fukien 
Demographic Fact Book 1992 (EYRC 1992)for Taiwan and the 1990 China Population 
Census (NBSC 1991) for China. 
The purposes of this dissertation are distinctive in several ways from previou
research. First, regarding the relationship between fertility behavior and women's sta
the focus here is on the interaction of contextual effects, family structure and persona
characteristics. Unlike conventional studies, advanced multilevel analysis methods 
efficiently assist in the construction of models that simultaneously incorporate the effects 
on the outcome, inclusively, of level-one and level-two characteristics. Accordin
clearer picture may emerge of how individual women may be shaping their fertility 
decisions based on the contextual effects of greater or lesser status of women in the 
society.  Second, although individual level women's status indexes of education and 
employment at the individual level have been shown to be important predictors of 
fertility patterns, many questions remain unanswered about the dynamics of those effects
In this study, several methods (Poisson, logistic analysis, survival analysis, and 
multilevel estimation) will be employed to provide a broader empirical base from which 
to clari
s 
tus, 
l 
can 
gly, a 
. 
fy the correlation of these indexes with fertility decline. Third, some previous 
researc
r, 
er 
h has focused on differences and similarities of the fertility transition in different 
geographic areas (Coale and Freedman 1993; Poston 1998). Directly comparing China 
and Taiwan in respect to fertility behavior and women's status is not common, howeve
and this study attempts to look at the influence of women's status on fertility to discov
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whether women's status could be a good predictor of fertility on both sides of the
Strait. 
To achieve those goals, the dissertation consists of seven chapters. Following thi
introduction, Chapter II reviews the literature on women’s status in China and Taiwan
terms of employment status, economic gains, family status, educational achieveme
and political involvement. It ends with a brief comparison of women's status in both 
regimes. Chapter III describes the demographic transition of China and Taiwan, 
especially the role of family planning programs, across those two regions. Chapter IV 
discusses the theoretical background of the relationship between fertility and women’s 
status and primarily focuses on the main indicators of women’s status: education and 
employment. The chapter also discusses influences of family structure on fertility 
behavior, and the feminization of sterilization is illustrated for both territories. Chapter
consists of data sources, variable lists, basic descriptions of macro and micro variabl
hypotheses, and statistical methods. Chapter VI introduces robust regression models to
examine the effects of contextual variables on fertility behaviors for the 29 provinces of 
China and the 23 counties of Taiwan. Poisson models are used to explore micro-lev
variable effects on children ever born. Sterilization status is analyzed with logistic 
regression. The dependent variab
 Taiwan 
s 
 in 
nt, 
 V 
es, 
 
el 
les (1) macro-level CEB and (2) sterilization rate are 
regressed on the macro-level women’s status indexes. Then, the survival analysis is 
introduced to investigate individual variables on the hazard rate of childbirth from the 
first to the third childbirth. Lastly, multilevel models are used to examine the interactive 
effects of micro-level and macro-level variables in HGLM models for fertility and 
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sterilization. The final chapter, Chapter VII, summarizes the findings and provides 
suggestions for future research. 
The limitations of this dissertation are worth mentioning. The differences in 
fertility and women's status between rural and urban areas should be carefully controlled,
especiall
 
y in China. The 1988 data from China, however, do not offer such information. 
The proxy variable that is substituted is the ratio of agricultural workers; the discrepancy 
between rural and urban areas in opportunities for employment arguably influences how 
women respond in their fertility behaviors. The data of both regimes also fail to provide 
detailed specification of job categories. Despite all these limitations and constraints, the 
findings should contribute important information to the literature on women’s status and 
fertility.
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CHAPTER II 
WOMEN'S STATUS IN CHINA AND TAIWAN  
 
Women’s Status in China 
Like women in other parts of the world, Chinese women traditionally have 
experienced oppressive gender discrimination for many generations. For many 
generations, girls were regarded as inferior to boys. The old Chinese ideas of yin (female) 
and yang (male) highlighted the social hierarchy of men and women. Yang referred to 
good fortune and all that was desirable, while yin referred to the elements of dark and 
evil. Females were viewed as subordinate to males, an ornament to the males’ social 
spectrum. In Mao Zedong’s report on an investigation of the peasant movement in 
Hunan (Mao 1967), he noted that “men in China are usually subjected to the domination 
of three systems of authority: political authority, clan authority, and religious authority. 
As for women, in addition to being dominated by these three systems of authority, they 
are also dominated by men, mainly by the authority of their husbands” (Mao 1967, p. 
28). This discriminatory perception is reflected in a widely known Chinese proverb, “A 
girl without intelligence and talent is one of integrity.”  
The traditional concept of the "three obediences" also can account for this kind of 
subservience. When a girl lives  in the parental home, she must obey her father; when 
she is married, she must obey her husband; and when her husband dies, she must obey 
her son. Men had complete authority over women’s labor, daily activities, use of 
resources, and even their life and death. According to the old Chinese saying, having 
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daughters was like "spilling water on the ground." The female child will be married to 
her husband’s house, she requires a dowry to be married, and she is devoted to serving 
her husband's family. Female infanticide was common. It is not difficult to understand 
why parents were not expected to allocate much of their resources to their daughters for 
education or other useful skills, given those pervasive societal values.  
In the Chinese patrilineal and patriarchal culture, family membership and 
economic cooperation, inheritance of property, lines of authority, and surname-carrying 
were defined to an extraordinary extent by way of males. Marriages were handled by the 
parents through matchmakers. A young couple did not meet until the day of their 
wedding. Marrying well gave dignity and grace to a woman. A woman also acquired 
greater importance in the family through bearing a son. A woman without a son was  
stigmatized by family members and neighbors. Even as she grew older, she did not have 
honor and support (Latourette 1964).  
The cruelest ancient custom regarding women was binding the feet of females. 
This notorious custom not only degraded women’s health, but also restricted them from 
leaving the home and breaking away from their husband’s dominance. 
Since 1949, when the Chinese Communist party (CCP) defeated the ruling 
Nationalist party on the mainland, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), based on 
Marxist principles, claimed to liberate the oppressed masses. Although national interests 
have always overridden gender interests in the PRC, its government opposed the system 
based on traditional sex roles and started to promote women’s social and economic 
status. The first constitution proclaimed that the People’s Republic of China shall 
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eradicate the feudal system that impeded women. It declared that women shall enjoy 
equal rights with men in all spheres of life: political, economic, cultural and social, 
including family life. Men and women shall have the freedom to choose their own 
spouses. This espousal of gender equality has been reiterated in subsequent revisions of 
the constitution. The Marriage Law in 1950 gave the option of divorce for persons in 
arranged marriages, prohibited arranged marriage, bigamy, concubinage, child betrothal, 
and interference with the marriage of widows. At the same time, the Land Reform law 
assured women the ownership of land so as to have financial independence from their 
husbands. Rural women’s status was greatly changed because women became 
independent laborers and household providers. In addition, collective labor enlarged 
rural women’s vision and scope of information and gave them opportunities to be elected 
as model workers and subsequently promoted to administrative levels (Gao 1994). In 
1953, the Electoral Law stipulated that women enjoy the same electoral rights as men. 
The All China Women’s Federation (ACWF) established in 1949 by the CCP was 
charged with the dual responsibilities of implementing government policy on behalf of 
women and with bringing women’s complaints to the various organizations within the 
Party.  By 1953, offices of the Women's Federation had been set up in most of China's 
cities and counties, including some of the minority autonomous areas (Wang 1999). 
Park (1992) points out that women’s emancipation in China has been 
continuously constrained by ideological, historical and developmental factors. During 
the revolutionary period, peasant resistance reduced women’s participation in the 
revolutionary process and led to their exclusion from most leadership positions. 
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Traditional sex-role attitudes continued to be brought to the economic arena, limiting 
women’s employment, training and advancement opportunities (Andors 1983). Appeals 
to the importance of separate spheres for women and men become particularly strong in 
times of economic crisis.  
Women’s political and economic activities were obviously elevated by the 
collectivization policy during the Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) that required the 
mass labor participation of men and women in communes, street industry, and industrial 
management (Yao 1983). During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, 
women’s rights were highlighted, and women were exhorted to participate in politics and 
labor for the national benefit. “Women hold up half the heaven” was a favorite slogan of 
Mao. Under the slogan of “Anything a man can do, a woman can do also,” men and 
women were viewed as unisex. During this period, the belief that women were the same 
as men was emphasized.  
In 1995, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) created a gender-
related development index (GDI) which takes into account gender inequalities. The 
indicators used in the GDI are life expectancy, adult literacy, combined school 
enrollment ratios and real income. China’s ranking in terms of GDI is 79th.  Yet China 
ranked 111 on the UN human development index (HDI) with relatively low incomes per 
capita. So China has relatively small gender inequalities (Tan 1999). China’s ranking on 
the gender empowerment measure (GEM) is 23rd (UNDP 1995). 
Overall, the progress of women’s economic gains is noteworthy. Statistics 
collected shortly after 1949 showed that women were only 7.5% of the total workforce 
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(Davin 1976; Qi 1986). By 1984, however, 36% of the country’s labor force was female 
(NBSC, 1985). Moreover, women stepped into a variety of occupations and professions 
that had formerly been occupied only by men. Women became construction-equipment 
operators, truck drivers and train conductors, lathe operators, metal casters and ship 
repairers (Curtin 1975; Yao 1983). Women began to occupy the administrative ranks, 
gaining positions in communes, factories and even in local and state government (Davin 
1976). The proportion of women in medicine and engineering quickly became higher in 
China than in the United States (Davin 1976). Wage differences between women and 
men declined as well. A major study in the cities of Beijing and Shaoxing (Wolf 1985) 
showed that the gender gap in wages decreased as new cohorts of workers entered the 
labor force. Hsieh and Burgess (1994) note that China is not only one of the leading 
societies regarding female workforce participation, but the earning differential between 
men and women workers is one of the smallest among industrialized societies. 
In 1993, the proportion of women in technical positions working in business and 
institutions across China reached 36.8%. Women engineers and technicians constituted 
35% of the national total (Wu 1997). In 1994, there were 174,000 higher-level women 
professionals in various areas, 17.3 percent of the national total. Intermediate-level 
women professionals, 1.695 million in number, made up 30.4 percent of the national 
total. Andors observes that "in comparison with the position of women in pre-1949 
China, there have been tremendous and positive changes. From a traditional agrarian 
society in which women were commodities and where the predominant female roles 
 
 15
were those of housewife and mother, Chinese women have emerged to play important 
roles in an increasingly diverse and sophisticated economy" (Andors 1983, p. 173). 
It is generally agreed that the labor market operates under the principles of social 
divisions of labor and social hierarchies. In a hierarchical labor market, women's 
employment faces structural restrictions (Redclift and Sinclair 1991). This is called 
gender segregation. This gender segregation can be further classified as horizontal 
segregation (referring to the extent to which men and women are concentrated in 
different jobs and occupations) or vertical segregation (defined as differences in pay, 
skills, status and promotion prospects between men and women within occupations) 
(West 1996).  
Despite the state’s efforts to eliminate gender segregation, it had not been 
entirely eliminated in China in the 1980s. Judging from statistics on ownership sectors 
and industries, women were far more likely than men to be found in collective-run rather 
than state-run enterprises. Figures in Table 2.1 for 1983 show that 50% of collective-run 
employees were women, compared with 32% in the state-run sector (NBSC 1984). 
Industrial distributions of male and female employees obtained from the 10% 
sample of the 1982 census (Beijing Review 1984) indicate that there is gender 
segregation by industry as well. Men constitute 56.3% of the employed population, yet 
they are 79% of the employees in administration. The figures show that 43.7% of the 
total labor force is female, and 48% of the employees in the public health, physical 
culture and social welfare industry are women. In addition, women make up 46.3% of 
agricultural workers and 44.1% of manufacturing employees. Approximately 43% of 
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those in the commerce, catering service, material supply, marketing and storage 
industries are female.  
Segregation of women in employment brings in its wake a subordinate status for 
women both economically and socially. For example, the wage differences are clear 
between state-run and collective-run enterprises (see Table 2.1). In 1988, the average 
yearly earnings in the state-run sector were 1853 yuan compared with 1426 yuan in the 
local-run sector (Annual of Chinese Statistics 1989). In addition, persons in the former 
sector have better housing, a better health-care package, and a better pension system than 
do persons in the latter. In a 1996 urban household survey, Zhao (2002) confirms this 
apparent difference. A higher female-to-male worker ratio is found in collective 
enterprises. The higher proportion of male employees in state-run enterprises is one 
indicator of the unfavorable  economic status of women.  
In the late 1970s, reform in Chinese economy led to the decentralization and 
autonomy of industries, the appearance of private enterprise, and the elimination of the 
“iron rice bowl” (very secure jobs). Strong evidence suggests that wage differentials 
between men and women even worsened during the 1990s, after economic and market 
reforms. A 1999 study showed that Chinese women earned 0.501 of the male wage in 
1991 and 0.418 in 1994 (Maurer-Fazio et al. 1999). Tan (1997) in Women in Social 
Development reports that, overall, women are twice as likely as men to be laid off due to 
a labor surplus. Croll notes that “women have constituted a high proportion of the new 
casual labor force, much of it migrant, contracted to produce electronics, textiles, 
clothing and automobile components for the export market” (1994, p. 123). 
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Table 2.1 Industry Distribution of Female Employees and Average Industry Wages:State-run and 
Local-run Enterprises, 1983. People’s Republic of China. 
 
Industry State-Run   
Local -
Run   
    
Ave. 
Yuan    
Ave. 
Yuan    
 Percent Per Year Percent Per Year  
  Female 
 in 
Industry Female 
 in 
Industry   
Manufacturing, Mining, 
Lumber 32.1 874 50.4 684   
Building, Geological 
Prospecting 33.2 1,023 56.5 844  
Agriculture, Animal 
Husbandry,      
Forestry, Fishing 35.2 713 47.7 555  
Transportation, 
Communication 20.2 959 29.3 787  
Commerce and Trade 37.8 764 59.9 616  
Housing, Public Utilities 37.5 876 47.6 776  
Scientific Research 34.7 986 44.4 757  
Health, Education, 
Culture and      
Social Welfare 38.7 861 44.6 685  
Finance, Insurance 35.4 820 23.2 688  
Government 17.0 927 53.3 696  
Total 32.1 865 50.4 698   
Source: NBSC 1984. Annual of Chinese Statistics, 1983 Pp. 126—129 
   
 
As men head to the cities for higher-paying jobs, labor-intensive, low-paid, 
agricultural work is gradually becoming feminized and regarded as a domestic chore 
(Kelkar and Wang 1997). Croll points to a survey conducted by the ACWF that reports 
75 percent of employers preferred to hire men and sometimes required women 
candidates to pass employment examinations with scores 12 percent higher than their 
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male counterparts (1997, p. 120). Hao and Zhou (1985) report similar discrimination 
against women in entrance requirements for higher education (tertiary institutions). Woo 
(1994) points out that in the 1980s, protective legislation, with its unusually detailed 
restrictions, is a form of “biologization” of women, and can be seen as part of an effort 
during an era of surplus labor to push women out of the work force. 
Compared with the progress made in female employment, the number of women 
who have received higher education is low. The distribution of women who received 
basic education and higher education indicates that gender equality in education is 
inadequate, and gender inequality in educational opportunities is especially serious in 
China. This is true in spite of major campaigns initiated by the CCP in the 1950s and 
1960s to eradicate illiteracy, as part of its commitment to emancipating the masses from 
oppression and ignorance. In the past, 90 percent of women were illiterate, very few 
received opportunities for higher education, and the idea of men being superior and 
women being inferior was prevalent in China's cultural traditions. Until 1949, girls were 
not included in the nation’s educational system. By contrast, in 1992 the percentage of 
girls between seven and eleven attending school was 96.2 percent, and the percentage of 
girls in high school was 43.1 percent (State Council Press Office 1994b). The number of 
women enrolled in higher education has risen rapidly (see Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 for 
provincial comparisons). In 1993, there were 852,000 women undergraduate students 
attending the 1,065 universities and colleges in China, making up 33.6 percent of the  
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Table 2.2 The Number and Proportion of Female College Students in China 1947-88. 
 
Year Number (10 Thousand) Proportion 
1947 2.76 17.8 
1948 - - 
1949 2.32 19.8 
1950 2.94 21.2 
1951 3.51 22.5 
1952 4.54 23.4 
1953 5.47 25.3 
1954 6.77 26.3 
1955 7.58 25.9 
1956 10.04 24.6 
1957 10.33 23.3 
1958 15.37 23.3 
1959 18.33 22.6 
1960 23.56 24.5 
1961 23.35 24.7 
1962 21.03 25.3 
1963 19.38 25.8 
1964 17.63 25.7 
1965 18.13 26.9 
1966 - - 
1967 - - 
1969 - - 
1970 - - 
1971 - - 
1972 - - 
1973 9.65 30.8 
1974 14.52 33.8 
1975 16.33 32.6 
1976 18.65 33.0 
1977 18.16 29.0 
1978 20.65 24.1 
1979 24.57 24.1 
1980 26.81 23.4 
1981 31.24 24.4 
1982 30.54 26.5 
1983 32.49 26.9 
1984 39.98 28.6 
1985 51.06 30.0 
1986 47.90 25.5 
1987 64.70 33.0 
1988 68.94 33.4 
Source: Research Institute of All China Women's Federation. 1991. Statistics on Chinese Women 1949- 
             1989, p. 168  
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Table 2.3 The Number and Proportion of Female College Students by Province 1947-
1988. 
 
Province Number Female Number Percentage 
Total 2065923 694731 33.63 
Beijing 143546 53036 36.95 
Tianjin 63071 22421 35.55 
Hebei 73047 31609 43.27 
Shanxi 49450 19945 40.33 
Neimenggu 32634 13749 42.13 
Liaoning 120510 46388 38.49 
Jilin 72933 27719 38.01 
Heilongjiang 78879 29396 37.27 
Shanghai 128163 45272 35.32 
Jiangsu 147705 42701 28.91 
Zhejiang 60419 19502 32.28 
Anhui 63139 15536 24.61 
Fujian 57059 17946 31.45 
Jiangxi 52152 11742 22.51 
Shandong 101281 31027 30.63 
Henan 79882 26400 33.05 
Hubei 130048 34094 26.22 
Hunan 87297 24325 27.86 
Guangdong 97224 30203 31.07 
Guangxi 37524 12061 32.14 
Hainan 9133 2422 26.52 
Sichuan 140760 45012 31.98 
Guizhou 27264 9630 35.32 
Yunnan 44985 16130 35.86 
Shaanxi 97955 36746 37.51 
Gansu 33039 10295 31.16 
Qinghai 7012 2987 42.60 
Ningxia 7673 2986 38.92 
Xinjiang 30483 13451 44.13 
Source: Research Institute of All China Women's Federation. 1991.Statistics on Chinese Women 1949-1989, p. 169 
  
 
total student enrollment. In the same year, 600 women graduate students were studying 
for a master's degree, 26 percent of the total; and some 300 doctoral students were 
women, or 11 percent of the total. As in a pyramid, women students made up 11 percent 
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of doctoral students, 26 percent master’s degree students, and 33.6 percent of 
undergraduates.  
Despite such impressive gains in educational placement, however, the evidence 
cannot be ignored that girls face greater difficulties gaining access to schooling. 
Increasing dropout rates among school girls, especially in rural areas, may be tied to the 
need for a labor force to replace males who have migrated to cities. Over 71 percent of 
China’s 164 million illiterates are women (SSSB 1997, p. 77), and 80 percent of the 
nearly 3 million unschooled primary-age children are girls (Rai 1993).  Huge differences 
exist between urban areas and the distant poor rural areas; only 11 percent of Beijing 
were designated as illiterate or semi-literate women, but 69 percent of Tibetan women 
and 45 percent of Guizhou women were so classified. 
For centuries, the traditional Chinese family has been basically patrilineal, 
patriarchal, and patrilocal in nature and has played a decisive role in perpetuating male 
dominance, gender inequality, and the exploitation of women. “China’s traditional 
family system was without doubt one of the most brutally patriarchal in the world. The 
legal, economic, physical, and ideological mechanism by which it subordinated women 
has been detailed in many places and needs no repetition” (Greenhalgh 1985). The 
traditional family system emphasizes the importance of the father-son relationship and 
discourages intimacy between husband and wife. Furthermore, the power structure in 
this type of family is characterized by absolute control by the elders, and a young 
daughter-in-law has the lowest status in the family. She is under the direct control of her 
mother-in-law and usually cannot expect any support from her husband when she is 
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mistreated. As China has undertaken its modernization process, however, this situation 
has gradually changed since the beginning of the last century. The changes entail a 
weakening of the traditional ideology and participation of women in the industrial labor 
force. 
To simultaneously achieve rapid industrial development and to control city size, 
in the 1950s the Communist government implemented a high-employment/low-wage 
policy and began to employ the large untapped female labor reserve in the cities. The 
consequent economic independence and indispensable contribution to the family gave 
women increased bargaining power and changed their subordinate position in the family. 
That elevation of women’s status not only changed interpersonal relations in the family, 
but also started to change the traditional patrilocal residence patterns. In recent years, 
more and more young couples choose to live with the wife’s parents, thereby increasing 
the number of stem families. Eighteen percent of young couples who were married 
between 1977 and 1982 chose such a matrilocal residence, as compared with 8% of such 
residence arrangements 30 years before (see Table 2.4).  
Wei Zhangling (1983) cited several dramatic changes that have taken place in 
Chinese families since 1949: (1) Monogamy has come true at last. (2) In cities, arranged 
marriages have shifted to free marriages. (3) Young people tend to marry later. (4) 
Family size is reduced, from extended families to nuclear ones. (5) The equality between 
husbands and wives has improved. (6) Household work is more often shared among 
family members.  
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The controversial one-child family policy implemented by the People’s Republic 
of China in 1979 is one of the most significant programs of planned fertility that China 
has attempted. The one-child policy leads inexorably to disorganization of the traditional 
Chinese family and to promotion of gender equality in China. Hong (1987) forecasts  
 
Table 2.4 Living Arrangements of  Couples, by Wedding Cohort. 
 
Year of Wedding -1937 1938-45 1946-49 1950-53 1954-57 1958-65 1966-76 1977-82 
         
Independent 
household 30.91 40.26 42.12 52.65 57.69 56.30 47.70 32.28 
(Number) (174) (246) (195) (248) (285) (353) (415) (285) 
         
With husband's 
parents 59.86 50.41 48.38 37.37 31.98 28.07 34.94 47.00 
(Number) (337) (308) (224) (176) (158) (176) (304) (415) 
         
With wife's 
parents 8.70 8.67 7.99 7.86 8.50 12.44 14.14 18.23 
(Number) (49) (53) (37) (37) (42) (78) (123) (161) 
         
Other 0.53 0.65 1.51 2.12 1.62 3.19 3.22 2.49 
 (3) (4) (7) (10) (8) (20) (28) (22) 
         
Totals 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 
(Number) (563) (611) (463) (471) (494) (627) (870) (883) 
                  
Source: Five-City Family Survey Research Group. 1985 Five-City Family Survey, p. 318 
 
that the power of patriarchy would dwindle. However, other researchers have focused on 
a broad range of gender issues associated with adverse effects of the one-child policy; 
namely, female infanticide, the increased burden of pregnancy on women, forced 
abortion and sterilization, hazards to women’s health, wife beating and abandonment, 
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loss of status, loss of jobs, diminished wages, and sometimes more severe penalties for 
mothers than for fathers who defy the policy.  
Using data on 1,130 Chinese in Beijing, Chow and Chen (1994) argue that the 
policy has a further unanticipated consequence, quite contrary to official expectations: it 
encourages the privatization of women in domestic labor and reproduction in the home. 
It reinforces, they argue, traditional gender-role relationships in families and strengthens 
the traditional patriarchal-family paradigm. 
In the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the emancipation rhetoric was persistent: 
“Gender equality has been achieved in the PRC.” But, as Edwards (2000) indicates, this 
official monotonous mantra has been joined by a multiplicity of refuting voices that 
recount vastly contradictory and diverse narratives about women’s lives and experiences 
in China. Following the market reforms, an increasing disparity between the sexes in 
economic and political power has clearly widened the gap between the prospects of men 
and women. Engel’s classical Marxist views that seek solutions to gender inequality by 
increasing women's participation in extra-familial productive activities, have in the 
Chinese revolutionary experience been found wanting. Stacy (1983) believes the 
disappointing outcomes came about because Communist leaders were unaware that 
Chinese socialism had its roots in a pro-patriarchal revolution; that is, socialism was 
brought to power by a peasant revolution that sought to restore and rehabilitate the 
traditional Chinese values of family. Johnson (1983) avers that deep beneath the Maoism 
that gave lip service to improving women's status lies the bedrock of Chinese patriarchy. 
Andors (1983) calls this revolution “the unfinished liberation of women” in China. Wolf 
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(1985) blames the failure of gender equality not on the lack of commitment to sexual 
equality by China's leaders, but on the insidiousness of a traditional patriarchal ideology 
that blinded them to the patriarchal bias in their own thinking and policies. Wolf also 
suggests that the current tide of reform that began in the late 1970s has not only swept 
away the ideological commitment to gender quality, but has also relegated women back 
to the traditional roles of good wife and mother. Andors (1983) maintained that the 
decollectivization efforts would hamper social reforms and undermine the ideology of 
equality. Johnson (1983) argues that new reforms may, in actual effect, strengthen the 
family system's control over its division of labor.  
The economic reforms, in reality, have brought conflicting changes. on the one 
hand, women have shared with men some of the benefits of reform, such as higher living 
standards, better economic and career opportunities, and more desirable life styles. on 
the other hand, many women have found a disadvantage in the labor market and a more 
insecure future. In the political field, women's status has definitely worsened. For 
example, the proportion of women representatives in the National People's Congress 
(NPC) and other political institutions began to decline only a few years after the 
economic reforms were launched (Shang 1996). The proportion of women in basic-level 
civil-service cadres has declined sharply, too. Whereas in the 1950s, 70 percent of the 
villages in rural China had at least one woman head or director, in the 1990s only 10 
percent of villages throughout the country have a woman head. In 1993, only about 3.8 
percent of the country's township administrator were women, only 5.9 percent of the 
country's heads, and only 5.8 percent of the municipal managers (Wang 1999). 
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Zhang (1996) documents that women have readily embraced rural reform 
because it provides them a greater sense of autonomy and a more extensive array of 
choices. The government fails, however, to regard women's needs and interests as prime 
policy goals. Additionally, in rural areas, a severe bias exists against providing women 
opportunities for educational advancement. The government officially attributes rural 
women’s disadvantaged position to the so-called “low quality” of female workers during 
the transition to non-agricultural employment in an increasingly competitive labor 
market. The government is thereby obviously shirking its responsibility. It blames the 
victims of sexual prejudice themselves for the social disadvantages they have 
experienced. The strikingly high suicide rates of rural women reflect their stressful life 
circumstances (Phillips 1999; Shiang 1998). Strong and pervasive preferences for sons 
and the heritage of Confucian patriarchal tradition are revealed in the abnormal sex 
ratios at birth (Poston et al. 1997; Kim 1997). For these reasons, the conclusions about 
progress in the status of Chinese women in this vast and varied mainland of China 
should be approached with some trepidation.  
 
Women’s Status in Taiwan 
Taiwan is an immigrant society of China. Since the seventeenth century, 
traditional ideas of Chinese cultural legacy have been the dominant ideology. In 1885, 
Taiwan achieved provincial status in the Ching Dynasty. Between 1895 and 1945, 
Taiwan was a colony of Japan. Thus, the Taiwanese gender system was influenced by 
both Chinese Confucianism and Japanese male chauvinism. During half a century of 
 
 27
colonial rule, the Japanese custom that men be well attended by women, while women 
should submit to men’s domination, was transplanted into Taiwanese families. The 
husbands were masters of the family, while their wives were nothing but housemaids. 
Hence, before World War II, Taiwanese women’s status was pretty much the same as in 
China, as described above.  
The status of Taiwanese women experienced a change when the society moved 
from agriculture to secondary and tertiary industries in the 1960s and 1970s (Coombs 
and Sun 1981). That transition opened more work opportunities for females on this small 
island. With exposure to Western cultures (especially American), new ideas about sexual 
equality began to spread. In Taiwan, as in most countries, it became established that girls 
should go to school. Parents now encourage their daughters to participate in the labor 
force before they marry. During this development process, Taiwanese women joined the 
labor force and reduced their fertility. As the female participation rate increased, female 
marriage at first age and the crude birth rate showed a declining trend (see Table 2.5).  
Ku Yenlin (1988) notes that when the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, “in 
order to counter the drastic social and political changes on the mainland, it took upon 
itself the role of maintaining tradition and tightening social control” (1988, p. 180). 
When martial law was proclaimed in 1948 (not to be lifted until 1987), restrictions were 
placed on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such that virtually all women’s 
groups either were government-controlled, such as the Chinese Women’s Anti-
Communist Aggression League founded in 1950 by Madame Chiang Kai-shek, or were 
local branches of conservative international organizations such as the YWCA, the Zonta 
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Club, and the Taipei Jaycettes (Chiang and Ku 1985).  
 
Table 2.5 Yearly Participation Rate of Both Sexes in Labor Force of Taiwan. 
 
Year  Total Male Female 
1951 67.56  89.97  42.12  
1956 63.10  88.00  37.50  
1961 61.75  86.37  35.81  
1966 57.23  81.37  32.63  
1971 57.07  78.35  35.37  
1977 58.67  77.79  39.27  
1978 58.76  77.79  39.13  
1979 58.73  77.95  39.23  
1980 58.26  77.11  39.25  
1981 57.82  76.78  38.76  
1982 57.93  76.47  39.30  
1983 59.26  76.36  42.12  
1984 59.72  76.11  43.30  
1985 59.49  75.47  43.46  
1986 60.37  75.15  45.51  
1987 60.93  75.24  46.54  
1988 60.21  74.83  45.56  
1989 60.12  74.84  45.35  
1990 59.24  73.96  44.50  
1991 59.11  73.80  44.39  
1992 59.34  73.78  44.83  
1993 58.82  72.67  44.89  
1994 58.96  72.44  45.40  
Source: EYRC 1994a. (abridged) Annual Report of Labor Statistics 
 
In a continuation of previous ROC policy on the mainland, women’s status was 
declared to be equal to that of men, based on the 1947 Constitution: “All citizens of the 
republic of China, irrespective of sex, religion, race, class or party affiliation, shall be 
equal before the law.” A nine-year compulsory education ensures equal educational 
opportunities for boys and girls between the ages of six and fifteen. The Labor Standards 
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Law, passed in 1984, forbids discrimination against any worker on the basis of sex. 
Special protection for women’s political rights, motherhood, and family is further 
specified in the Constitution.  
While their roles were seen to be complementary to those of men, women were 
expected to contribute to the stability and prosperity of Taiwanese society in their roles 
as wives, mothers, and volunteer workers. In the 1960s, young women and female 
graduates of elementary and junior high school were encouraged by the government to 
enter the work force, helping to fuel economic expansion (Gallin 1984). This economic 
prosperity in turn contributed to the growth of a new urban middle class in the 1970s, 
and government rhetoric once again valorized the wife and mother roles as the proper 
sphere of women (Diamond 1973). Rather than being the result of conscious 
interventionist social planning or agitation by Taiwan’s women’s movement, 
improvements of women’s status in Taiwan have been the inadvertent results of the 
general rise for all Taiwanese in their standard of living and their participation in the 
political arena. This is in direct contrast to China’s revolutionist style promoted by the 
PRC government.  
The economic achievement of Taiwanese women is clear. Taiwan’s shift in 
economic strategy from a labor-intensive (1965-1973) to a capital-intensive (after 1973) 
production had a significant impact on women’s employment. Table 2.6 presents data on 
the occupational distribution of men and women over time. Between 1966 and 1986, the 
percentage distribution of men’s and women’s employment across various occupations 
was similar. Not only was the relative concentration of their employment across 
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occupations the same, but the magnitude of the percentage distribution was not very 
different in many occupational categories in the earlier period. Thus, for both men and 
women, the most dominant occupation in the first decade (1966-76) was agricultural 
work, followed by production work. About half of the total number employed males (44 
percent) and females (47 percent) in the early stage of industrialization worked in 
agriculture-related jobs. This proportion, however, has declined consistently since then. 
In 1993, it reached a level of less than one-fifth. on the other hand, during the same 
period, the proportions of men and women in production work increased. For males, 
they increased from 29 percent of total employed males in 1971 to 43 percent in 1986. 
Similarly, for women the increase was from 17 percent in 1971 to 36 percent in 1986. In 
1993, however, women--but not men--showed a significant movement from production 
work to other occupational categories. 
As a consequence of the shift in Taiwan to a capital-intensive economy, 
differences in the occupational distribution of men and women became more pronounced 
by 1986. Two types of differences are observed. First, a different concentration of male 
and female employment is seen across occupations. Although production work replaced 
agricultural work as the dominant occupation for both sexes in 1986, clerical work was 
the second largest occupation for women (18 percent), followed by agriculture (14  
percent) and sales (14 percent). For men, the second largest employment was 
agricultural work (19 percent), followed by sales (13 percent) and clerical (11 percent). 
Agriculture did not appear to retain its capacity to absorb surplus female agricultural 
labor. On the contrary, the urban economy, with its expanding clerical work, provided 
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the major source of employment for the younger female cohorts. This type of 
employment, however, is beyond the access of the agricultural surplus labor of the older 
generation. Taken together, these results suggest that older female surplus agricultural 
labor may either become unpaid family labor or go into the informal sector, which is part 
of the reserve army of industrial workers. This suggestion complements the findings of 
some anthropological studies (e.g., Gallin 1984). 
The second difference is with regard to gender differences at the other end of the 
occupational hierarchy, that is, the professional and administrative positions. For both 
sexes, the percentage of administrators consistently declined, while that of professionals 
slowly increased. The rate of increase among female professionals (17 percent), however, 
was much smaller than among males (31 percent). Conversely for administrative jobs, 
the rate of decrease for females (85 percent) was much greater than for males (72 
percent)-- in spite of a minor increase in 1993. In other words, for the upper end of the 
hierarchy, as industrialization proceeded the gender gap in status appeared to have 
widened. 
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Table 2.6 Distribution of Female and Male Workers by Occupations in Taiwan, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981, 1986, 1993 (in 
percent). 
          Men Workers Employed       
         Profes- Admini-   Transport,
           
           
sional, strative, Communi
Year Technical  Managerial  Clerical Sales Services Agriculture Mining cation Production Total 
1966 4.55 4.40 7.30 10.42 5.08 42.37 1.59 4.06 20.22 99.99
1971           
           
          
          
          
 
3.93 4.10 6.46 11.89 4.33 33.53 2.13 4.70 28.94 100.01
1976 4.99 3.11 7.86 11.87 5.17 28.75 ---- ---- 38.26 100.01
1981 5.24 1.24 11.22 12.90 6.56 19.69 ---- ---- 43.14 99.99
1986 5.97 1.24 11.20 13.32 7.11 18.52 ---- ---- 42.63 99.99
1993
 
7.42
 
1.40
 
12.07
 
 15.04
 
7.77
 
13.81
 
---- ----
 
42.50
 
100.00
 
      Women Workers Employed 
   
   
1966        5.75 1.42 6.08 12.38 9.76 46.60 0.29 1.15 16.57 100.00
1971           
          
          
          
          
           
4.55 0.87 7.1 13.31 7.85 37.21 0.40 0.97 27.73 99.99
1976 5.67 0.55 11.92 11.65 6.53 29.36 ---- ---- 34.31 99.99
1981 6.29 0.18 17.53 12.81 9.30 16.40 ---- ---- 37.48 99.99
1986 6.73 0.21 18.00 13.67 10.99 14.22 36.17 99.99
1993 8.96 0.28 23.93 15.65 13.25 9.33 ---- ---- 28.59 100.00
Source: EYRC. 1994a. Annual Report of Labor Statistics 
 
                
 
 
Table 2.7 Distribution of Ratio of Female and Male Workers to Total Employed, by Occupations in Taiwan, 1966, 1971, 
1976,  1981, 1986, 1993 (in percent) 
 
        Ratio of Men Workers to Total Employed       
       Profes- Admini-    Transport,
           
           
sional, strative, Communi
Year Technical  Managerial  Clerical Sales Services  Agriculture Mining cation Production Total 
1966 68.13 89.33 76.42 69.44 58.40 71.05 93.68 90.48 76.72 72.97
1971           
           
           
           
           
           
65.22 91.1 66.43 66.01 54.55 66.22 92.03 91.33 69.42 68.51
1976 65.22 92.31 58.49 68.50 62.81 67.64 ---- ---- 70.42 68.10
1981 62.47 93.22 56.13 66.82 58.52 70.59 ---- ---- 69.71 66.66
1986 59.50 90.91 50.75 61.73 51.73 68.32 ---- ---- 66.12 62.35
1993 58.02 89.29 45.73 61.60 49.47 71.18 ---- ---- 71.28 62.55
        
          
Ratio of Women Workers to Total 
Employed 
 1966 31.87 10.67 23.58 30.56 41.60 28.95 6.32 9.52 23.28 27.03
1971           
           
           
           
           
           
34.78 8.90 33.57 33.99 45.45 33.78 7.97 8.67 30.58 31.49
1976 34.78 7.69 41.51 31.50 37.19 32.36 ---- ---- 29.58 31.90
1981 37.53 6.78 43.87 33.18 41.48 29.41 ---- ---- 30.29 33.34
1986 40.50 9.09 49.25 38.27 48.27 31.68 ---- ---- 33.88 37.65
1993 41.98 10.71 54.27 38.40 50.53 28.82 ---- ---- 28.72 37.45
Source: EYRC. 1994a. Annual Report of Labor Statistics          
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As the other indicator of gender gap in occupational attainment, the sex 
composition of occupations is shown in Table 2.7. This variable can be used to assess 
the validity of predictions by female marginalization theories about feminization of 
marginal occupations. Several points are worthy of attention. Overall, in the past two 
decades, there was a significant increase (11 percent) in the visibility of females in the 
production system. From 1966 to 1993, the percentage of females to total employed 
increased from 27 percent to 37 percent. Among all occupations, the increase was 
greatest among clerical workers, where the ratio of females to total employed increased 
from 24 percent in 1966 to 54 percent in 1993. The magnitude of this increase was more 
than twice that of the increase of women in the workplace. Most of the remaining fields 
experienced 10 percent gains, except for the gradual leveling to the 1966 standard in 
administrators and managers, and the clear shrinkage in production in the 1990s. The 
only occupation in which women experienced a decline was agriculture. The 
occupational category of administrators and managers, however, is still segregated by 
sex to a high degree. Women are therefore underrepresented in that important part of the 
occupational system. 
In reviewing women’s labor history in Taiwan, Wang (1994) finds that although 
women improved their labor participation rate to 45%, they still lag behind the female 
participation rates of western countries, as well as of Japan (50.7%). There are both 
structural and legal drawbacks associated with female employment. Married women tend 
to withdraw from the labor force after marriage and after childbirth (refer to Table 2.8). 
The labor participation rate for married women with children under six years old is 43%. 
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In view of an average participation rate of 60 percent for such women in western 
countries, insufficient daycare in Taiwan could be one factor contributing to this  
discrepancy. Throughout various family life cycles, women often sacrifice employment 
opportunities in order to manage the double challenge of family and work.  Several 
studies in Taiwan have confirmed such a pattern of conforming to social norms. The 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting, Statistics, Executive Yuan (1991) reports 
that 30.3% of married women age 15-64 left jobs for marriage. Yi and Chien (2001) 
found continuous employment is just 43.7% for married Taiwanese women. 
Wage differentials between men and women in Taiwan have been documented 
by numerous studies. Table 2.9 compares the difference of industry distribution and 
salary by gender. In 1989, the average salary of women with a high school education 
was 66 percent of that of men with the same educational achievement. At the junior 
college level and beyond, the average salary of women was 69 percent of that of men. 
Tseng (2001) finds that average incomes of males in 1982, 1992, and 2000 exceeded that 
of females by, respectively, 30%, 31% and 27%. He further argues that occupational 
segregation is the most important factor accounting for this discrepancy. Liao and Cheng 
(1985) found, moreover, that discrepancies in pay between the sexes are larger in private 
industry than in government employment. Lin’s (1988) study further indicates that 
unequal pay for equal work directly contributed to the wage differential by sex. Tam 
(1996) finds in the 1991 Taiwan Social Survey that a large part of the gender gap 
appears to have resulted from gender differences in constraints associated with family 
roles. Discriminatory treatment against women in promotion, salary increases, and 
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provision of in-service training is significantly more frequently and seriously perceived 
by women than by men (Yu 1991). 
 
 
Table 2.8 Yearly Married Women Labor Participation Rate in Taiwan Unit: %. 
 
Year Average 
with 
Children 
over 18 
years old 
with 
Children 
6~17 
years old 
with 
Children 
under 6 
years old No Children 
1979 31.72 21.98 39.16 28.73 43.01 
1980 33.23 23.52 43.90 28.91 39.10 
1981 31.42 22.15 39.93 28.26 39.30 
1982 31.51 21.91 40.02 28.99 41.12 
1983 35.53 25.24 43.68 33.40 48.89 
1984 38.74 27.06 47.82 37.34 50.88 
1985 39.84 27.92 49.06 38.99 48.64 
1986 41.82 29.88 51.71 40.55 50.62 
1987 43.74 30.45 54.18 42.95 56.75 
1988 42.66 30.15 52.20 42.40 56.49 
1989 43.65 30.00 53.54 44.64 54.79 
1990 42.49 29.14 52.06 43.70 55.21 
1991 44.00 32.02 52.56 44.36 60.45 
1992 43.23 30.28 54.25 42.30 58.24 
1993 44.39 31.32 55.76 42.99 59.72 
Source: EYRC. 1994b. Human Power Investigation of the Republic of China. 
                
 
Table 2.9 The Comparison of Size and Salary of Female and Male Workers by Industry in 
the Taiwan, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990, 1991. 
 
Industry Male 
(Thousan
d) (1) 
Female  
(Thousand)  
(2) 
%      
(2)/(1)
Male 
Salary (NT 
Dollar) (3) 
Female 
Salary (NT 
Dollar)     (4) 
%           
(4)/(3) 
Total       
1975 1022 755 73.9 22754 12545 55.1 
1980 1733 1395 80.5 62792 39806 63.4 
1985 2078 1744 83.9 110292 71920 65.2 
1990 2082 1725 82.9 185438 125377 67.6 
1991 2045 1697 83.0 204160 139395 68.3 
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Table 2.9 (Continued) 
 
Industry Male 
(Thousan
d) (1) 
Female  
(Thousand)  
(2) 
%      
(2)/(1)
Male 
Salary (NT 
Dollar) (3) 
Female 
Salary (NT 
Dollar)     (4) 
%           
(4)/(3) 
Mining and 
Quarrying           
1975 56 8 14.3 5582 2174 38.9 
1980 41 8 19.5 12699 5835 45.9 
1985 28 5 17.9 17524 9022 51.5 
1990 16 3 18.8 28094 15020 53.5 
1991 15 3 20.0 30523 16932 55.5 
Manufacturing           
1975 730 671 91.9  -  -  - 
1980 1003 993 99.0  -  -  - 
1985 1283 1176 91.7 15402 9762 63.4 
1990 1239 1021 82.4 26941 16395 60.9 
1991 1204 982 81.6 29904 18119 60.6 
Commerce           
1975  -  -  -  -  -  - 
1980 303 201 66.3 11203 5760 51.4 
1985 336 296 88.1 16595 10242 61.7 
1990 374 356 95.2 27459 19075 69.5 
1991 369 361 97.8 29535 20947 70.9 
Transport, Storage, Communication     
1975 163 38 23.3 5815 4589 78.9 
1980 199 54 27.1 11579 8610 74.4 
1985 207 58 28.0 18532 14058 75.9 
1990 205 61 29.8 30531 24336 79.7 
1991 205 60 29.3 35099 28497 81.2 
Services       
1975 73 38 52.1 11348 5982 52.7 
1980 96 54 56.3 16559 10492 63.4 
1985 112 58 51.8 26353 17628 66.9 
1990 134 61 45.5 43884 30855 70.3 
1991 138 60 43.5 47496 33096 69.7 
Public, Social Administrations     
1975  -  -  -  -  -  
1980 91 87 95.6 10752 9109 84.7 
1985 110 124 112.7 13886 11208 80.7 
1990 114 144 126.3 28527 19693 69.0 
1991 114 146 128.1 31603 21874 69.2 
Source: EYRC. 1993. Taiwan Human Resource Report.  
 .   
 
 
 38
Even as women entered the paid labor force their status in the family did not 
seem to change. Lu's (1981) in-depth interviews of 58 women in  three rural 
communities found that the women's participation in the industrial labor force was not 
accompanied by a significant change in their family status and roles nor in the family's 
adjustment to the women's employment. Gallin (1982) established that daughters who 
turned in a good portion of their wages to their natal families did not win equal 
opportunity because most of them lacked skills and knowledge that would have enabled 
them to have alternatives to the traditional arrangement of marriage and family. Gallin 
concluded that development in Taiwan changed neither the cultural definitions of male 
and female roles nor the structure of status and authority within the family. Kung (1983) 
analyzed the effects of women's work on their position and self-image and concluded 
that while working does allow women physical mobility and provide money for better 
clothing and recreational activities, new economic roles do not evolve into higher 
familial status. 
Notwithstanding the misgivings pinpointed by the research reviewed thus far, 
there are still positive signs for women’s status in Taiwan. From the life-course 
perspective, in her research on women’s status since 1958, Margery Wolf (1972) wrote 
that in rural Taiwan crucial differences were observed in the status of Chinese women as 
a function of a woman’s position in the life cycle. If a woman had sons who remained at 
home with their wives, she occupied a key role in the extended family, influencing many 
household decisions. Sung, an anthropologist who conducted fieldwork in northern 
Taiwan between 1972 and 1981, discovered that Taiwanese women in the rural areas 
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were not powerless by any means (Sung 1983). Li (1987) compared results of sex-role 
scales from different cohorts of college students in Taiwan and argued that 
psychologically recent cohorts of Taiwanese women generally had more masculine 
qualities than Taiwanese women previous to the recent major social change. Tong and 
Zeng (1990) examined married women from one city area and one rural area in Taiwan 
and concluded that married women’s working status also makes them more inclined to 
be nontraditional. Yao (1987) studied 341 women in fourteen Taiwanese villages and 
found that attitudes and the household division of labor had become more egalitarian. 
Nonetheless, even while women’s levels of education and employment have increased 
concurrently with attitudinal changes, most household tasks continue to be performed by 
women.  
Hu (1985) reasoned that as a result of rural industrialization, the male family 
head has less control over the younger generation that is engaged in industrial work. 
Further, in all types of families, daughters and daughters-in-law now enjoy more 
autonomy, whereas the status of mothers-in-law has become lower. Young women's 
status has substantially improved in at least two regards. First, a young working woman's 
parents now usually transfer into the young woman’s dowry the full bride price from the 
husband’s side. thereby giving them extra money to raise the young woman’s marriage 
status.  Second, married daughters maintain closer ritual relations with their natal 
families: in research on  urban women, Tsui (1985) focused on parents’ investment in 
their children's education, as well as on the subsequent role changes of highly educated 
working women in relation to their families. She concluded that women improved their 
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positions in the family by continuing an economic relationship with their natal families 
after marriage. 
Examining data from several surveys from 1965 to 1986 focusing on female 
respondents, and analyzing household registration data and census data from 1905 to 
1990, Thornton and Lin (1994) inferred that changes in traditional Taiwanese familial 
attitudes were coming about because women were changing their models of 
interpersonal organization from a familial model toward a nonfamilial model. The crude 
Taiwanese divorce rate in 1988 was 1.3, very close to the Japanese divorce rate of 1.2. 
Both of these rates appear to be higher than others of East Asia. Over the time spans 
studied, Thornton and Lin identified trends toward reduced fertility preferences, 
movement away from arranged marriages toward love matches, increased sexual 
intimacy before marriage, increased premarital pregnancy, and an increasing potential 
for remaining single.  
Despite social changes, co-residence of a married couple with the husband’s 
parents has continued to be an important aspect of family life, according to Weinstein 
and associates (1990). Chien and Yi (2001) report that living arrangements for married 
Taiwanese women are as follows: always nuclear (36.4%), always paternal stem family 
(24.3%), always paternal extended family (9.4%), divided between stem and nuclear 
family (11.9%), and divided between extended and nuclear family (5.3%).  A decade 
before, Coombs and Sun (1981) and Chang (1986) found that attitudes about children 
supporting their parents in old age lagged behind other attitude changes. Patrilineal and 
patrilocal living arrangements still prevail in Taiwan. In general, the older the marriage 
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cohort, the more likely a married woman would live with her husband's parents at the 
time of marriage. Among married women who had lived with parents-in-law since 
marriage, the duration of co-residence has tended to decrease over time (refer to Table 
2.10). The traditional filial obligations can be fulfilled during the period of co-residence, 
while the benefits of nuclear family living can be enjoyed during the remainder of the 
lifetime. This new form of adjustment maintains certain aspects of traditional values 
without a lifetime commitment to the extended family system. It is a rational and 
practical response to a rapidly changing social world. 
Yi and Lu (1996) review the past thirty years of research on sex-role attitudes 
and conclude that women are now accepted as having working roles outside the home 
and are entitled to look for their own careers; however, when they come home, they 
expect and are expected to be good at taking care of their families. It is clear that 
nontraditional sex role attitudes do not fully spill over into the family system, the main 
stage of the male-dominated world within the Confucian values framework.  
Female work patterns in Taiwan in terms of formal versus informal employment 
are determined by family organization rather than by market conditions, according to Lu 
(1994) who  examined female marginalization in Taiwan. Women from families with 
small businesses, especially from families who have young children, are more likely to 
undertake informal rather than formal employment. In part, this is due to the division of 
labor in the family by sex. This arrangement is also likely because of the prevalence of 
small family businesses in Taiwan.  Accordingly, these work patterns are not produced 
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by exclusion of women from capitalistic production work. The plight of modern working 
women continues in Taiwan: they must balance family responsibilities and their careers. 
 
 
Table 2.10 Percent of Couples Who Have Lived with Parents after Marriage by Marriage 
Cohorts for Married Women Aged 15 to 49 in Taiwan, 1985. 
   
      Marriage Cohorts      
Year 81-85 76-80 71-75 66-70 61-65 Prior 1961  
1. Wife's Parents            
Total 611 645 478 372 284 233  
Yes 96.0 96.6 39.9 28.3 39.3 39.3  
No 4.0 3.4 40.0 29.0 41.1 41.1  
2. Husband's Parents          
Total 611 645 478 372 284 233  
Yes 23.4 26.2 26.9 21.2 18.0 15.0  
No 76.6 73.8 73.1 78.8 82.0 85.0  
3. Months of Co-residence *      
 1-6 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  
 7-12 84.4 92.9 93.4 94.6 97.2 99.0  
 13-18 72.2 87.7 88.8 90.7 94.8 97.0  
 19-24 59.9 84.0 85.5 88.1 92.7 96.6  
 25-30 47.9 79.8 81.1 83.3 90.0 93.1  
 31-36 36.9 77.3 79.7 81.9 88.6 91.4  
 37-42 26.1 72.5 75.4 77.1 86.0 87.8  
 43-48 19.2 70.5 74.4 76.4 85.1 86.9  
 49-54 12.4 65.9 71.7 75.0 83.9 85.5  
 55-59 8.6 63.4 70.6 74.7 83.4 84.9  
60+ 7.8 61.9 69.6 74.2 82.9 84.2  
Source: EYRC. 1985a. Taiwan Labor Force Survey  
     
*Percent of couples who still lived with the husband's parents at the end of six  
months after marriage.      
 
Formal education in Taiwan was initiated by the Japanese colonial empire and 
later expanded by the Nationalist government. During Japanese rule (1895-1945), the 
proportion of school-aged girls enrolling in elementary schools increased from 1.02 
percent in 1908 to 61.0 percent in 1943, and the corresponding increase for boys was 8.2 
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percent to 80.7 percent (Yu 1988, p. 286). Statistics from 1974 indicate that 20 percent 
of women were illiterate, compared with 7.25 percent of men; that 73.24 percent of 
women received elementary education or less, compared with 59.74 percent of men; and 
that 3.32 percent of women received a college education or above, compared with 6.89 
percent of men.  
Since World War II, and especially since the 1960s, Taiwan has experienced 
extraordinary economic growth and social change, including a considerable expansion of 
its educational system. According to educational statistics of the Republic of China in 
1987, the ratios of female to male students in elementary schools, secondary schools, 
and colleges were 1:1.05, 1:1.07 and 1:1.36, respectively. The enrollment rate for girls 
aged 6-11 rose from 68.6 percent in 1951 to 99.9 percent in 1989, when it reached the 
same level as the enrollment rate for boys (Ministry of Education 1990, p. 28). An 
increase in net enrollment rates for females in secondary education is also seen. In the 
academic year 1988-89, the enrollment rate for females aged 12-17 was 84.6 percent, 
which was higher than that for males of the same age (81.3 percent). Among the group 
aged 18-21, the enrollment rate for women (9.0 percent) was approximately the same as 
that for men (15.9 percent) in that same year (Ministry of Education 1990, p. 32). In 
terms of educational attainment, Table 2.11 informs us that the discrepancy across 
gender has been eliminated. The goal of equal educational opportunity seems to have 
been achieved. 
A general picture of gender differences in educational attainment in Taiwan is 
seen in Table 2.12 (Tsai et al. 1994), which reports the mean years of schooling  
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Table 2.11 Educational Attainment of Population Aged 6 and over (%). 
 
  1980 1985 1990 1993 
 Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female 
First Level 
(6-11 years) 50.64 48.27 43.59 44.93 36.11 38.98 31.18 34.19 
Second Level 
(12-17 years) 29.72 18.07 37.08 26.32 44.33 35.53 48.01 40.79 
Third Level  
(18-21 years) 11.11 5.32 13.26 7.24 15.05 9.43 16.90 11.39 
Source: EYRC. 1997. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1997. 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.12 Mean Years of Schooling, by Gender, Cohort, and Ethnicity (N= 2, 866). 
 
     Ethnicity     
 
Year of Birth  Hokkien Hakka Mainlander Total 
Men (n =1477)      
1927-44  7.71 7.14 9.81 7.91 
1945-55  9.73 10.73 14.08 10.2 
1956-71  11.6 12.13 12.67 11.78 
Total  10.05 9.96 12.12 10.28 
Women (n= 1,389)     
1927-44  4.38 4.09 9.9 4.87 
1945-55  8.2 8.68 12.48 8.73 
1956-71  10.8 12.09 12.58 11.09 
Total  8.58 8.98 11.99 8.97 
Source: Tsai, Shu-Ling, Hill Gates, and Hei-Yuan Chiu. 1994. 
 
 
completed by men and women. The average level of education attained by women is 
lower than that of men, irrespective of ethnicity and cohort. But, the gender gap declines 
across cohorts because education has been expanded over the years. Furthermore, in the 
youngest cohort examined, differences in average years of schooling between men and 
women are no longer statistically significant among both the Hakkas and the 
Mainlanders, whereas a gender difference is still obvious among the Hokkien. Luoh 
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(2001), using data from the 1990 census, confirms that there is still an ethnic group 
difference and that gender differences within ethnic groups still persist. In the 1960 
cohort, however, there is no difference by gender for the probability of entering college.  
Politics in Taiwan, as in many other societies, is almost exclusively a male 
domain. Still, participation of women in politics has increased in all levels of public 
office, and especially in high-ranking government positions. Taiwan has made 
impressive strides toward increasing women's representation in all its legislative bodies 
(now in the 15 to 20 percent range) thanks to the reserved seats system, which is based 
on the provision in the 1947 Constitution that "reserves" about 10 percent of legislative 
seats for women (Lee 2000). Recently, local women's organizations and associations for 
various purposes have emerged, indicating a rapid rise in women's social participation. 
However, these groups are primarily populated by well-educated women with white-
collar jobs and/or by middle-class housewives. Only one association, the Women’s New 
Awakenings Foundation, openly promotes feminism. In 1972, Lu Hsiu-lien (Annete Lu, 
currently the Vice President of Taiwan) launched the feminist movement in Taiwan, 
contrary to the KMT ruling party's policy on women, which aimed at preserving the 
patriarchal tradition. 
 
The Comparison between Taiwan and China 
Taiwan and China are viewed as possessing similar cultural traditions but 
different political and social systems. In 1971, Taiwan faced a significant decline in its 
international position when its seat as “China” within the United Nations passed to the 
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People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. As a result, we cannot directly 
compare them based on the Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender 
Empowerment Measure (GEM) of the United Nations. Yao (1983) emphasized the 
sharply different expectations between the two societies regarding women’s roles. 
Whereas women in mainland China were expected to live up to their potential by 
contributing their share to socialist construction, young women in Taiwan were educated 
to place their families before careers. Therefore, Taiwan tends to have a more traditional 
family pattern, and women have a more inferior status than in mainland China. Meng 
(2000) compares the effects of institutions and culture on the economic position of 
women in the PRC and Taiwan. She finds that the proportion of the female-male wage 
gap attributed to discrimination is much larger in Taiwan than in the PRC. She argues 
that the promotion of gender equity in the PRC’s socialist period has been very effective. 
Hsieh and Burgess (1994) found that college students in the PRC expressed more 
egalitarian attitudes towards the importance of the wife’s career and husband-wife role 
alterations, while students in Taiwan care more about institutionalized equality. 
However, they believe China is destined to deteriorate after economic reform. Taiwan 
has moved more toward the progressive way. Yi and associates (2000), compared 
women’s family status in Tianjin, a northern metropolis in China, and in Taiwan. They, 
too, found that Tianjin couples possess stronger concepts of gender egalitarianism than 
their Taiwanese counterparts.  
In term of laws and regulations to protect women, China overshadows Taiwan. In 
China, for example, three recently passed laws ensuring Chinese women’s rights and 
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interests are the Provisional Regulations for Health Care for Women Employees (known 
as the 1986 Health Care Regulations), the Regulations Governing Labor Protection for 
Female Staff Members and Workers (known as the 1988 Labor Protection Regulations), 
and the 1992 Law on Protection of Rights and Interests of Women. In Taiwan, on the 
other hand, in spite of several codes about the protection of women, there are no such 
laws dispersed in Labor Standard Law that specifically provide for the protection of 
women.  
Regarding the division of household labor, in China, even though women still 
perform 66% of household labor, men's participation in housework is common, (Skinner 
and Meredith 1998). Chinese husbands have shown a greater degree of equal sharing in 
housework than have husbands in Russia, Czechoslovakia, France, the United States, 
Great Britain, Japan, and Hong Kong (Greer 1992; Wang and Li 1982; Bonney et al. 
1992; Xuewen et al. 1992). The majority of wives and husbands perceived fairness in 
their division of housework (Zuo and Bian 2001). However, Sanchez (1994) studied the 
results of  the International Value of Children surveys conducted in 1975 and 1977, 
comparing husbands’ housework participation internationally. In hours of husband 
sharing housework, Taiwan slightly outranks the Sundanese of West Java, Indonesia, a 
Muslim area, and lags behind Japan, the Philippines, South Korea and the United States. 
Hu and Kamo (2003) could not find an association between women’s economic 
resources and their share of housework in the 1995-1996 Taiwan Social Survey. Judging 
from my personal experiences in contact with people from mainland China, I have found 
that most married men from China can and will cook meals for his family, but men from 
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Taiwan will not. Married men from China always say to me that Taiwanese men are 
more blessed than they. While rapid economic growth in the past three decades in 
Taiwan has improved women's socioeconomic status, gender biases based on traditional 
value systems still tend to prevail in attitudes toward gender roles at work and in family 
life. 
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CHAPTER III 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION IN TAIWAN AND CHINA 
 
China  
Since the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China has 
experienced a dramatic change in its fertility. Over the 40 years from 1949 to 1989, 
China doubled its population but, at the same time, experienced a 50% reduction in both 
the crude birth rate (CBR) and the total fertility rate. China’s population has grown from 
542 million in 1949 to 1.3 billion in 2001 (Table 3.1), with an annual average population 
growth rate of 1.63% during these fifty years. The process is a demographic outcome of 
two baby booms with two significant reductions in the CBR, and a gradual decline in the 
CDR (Crude Death Rate). The first baby boom transpired during the period of 1949 to 
1958. In this period, the CBR was as high as 37 per thousand while the CDR decreased 
continuously from 20 per thousand to 10.8 per thousand. As a result, within a decade 
China experienced a net increase of more than a hundred million people in its total 
population within a decade. Following the first baby boom, the first significant reduction 
in the CBR occurred, declining from 29.2 per thousand in 1958 to 18.0 per thousand in 
1961. This reduction in fertility, accompanied by an increase in the CDR, resulted in a 
decline in China’s population, from 672 million in 1959 to 662 million in 1960 and 659 
million in 1961. The three-year famine, caused in part by natural disasters and partly by 
the government’s economic failures, was the major contributor to the decline in the size  
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Table 3.1 Population Size and Vital Rates of China, 1949-1988. 
 
Year 
Total Population  Total Fertility Rate 
  CBR 
  
CDR NIR 
 (Million)    (Per Thousand)  
1949 541.67 - 36.00 20.00 16.00 
1950 551.96 5.81 37.00 18.00 19.00 
1951 563.00 5.70 37.80 17.80 20.00 
1952 574.82 6.47 37.00 17.00 20.00 
1953 587.96 6.05 37.00 14.00 23.00 
1954 602.66 6.28 37.97 13.18 24.79 
1955 614.65 6.26 32.60 12.28 20.32 
1956 628.28 5.85 31.90 11.40 20.50 
1957 646.53 6.41 34.03 10.80 23.23 
1958 659.94 5.68 29.22 11.98 17.24 
1959 672.07 4.30 24.78 14.59 10.19 
1960 662.07 4.02 20.86 25.43 -4.57 
1961 658.59 3.29 18.02 14.24 3.78 
1962 672.95 6.02 37.01 10.02 26.99 
1963 691.72 7.50 43.37 10.04 33.33 
1964 704.99 6.18 39.14 11.50 27.64 
1965 725.38 6.08 37.88 9.50 28.38 
1966 745.42 6.26 35.05 8.83 26.22 
1967 763.68 5.31 33.96 8.43 25.53 
1968 785.34 6.45 35.59 8.21 27.38 
1969 806.71 5.72 34.11 8.03 26.08 
1970 829.92 5.81 33.43 7.60 25.83 
1971 852.29 5.44 30.65 7.32 23.33 
1972 871.77 4.98 29.77 7.61 22.16 
1973 892.11 4.54 27.93 7.04 20.89 
1974 908.59 4.17 24.82 7.34 17.48 
1975 924.20 3.57 23.01 7.32 15.69 
1976 937.17 3.24 19.91 7.25 12.66 
1977 949.74 2.84 18.93 6.87 12.06 
1978 962.59 2.72 18.25 6.25 12.00 
1979 975.42 2.74 17.82 6.21 11.61 
1980 987.05 2.31 18.21 6.34 11.87 
1981 1000.72 2.61 20.91 6.36 14.55 
1982 1015.90 2.86 21.09 6.60 14.49 
1983 1027.64 2.42 18.62 7.08 11.54 
1984 1038.76 2.35 17.50 6.69 10.81 
1985 1050.44 2.20 17.80 6.57 11.23 
1986 1065.29 2.42 20.77 6.69 14.08 
1987 1080.73 2.59 21.04 6.65 14.39 
1988 1096.14 2.52 20.78 6.58 14.20 
1989 1127.04 2.35 21.58 6.54 15.04 
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Table 3.1 (Continued) 
 
Year 
Total Population  Total Fertility Rate 
  CBR 
  
CDR NIR 
 (Million)    (Per Thousand)  
1990 1143.33 2.31 21.06 6.67 14.39 
1991 1158.23 2.20 19.68 6.7 12.98 
1992 1171.71 1.82 18.24 6.64 11.6 
1993 1185.17 1.81 18.09 6.64 11.45 
1994 1198.5 1.79 17.7 6.49 11.21 
1995 1211.21 1.76 17.12 6.57 10.55 
1996 1223.89 1.80 16.98 6.56 10.42 
1997 1236.26 1.80 16.57 6.51 10.06 
1998 1247.61 - 15.64 6.5 9.14 
1999 1257.86 - 14.64 6.46 8.18 
2000 1267.43 - 14.03 6.45 7.58 
2001 1276.27 - 13.38 6.43 6.95 
Sources: NBSC. 2002. Statistical Yearbook of China 2002.    
 
 
of the Chinese population. China’s second baby boom began when the famine was over 
in 1962. It lasted almost a decade, from 1962 to 1970. During this period, the CBR first 
went up quickly from 18.0 per thousand in 1961 to 27.0 in 1962 and 43.4 in 1963 and 
then remained above 30 per thousand throughout the rest of the decade. Meanwhile, the 
CDR continued to decrease from 14.2 per thousand in 1961 to 7.6 per thousand in 1970. 
In total, this second baby boom added about 170 million individuals to China’s 
population. 
In the beginning of the 1970s, China entered its second dramatic fertility decline, 
largely resulting from the state’s continuous efforts to limit its population growth. 
During this time, while the CDR has remained almost unchanged, the CBR first 
decreased from 33.4 per thousand in 1970 to 17.8 per thousand in 1979 and then has 
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stabilized around 20 per thousand. Consequently, the NRI (Natural Rate of Increase) 
declined dramatically from 25.8 per thousand in 1970 to 11.6 per thousand in 1979. 
Since 1979, the NRI has fluctuated slightly, but at a low level. These data, therefore, 
indicate that China needed only a decade to complete its demographic transition. 
The dramatic decline in the CBR in China was mainly caused by a rapid drop in 
the TFR (Total Fertility Rate) since 1970 due to significant changes in age-specific 
fertility patterns. The total fertility rate increased from about 5.4 at the founding of the 
PRC to 6.1 in the first baby boom. It decreased to 3.2 in the famine years, and then 
increased to 6.1 again in the second baby boom. The TFR finally fell from 5.4 in 1971 to 
2.6 in 1981.  
The decline in the TFR, especially since the 1970s, was a result of three factors. 
The first is postponement of childbearing promoted by the government’s later-marriage 
requirement. The second factor is the earlier relinquishment of the reproductive phase of 
life in order to conform to the “fewer” requirement in the 1970s and to the one-child 
fertility policy after 1979. The third factor is the role played by socioeconomic 
development (Poston and Gu 1987) 
In spite of the one-child policy introduced in 1979 and various family-planning 
campaigns, the fertility decline slowed down after the rapid decline observed in the 
1970s. Both the crude birth rate and the total fertility rate experienced significant 
fluctuations during this period, maintaining rates of about of 20 per thousand and 2.5 
children per woman, for the CBR and TFR, respectively. 
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Fertility declined further and reached the below-replacement level (2.1) around 
1991. Fertility in the urban and rural areas started to converge. In 1994, China's natural 
population growth rate stood at 1.12%, the lowest ever in its history (Wu 1997). 
However, deterioration in the quality of demographic data in recent years has led to 
considerable disagreement and speculation about recent fertility trends and the causes 
(Feeney and Yuan 1994). 
In China, provincial fertility differentials from 1960 to 1987 are reported in Table 
3.2 for the crude birth rates, the crude death rate, and the natural increase rates. Table 3.3 
displays total fertility rate. Provincial differences in the CBR had increased since 1961, 
reaching the largest difference, 26.5 per thousand, in 1970. During the 1980s, the gap 
had decreased to a low of about eight per thousand. Differences among the provinces in 
total fertility rates were relatively constant over the period with a value of about two. 
However, even during the one-child policy years of 1979 to 1982, there were eight 
provinces and autonomous regions whose inhabitants, about one-fifth of the total 
population, still had more than three children on average. In terms of total fertility rates, 
during the period of 1979 to 1982, Shanghai’s was 1.2, the lowest in the country. 
Actually, this city’s fertility rate had started to decline in the 1960s. Guizhou, Qinghai, 
and Ningxia’s TFR  remained above 4. Hence, there are marked regional differences in 
the  timing and pace of the fertility transition. Peng (1989) points out that there is 
considerable variation in the fertility behavior of women with different educational 
backgrounds, work statuses, and places of residence.  
  
 
 Table 3.2 Provincial Population Size and Vital Rates (Per Thousand) in China, 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1984-87.
 
        1961     1965     1970   
Province            
            
Population CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR
Beijing 0.99 25.7 10.8 14.9 23.1 6.7 16.4 20.7 6.4 14.3
Tianjin            
            
            
           
            
           
           
           
            
            
            
            
            
           
            
            
            
           
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
             
0.77 - - - - - - 19.3 6.4 12.9
Hebei 5.28 15.4 13.4 2.0 31.8 8.4 23.4 26.8 6.5 20.3
Shanxi 2.51 19.0 12.2 6.8 34.0 10.4 23.6 31.1 8.1 23.0
Neimenggu 1.91 22.1 8.6 13.4 38.0 9.6 28.4 28.9 5.8 23.1
Liaoning
 
3.49 17.3 17.1 0.1 36.2 7.1 29.1 27.4 5.1 22.3
Jilin 2.17 26.5 12.0 14.4 40.5 9.7 30.8 33.2 6.3 26.8
Heilongjiang 3.17 27.3 11.1 16.1 40.4 8.0 32.4 34.8 5.8 29.0
Shanghai 1.16 22.5 7.7 14.8 17.0 5.7 11.3 13.9 5.0 8.9
Jiangsu 5.87 18.6 13.2 5.4 36.9 9.5 27.4 30.7 6.9 23.8
Zhejiang 3.81 17.6 9.8 7.7 36.5 8.1 28.4 26.2 6.0 20.1
Anhui 4.90 12.3 8.1 4.2 41.8 7.2 34.6 37.2 6.4 30.8
Fujian 2.60 17.4 11.9 5.6 41.1 7.3 33.8 33.4 6.0 27.4
Jiangxi 3.29 21.0 11.5 9.5 38.9 9.4 29.5 31.6 7.7 23.8
Shandong 7.36 21.5 18.5 3.1 35.5 10.2 25.3 33.9 7.3 26.6
Henan 7.37 15.3 10.2 5.1 36.1 8.5 27.6 31.6 7.4 24.2
Hubei 4.74 27.2 9.1 18.1 35.1 10.0 25.1 29.9 7.7 22.2
Hunan 5.36 12.5 17.5 -5.0 42.3 11.2 31.1 37.2 10.2 27.1
Guangdong 5.97 21.5 10.7 10.8 36.3 6.8 29.5 29.6 5.9 23.8
Guangxi 3.72 16.0 20.1 -4.1 42.4 9.0 33.4 31.1 6.8 27.5
Hainan 9.67 11.7 28.0 16.4 42.4 11.5 30.9 52.7 12.6 40.1
Sichuan 2.84 15.8 20.0 -4.2 50.0 15.2 34.8 43.1 10.8 32.3
Guizhou 3.27 19.4 11.8 7.6 44.1 13.0 31.1 28.5 8.2 20.4
Yunnan 0.19 - - - - - - 19.4 7.6 11.8
Shaanxi 2.86 21.0 8.8 12.2 34.7 13.0 21.7 26.8 6.3 20.5
Gansu 1.96 14.8 11.5 3.3 45.3 12.3 33.0 39.5 7.9 31.5
Qinghai 0.40 11.4 11.7 -0.3 48.7 9.1 39.6 39.9 7.6 32.4
Ningxia 0.40 13.0 10.7 2.3 48.1 9.3 38.8 40.4 6.4 33.9
Xinjiang 1.32 25.5 1.0 14.5 41.7 11.1 30.6 36.7 8.2 28.4
Total 100.00% 18.1 14.3 3.8 38.0 9.5 28.5 33.6 7.6 26.0 54
 
 Table 3.2 (Continued)
   
      1975     1980     1984   
Province     CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR
Beijing    9.9 6.5 3.4 15.6 6.3 9.3 15.4 5.5 10.0
Tianjin           
   
    
   
    
   
   
      
           
           
   
   
    
           
    
           
           
   
    
           
           
    
    
           
    
    
    
    
   
13.9 6.6 7.4 13.5 6.0 7.4 16.0 5.4 10.6
Hebei  15.6 7.2 8.4 19.6 7.3 12.4 14.0 5.8 8.3
Shanxi  23.2 7.9 15.4 17.5 6.7 10.8 14.4 6.0 8.4
Neimenggu 22.2 5.7 16.5 18.5 5.5 13.1 16.6 4.5 12.1
Liaoning  16.4 6.2 10.2 15.8 5.6 10.2 10.8 5.0 5.8
Jilin  20.5 6.7 13.7 17.9 6.2 11.7 11.8 5.3 6.5
Heilongjiang 22.0 5.4 16.5 23.6 7.2 16.3 11.0 4.5 6.6
Shanghai  9.4 6.0 3.4 12.6 6.5 6.1 13.7 6.5 7.1
Jiangsu 17.9 6.5 11.4 14.7 6.6 8.1 10.4 5.9 4.5
Zhejiang 19.5 6.3 13.2 15.1 6.3 8.8 12.5 6.0 6.5
Anhui  22.1 5.7 16.5 15.5 4.7 10.8 13.0 5.3 7.6
Fujian  28.8 6.5 22.3 18.7 6.5 12.1 18.9 5.6 13.3
Jiangxi  34.0 8.0 26.0 16.0 5.3 10.7 14.8 5.9 8.9
Shandong 21.6 7.5 14.0 15.3 6.6 8.7 13.0 6.0 0.7
Henan  22.8 7.7 15.1 17.3 5.2 12.0 11.2 6.3 4.9
Hubei 19.9 7.9 12.1 16.5 7.1 9.4 13.5 6.9 6.6
Hunan 25.0 8.3 16.7 16.2 6.9 9.3 14.6 6.8 7.8
Guangdong 21.0 6.1 15.0 20.7 5.4 15.3 17.5 5.2 12.4
Guangxi  27.5 6.8 20.8 22.9 5.9 17.0 21.5 5.2 16.3
Hainan 29.1 8.9 20.3 11.9 6.8 5.1 10.2 6.8 3.5
Sichuan 37.5 10.5 27.0 21.0 7.0 14.0 14.7 6.6 8.1
Guizhou  29.5 8.7 20.9 17.8 7.4 10.4 17.2 6.7 10.5
Yunnan  22.4 9.3 13.3 22.4 8.2 14.2 23.9 8.0 15.9
Shaanxi 21.7 8.2 13.5 16.2 7.2 8.9 16.6 6.2 10.5
Gansu  21.0 7.4 13.5 16.5 5.5 11.0 15.7 5.2 10.4
Qinghai  32.0 8.2 23.7 22.3 6.1 16.2 15.9 5.1 10.8
Ningxia  36.3 7.7 28.6 27.4 5.7 21.7 18.6 3.4 14.8
Xinjiang   33.1 8.7 24.4 21.8 7.7 14.1 19.9 6.5 13.4
Total  23.1 7.4 15.8 17.0 6.3 10.6 13.9 5.9 7.9 55
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Table 3.2 (Continued)
      1985     1986     1987   
Province       CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR CBR CDR NIR
Beijing     14.4 5.5 8.9 14.9 4.5 10.4 17.8 6.5 11.3
Tianjin     
    
     
    
       
    
     
       
       
       
    
    
     
   
     
    
     
    
       
      
       
       
       
       
     
       
      
       
     
14.5 5.8 8.8 18.2 6.5 11.6 17.]. 6.1 11.0
Hebei 13.4 5.7 7.7 19.8 6.1 13.7 22.5 6.0 16.5
Shanxi 14.2 6.0 8.2 21.3 6.3 15.0 20.1 6.5 13.7
Neimenggu 13.8 4.5 9.3 18.2 5.3 12.9 19.7 6.1 13.6
Liaoning 11.9 5.3 6.6 15.9 5.9 10.0 17.3 5.3 12.0
Jilin 10.7 4.3 6.5 18.9 5.9 13.1 18.2 5.4 12.8
Heilongjiang 10.7 4.3 6.5 16.9 5.5 11.5 19.2 5.2 14.0
Shanghai 12.7 6.7 6.1 11.3 4.6 6.6 15.3 6.7 8.6
Jiangsu 10.8 5.9 5.0 15.7 6.9 8.8 15.4 5.8 9.6
Zhejiang 12.1 6.1 6.1 16.4 6.7 9.6 17.0 6.9 10.1
Anhui 12.8 5.2 7.6 17.9 6.6 11.3 18.9 5.9 13.0
Fujian 17.5 5.4 12.1 18.7 4.7 14.0 21.0 5.8 15.2
Jiangxi 14.3 5.5 8.7 23.3 7.1 16.2 20.4 6.5 13.8
Shandong 11.8 5.9 5.9 21.9 7.1 14.8 23.4 7.1 16.3
Henan 11.5 6.2 5.3 19.7 6.6 13.2 21.8 6.5 15.3
Hubei 13.2 6.7 6.5 22.3 9.2 13.1 21.4 7.1 14.3
Hunan 14.4 6.5 8.0 21.1 5.8 15.3 23.6 7.1 16.6
Guangdong 15.7 5.0 10.7 23.4 6.4 17.0 22.2 5.7 16.4
Guangxi 19.5 5.1 14.4 30.3 6.8 23.5 24.4 7.4 17.1
Hainan 12.8 6.7 6.1 21.3 6.8 14.5 17.9 7.0 10.9
Sichuan 15.0 6.4 8.6 24.1 6.0 18.1 23.7 8.5 15.2
Guizhou 16.8 6.6 10.2 23.7 7.1 16.6 24.0 8.4 15.6
Yunnan 23.3 10.1 13.2 34.9 3.5 31.4 23.9 7.8 16.0
Shaanxi 16.1 6.0 10.1 23.5 5.0 18.4 21.6 6.3 15.3
Gansu 14.3 5.0 9.0 18.7 5.4 13.2 20.6 5.7 14.8
Qinghai 14.2 4.6 9.6 19.3 5.5 13.8 22.6 6.4 16.2
Ningxia 17.1 3.8 13.3 30.2 3.5 26.7 25.1 5.0 20.1
Xinjiang 19.8 6.4 13.4 23.2 7.5 15.7 27.3 8.7 18.6
Total 13.6 5.8 7.8 20.5 6.4 14.1 21.0 6.7 14.4
Sources: NBSC (Department of Population Statistics). 1989. China Population Statistics Yearbook 1988 
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Table 3.3 Provincial Total Fertility Rates in China, 1945-82. 
 
        Total Fertility Rates       
Province   1945-48 1949-58 1959-61 1962-70 1971-78 1979-82
Beijing 5.231 5.580 3.868 4.101 1.908 1.517 
Tianjin 5.452 6.887 4.844 4.258 2.172 1.414 
Hebei 4.599 5.531 3.671 5.514 3.240 2.614 
Shanxi 4.331 5.115 4.501 5.933 3.925 2.366 
Neimenggu 4.752 5.731 5.034 5.641 3.785 2.688 
Liaoning 4.881 6.289 4.523 5.514 2.721 1.975 
Jilin 6.056 6.868 5.737 6.523 3.509 2.140 
Heilongjiang 5.280 6.509 5.844 6.188 3.846 2.504 
Shanghai 5.255 5.491 3.062 2.755 1.371 1.158 
Jiangsu 5.403 5.610 3.642 5.211 2.582 1.810 
Zhejiang 5.432 5.933 4.246 5.986 2.982 2.157 
Anhui 4.752 5.224 2.254 6.619 4.265 2.926 
Fujian 4.781 5.899 4.487 6.594 4.720 2.578 
Jiangxi 4.943 5.779 4.463 6.923 5.942 3.313 
Shandong 4.838 5.385 3.593 5.607 3.333 2.121 
Henan 4.725 5.263 3.156 6.452 4.287 2.707 
Hubei 5.444 6.002 4.268 6.633 3.718 2.472 
Hunan 5.429 6.079 3.502 6.820 4.052 2.798 
Guangdong 4.186 5.163 4.074 5.777 4.297 3.540 
Guangxi 4.890 5.602 4.457 6.459 4.892 3.863 
Hainan 5.057 5.969 3.007 6.396 4.376 2.194 
Sichuan 5.379 6.110 3.794 6.936 5.837 4.227 
Guizhou 5.358 6.132 4.222 6.587 5.318 3.688 
Yunnan 5.167 5.847 4.637 5.983 3.877 2.523 
Shaanxi 5.711 6.106 3.596 6.929 4.507 2.910 
Gansu 3.836 4.158 2.157 5.742 5.431 4.620 
Qinghai 6.416 6.696 3.581 6.865 5.346 4.190 
Ningxia 4.109 5.252 4.686 6.407 5.079 3.646 
TOTAL   4.968 5.697 3.883 6.086 3.927 2.611 
Highest-Lowest 2.220 2.710 3.687 1.725 3.360 2.810 
Sources: Coale and Li. 1987. Pp. 24-189 
 
 
A process of diffusion in China's fertility transition has been confirmed by 
empirical research. Skinner (2000), using a 1% sample (12 million records) of 
households from the People's Republic of China's 1990 population census and 
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geographic information system (GIS), demonstrated that as fertility levels decline overall, 
the cessation of childbirth with the fourth birth diffused through hierarchical regional 
space. Because the pace of fertility transition in China has been enforced by the 
government, it is remarkably compressed in time. In addition, sustained fertility decline 
started in a few large municipalities and some eastern provinces. Then the transition 
gradually spread to the interior. The urban fertility transition was much earlier and faster 
than the rural one. By contrast, the vast area covering northwest and southwest China 
entered the transition much later, and relatively high fertility in that area has persisted to 
the present (Peng, 1989). 
Freedman and his colleagues (1988), using 1982 One-per-thousand Population 
Fertility Sampling Survey data, illustrated that age at marriage, abortion ratios, 
proportion of first births, proportion having a one-child certificate, types of 
contraception used, and fertility and educational development vary considerably in 
different local areas (also see Poston and Gu 1987). However, the magnitude of the 
fertility declines across educational levels strongly suggests that the family planning 
program has been very effective. It is worth noting, for example, that the fertility of 
Sichuan, the most populous province, declined spectacularly for a short period and for 
such a large population from initial high levels across all educational levels. The overall 
Chinese fertility rates are very responsive to variations in birth control policy regulations. 
Areas with mainly ethnic minorities or low population densities show higher fertility 
rates than other areas, all other things equal. This may be partly due to loose policy 
regulations in these areas (Liu and et al., 1996). 
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In China, late marriage has long been a principle of the official family planning 
policy, and it is still vigorously pushed today. Based on the 1982 China National One-
per-thousand Population Fertility Sampling Survey, Bianco identifies that it was 
promoted with little success during the 1960s when the mean age of women at first 
marriage remained slightly under twenty (19.8 years: Bianco 1985). It increased steadily 
thereafter until the late seventies from  21.6 years during the 1970s to over 23 years in 
1979. While three-fifths of women aged 20 were married in 1970, only one-fourth were 
married by the same age ten years later. Following the promulgation of a new marriage 
law in 1980 and the application of the responsibility system in agriculture, rural areas 
witnessed an increase in early marriages. In 1982, the mean age at first marriage for 
women was 22.6 years, half a year less than the mean age reached by the late seventies. 
In 1990, Chinese women who had married before the age of 20 totaled 2.76 million, 
more than in 1982 when the number was 2.7 million. Nearly 90% of the women who had 
married early were village women. Women who married early gave birth early. In 1989, 
the number of early births was 2.5 times higher than in 1980.  
Because of ancestral values, the enduring desire for a large family and the strong 
preference for a son are encouraged among parents eager to perpetuate the family line, 
especially after the adoption in 1979 of the single-child family policy. Several studies 
have documented these desires. The strength of the desire for at least one son is 
underlined by the cases of female infanticide reported by various sources (Bianco 1985). 
However, there is little evidence today indicating the existence of female infanticide. 
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Urban-rural differentials in fertility are marked. Prior to 1970, urban fertility was high 
but was showing a decline; however, rural fertility rates were not only higher, but have 
remained fairly stable. Beginning in 1971, the gap between urban and rural fertility rates 
narrowed. In contrast, educational differentials in fertility were even higher than urban-
rural differentials (Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4 Average Number of Live Births to Women Age 35, 40 or 45 in 1982. 
 
    China Rural Areas Urban Areas 
All Educational 
Levels 
4.18 4.44 2.92 
     
Illiteracy  4.74 4.78 3.97 
Primary School 3.81 3.99 3.14 
Junior High 3.08 3.52 2.6 
Senior High 2.41 3.17 2.21 
College or University 1.94 2.22 1.92 
Source: Bianco 1985. 
 
 
 
The importance of the family-planning program on fertility transition is a subject 
of some controversy. While Mauldin (1982) has argued that family-planning programs 
had a significant, independent effect on fertility, Handwerker (1986) claimed that 
family-planning services alone could not cause the fertility transitions. To some extent in 
China, both views are true.  Most, but not all, of the fertility decline that took place in 
mainland China is attributable to the birth control program. Actually, earlier than in 
Taiwan, birth control was first advocated on the mainland in 1957. The campaign did not 
last long and was quickly followed by intensive criticisms of Ma Yin-chu, the foremost 
 
 61
advocate of population planning. Pro-natalistic slogans such as "one added mouth means 
two more arms" were spread to denounce Ma's idea. Ma’s promotion of birth control 
was a dismal failure. The second birth control campaign (1962-66) was likewise largely 
ineffective, except in a few large cities (Aird 1981). It was muted at the outset of the 
Cultural Revolution and criticized by a barrage of anti-Malthusian proclamations. 
Without a doubt, these discontinuities and reversals in the official population policy 
contributed to the disappointingly meager results obtained by 1970 (Bianco 1985). 
Saddled with the extreme socioeconomic burden resulting from the second baby 
boom, China entered the third period of its family policy. Banister (1987) described this 
as a remarkable period in the history of China’s fertility and family planning. In July 
1971, the State Council issued its 53rd document asking governments at all levels to 
continue implementing the population control policy. Two years later, the state's leading 
family planning body was established as an independent administrative institution to be 
in charge of all functions related to family planning. on December 31, 1974, the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued the 32nd document and called for 
party committees at all levels to put family planning into their working schedules and to 
further intensify their leadership. This population policy was advanced with the 
objectives of controlling population growth in conformity with the guiding requirements 
of “Wan-Xi-Shao” (Later-Longer-and-Fewer) and of extending the policy to rural and 
ethnic areas. The "Fewer" policy not only slowed China's population growth in the 
1970s, but also obviously changed traditional Chinese fertility behavior, which was 
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useful preparation for the later implementation of the one-child policy (Ye 1991; Xie 
2000). 
The demographic pressure from the second baby boom began to hamper the 
nation's socioeconomic development. This serious reality finally forced Chinese 
authorities to adopt a one-child policy in 1979. This policy was claimed as the state's 
policy at the Chinese Communist Party's twelfth convention on September 1, 1982, and 
legalized by including it in the Constitution of the People's Republic of China passed on 
December 4, 1982. The specific requirements of this policy included late marriage, late 
childbearing, few births, and better babies. The basic components are as follows: (1) 
strongly encouraging couples to have only one child, (2) seriously controlling second 
births, and (3) absolutely stopping higher parities. The third requirement is rigorously 
applied throughout the country except in some of the less populous ethnic areas. For the 
second requirement, the state has not established national rules about how to control 
second births. The central government has assigned rights to individual provinces, 
municipalities and autonomous regions to make decisions in terms of local 
circumstances (Ye 1991; Wu 1997). 
In part because of the one-child policy’s demographic success and in part 
because of the political problems that stemmed from efforts to shrink family size very 
rapidly, in 1984 and 1985 China's leaders took steps to relax the birth-planning policies. 
An important shift in policy direction occurred in April 1984 with the issuance by the 
Party's Central Committee of Central Document 7. Under this document, the conditions 
under which couples may have two children were expanded and reforms were called for 
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in policy, work style, organization, and ideology that were designed to increase 
voluntary participation through better meshing of the policy with the needs of the people. 
In 1986, however, in response to the concern that age structure would put upward 
pressure on the birthrate for the coming decade, Document 13 put more restrictive 
measures on the one-child limitation (Greenhalgh 1986). In addition, economic reforms 
undermined the enforcement of China’s state-directed birth planning program. The 
disbanding of the socialist collectives led to an erosion of cadre power and a breakdown 
of the system of economic incentives and disincentives on which policy enforcement had 
been largely based (Greenhalgh et al. 1994). In May 1991, the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party and State Council issued the “Decision on Strengthening Birth 
Planning Work and Strictly Controlling Population Growth” to guarantee policy stability 
and enhance efforts to implement the policy (especially in the rural areas) by mobilizing 
the entire party and society. Following this decision, in order to elevate the achievement 
of population goals to a level equal that of economic goals, a new system was introduced 
that placed responsibility for birth control in the hands of the provincial governor and 
party secretary. 
In China, industrialization and urbanization have been neither fast nor vast. 
China’s great success in family planning (Table 3.5) is largely attributed to the well 
organized implementation of the designated policy. In essence, the central government 
launches the targets and policy directives. Targets are then allocated to the provinces and 
counties. Birth-planning committees at these levels are responsible for devising the 
actual policies that will guide fertility behavior within their boundaries on the basis of  
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results from local sources at the provincial and county levels.  
 
Table 3.5 Family Planning Achievements in China, 1979-1988. 
 
Area Year Rate of Contra- Rate of Rate of Rate of 
  Late ceptive One High One Child 
  Marriage Rate Parity Parity* Certificate 
    (Female)     Received   
Total       
China 1979 86.00 79.80  --  -- 39.10 
 1980 87.50 82.00  --  -- 57.10 
 1981 68.73 88.90 57.70 16.70 60.04 
 1982 64.89 89.60 61.21 15.14 66.77 
 1983 81.30 92.00 65.90 11.70 71.80 
 1984 58.86 85.82 68.03 10.29 18.25 
 1985 55.20 85.80 67.66 8.45 18.14 
 1986 54.12 85.61 65.81 7.28 17.90 
 1987  --  -- 49.31 18.20  -- 
 1988 56.30 87.90  --  -- 18.20 
Urban             
China 1979 93.70 87.20  --  -- 64.00 
 1980 95.10 88.20  --  -- 82.90 
 1981 80.00 94.10 80.84 5.98 86.61 
 1982 80.48 94.70 83.76 5.19 90.79 
 1983 81.30 95.50 83.00 4.70 88.00 
 1984 73.08 86.86 84.30 3.67 34.46 
 1985 67.05 87.79 82.74 3.11 35.11 
 1986 66.68 87.60 79.59 3.08 34.70 
 1987  --  -- 70.89 8.90  -- 
  1988 62.40 88.90  --  -- 27.80 
Rural             
China 1979 82.70 78.70  --  -- 34.60 
 1980 84.90 81.00  --  -- 51.00 
 1981 65.58 88.00 54.70 18.14 52.87 
 1982 60.98 88.70 57.70 16.69 59.02 
 1983 61.10 91.20 62.30 13.20 65.20 
 1984 53.20 85.29 63.31 12.25 12.87 
 1985 49.42 84.89 62.87 10.19 11.82 
 1986 47.78 84.58 60.82 8.96 11.12 
 1987  --  -- 43.93 21.29  -- 
      1988 48.90 87.10  --  -- 10.00 
Sources: CFPYEC 1990. Yearbook of China Family Planning.  Pp. 374-431   
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There are four major measures taken by the Chinese government to carry out its 
population control policy. These are:  
1. A network of family planning organizations. By the end of 1985, China had 29 
provincial; 2,427 district, city, and county; and 62,030 village and town family planning 
commissions and offices (CFPYEC 1986). In 1993, there were 900,000 branch 
associations throughout the country under the China Family-Planning Association, with 
more than 50 million members assisting the implementation of the family-planning 
program (Xie 2000). All of these commissions or offices have been designated to be in 
charge of family planning in their own administrative areas under the dual direction of 
the local government and the State’s Family Planning Commission (Ye 1991).  
2. State Financial Support. In 1982, local government expenditures constituted 
83.4% of the total expenditures of family planning. The state’s financial aid is primarily 
used to supply free contraceptive materials and services for the public, pay salaries for 
family planning personnel in local commissions, and support scientific research in 
family planning (CFPYEC 1986). 
3. Family planning dissemination and contraceptive services. The most 
significant developments in family dissemination have occurred during the last two 
decades. With mass media, face-to-face family planning propaganda, an intensive 
“family planning month” each year, and instructive courses in schools, clear goals help 
the public understand why and how to practice family planning so that they will change 
their traditional fertility behavior and implement population control policy voluntarily 
(Sun 1987; CFPYEC 1986). 
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4. Incentive and disincentive systems. The system focuses on offering political 
and social rewards and economic support to couples who voluntarily give birth to only 
one child during their reproductive lives. The major family planning rewards include: 
educational benefits for the child; medical care, employment, housing, and a certain 
amount of health allowances; benefits for parents such as having more days off for 
weddings and childbearing, achieving relatively higher retirement stipends in urban 
areas, and enjoying free services in retirement homes in rural areas. To discourage 
couples from having extra children, compensation fees are generally required for 
unplanned fertility behavior. Local governments, institutions, and enterprises are also 
responsible for the implementation of these measures (Ye 1991; CFPYEC 1986).   
Greenhalgh and her associates (1994) clearly documented that, beginning in the 
late 1980s, the province of Shaanxi strengthened its family program by increasing 
administrative personnel, investing more funds for incentives, creating party-led birth 
planning associations, strengthening responsibility systems, making semiannual 
gynecological exams mandatory, and conducting frequent sterilization campaigns, 
offering old-age insurance plans for two-daughter couples, and linking to compliance a 
family’s access to crucial land resources. As a result, the troubles that hindered the 
accomplishment of the one-child policy in the mid-1980s appear to have been effectively 
eased in this relatively poor province in a poor region of China. 
Has China's strict one-child policy been successful in changing fertility 
preferences? In the 1970s, rural couples wanted two sons and a daughter (Parish and 
Whyte 1978). In their review of surveys conducted in rural and suburban areas of nine 
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Chinese provinces between 1982 and 1985, Whyte and Gu (1987) found that a two-child 
family (one boy, one girl) was the most common preference. Choe and Tsuya (1991) 
analyzed a 1985 survey of rural Jilin and found that female respondents reported a mean 
ideal number of children of 1.95, as reported by Remez (1991). Merli and Smith (2002) 
argue that the acceptance of policy-sanctioned family size follows a development 
gradient and reflects the degree of enforcement. High acceptance occurs in the most 
urban, industrialized counties and in the counties with the most rigid family planning 
policies. Acceptance is weaker among women living in the poorest counties and in the 
counties where enforcement is most relaxed.  
From anthropological and demographic inquiries, Zhang (1999) documented 
several changes in fertility behaviors.  Zhang discovered that early age at marriage does 
not necessarily increase fertility. Rural couples prefer to have fewer children, and their 
motivation to have girls has increased as well. These decisions may be related to several 
socioeconomic factors. The education of children is more costly. Having more children 
as a strategy to gain a bigger share of contracted land is impractical because of the 
abolishment of the ration system after 1987 when land was last adjusted. Parents seem to 
have less influence on the younger generation. The burden of new housing and modern 
electrical appliances as a dowry for sons is increasing. Greenhalgh and her associates 
(1994) also have recorded similar motivations regarding fertility among the people of 
Shaanxi.  
There have been demographic and socio-economic changes that have contributed 
enormously to fertility decline in China. Notably, the decline in the infant mortality rate 
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(IMR) has been dramatic since World War II. Infant mortality has dropped tremendously 
over the last four decades (Table 3.6) with the greatest reduction in the 1950s and 1960s. 
By the early 1970s, the IMR was only about one-fourth of the level before 1949. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, the IMR continued to decline at a much slower rate.  
 
Table 3.6 Infant Mortality Rate, 1944-1987 (per 1,000 live births). 
 
 
     Year   IMR  Year   IMR   Year   IMR 
1944-49 203.6 1970 51.95 1983 41.37 
1950 197.93 1975 48.05 1984 38.41 
1955 107.64 1980 42.76 1985 37.38 
1960 109.92 1981 37.33 1986 37.14 
1965 72.13 1982 36.42 1987 39.92 
Source: Yao and Yin 1994, p.145. 
 
 
 
As for the rise in life expectancy at birth, China rose from a little over 40 years in 
1950 to almost 71 years in 1981, an increase by an average of one year every year (Table 
3.7). During the same period of time, few developing countries gained in life expectancy 
more than one year every two years (Coale 1984). 
Freedman (1997, pp.10-11) concludes that there is evidence to suggest  that 
“family planning programs sometimes do not affect couples’ preferences, but do help to 
shape up latent demands created not by the program but by other development 
processes.” 
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Table 3.7 Life Expectancy by Residence, 1981 and 1989-1990. 
  
Residence  1981       1989-1990   
  Males Females 
Both 
Sexes Males Females 
Both 
Sexes 
City 69.08 72.74 70.87  70.7 75.05 72.77 
County 65.56 68.36 66.95  67.59 70.91 69.18 
Source: Huang and Liu 1995. Pp. 27-56.     
 
 
Taiwan 
The demographic transition in Taiwan gained momentum after World War II 
(Freedman et al. 1963; Chang et al. 1981). The dramatic decline in the mortality rate 
took place shortly after World War II, dropping from 18 per thousand in 1947 to 8 per 
thousand in 1956, and to less than 5 per thousand in 1970. A continuous decline in the 
birth rate began in the late 1950s. In 1955, the total fertility rate (TFR) was 6.5 and the 
net reproduction rate (NRR) was 2.8. The crude birth rate was 45.3 per thousand. A 
decline in fertility proceeded rather slowly until the mid-sixties. In 1960, the TFR was 
5.8, and the natural increase rate was 36.7 per thousand (Table 3.8). It accelerated 
throughout the succeeding decade (1965-1975), and then leveled off. In 1983, the NRR 
fell to 1.0 and to 0.9 in 1985. Over the period of 1961-1980, total fertility in Taiwan fell 
from 5.6 per woman to 2.5, a decrease of 55 percent. At ages over 30, the declines have 
ranged from 70 to 92 percent. Indeed, nearly two-thirds of the overall fertility decline is 
attributable to reductions in fertility among women aged 30 and over; this is almost 
entirely due to marital fertility (Chang et al. 1981, 1987). The result of the almost 
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continuous fertility decline is striking: the TFR has fallen by almost two-thirds in less 
than thirty years.  
During the demographic transition, a diffusion process took place in which the 
decline in fertility moved from the cities to rural areas, and from the better educated to 
the less educated couples (Montgomery and Casterline 1993; Sun and Ting 1988). The 
diffusion process was so rapid during the late sixties and  early seventies that the 
increase in the use of contraception was greater in lower status than in higher status 
categories. By 1980, the educational differentials in contraceptive use had almost 
vanished. In 1973, urban-rural differentials still existed but rural townships reached 
fertility levels prevailing in the cities three years earlier. In 1975 they reached fertility 
levels prevailing in Taiwan as a whole two or three years earlier and in Taipei five years 
earlier (Sun and Ting 1988). In 1991, the TFR was 1.94 for rural townships, 1.84 for 
urban ones and 1.54 for Taipei (Freedman et al. 1994).   
In 1943, the mean age of Taiwanese women at first marriage was 20.8 years.  By 
1980, mean age at marriage rose slightly, by three years to 23.8 years (Liu and Sun 1979; 
Sun 1983). Higher age at first marriage has nevertheless progressed at a rapid pace in 
Taiwan. While three-fifths of Taiwanese women aged 20-24 were married in 1961, the 
proportion fell to one half in 1970 and a little over two-fifths in 1976. For women aged 
15-19, the proportion fell from one in eight in 1961 to one in eighteen in 1976 (Sun et al. 
1978). The rapid changes were achieved in spite of the rather long persistence of 
traditional Chinese values favoring large families. The adherence to these values is  
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Table 3.8 Population Size and Vital Rates of Taiwan, 1950-2002. 
 
Year  Total Fertility Rate  CBR CDR NIR 
     
1950 6,030 43.40 11.47 31.93 
1951 7,040 50.00 11.57 38.43 
1952 6,615 46.60 9.88 36.72 
1953 6,470 45.20 9.43 35.77 
1954 6,425 44.60 8.17 36.43 
1955 6,530 45.30 8.59 36.71 
1956 6,505 44.80 8.02 36.78 
1957 6,000 41.40 8.46 32.94 
1958 6,055 41.70 7.58 34.12 
1959 5,990 41.20 7.23 33.97 
1960 5,750 39.50 6.95 32.55 
1961 5,585 38.30 6.62 31.68 
1962 5,465 37.40 6.33 31.07 
1963 5,350 36.30 6.03 30.27 
1964 5,100 33.95 5.70 28.25 
1965 4,825 32.70 5.50 27.20 
1966 4,815 31.88 5.36 26.52 
1967 4,220 28.01 5.38 22.63 
1968 4,325 28.81 5.38 23.43 
1969 4,120 27.72 5.00 22.72 
1970 4,000 27.18 4.91 22.27 
1971 3,705 25.64 4.78 20.86 
1972 3,365 24.15 4.72 19.43 
1973 3,210 23.79 4.76 19.03 
1974 3,045 23.42 4.76 18.66 
1975 2,830 22.98 4.69 18.29 
1976 3,075 25.93 4.69 21.24 
1977 2,700 23.76 4.76 19.00 
1978 2,710 24.11 4.68 19.43 
1979 2,660 24.41 4.73 19.68 
1980 2,515 23.38 4.76 18.62 
1981 2,455 22.97 4.84 18.13 
1982 2,320 22.08 4.77 17.31 
1983 2,170 20.56 4.88 15.68 
1984 2,055 19.60 4.75 14.85 
1985 1,880 18.04 4.81 13.23 
1986 1,680 15.93 4.9 11.03 
1987 1,700 16.01 4.91 11.10 
1988 1,855 17.24 5.15 12.09 
1989 1,680 15.72 5.15 10.57 
1990 1,810 16.55 5.21 11.34 
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Table 3.8 (Continued) 
 
Year  Total Fertility Rate  CBR CDR NIR 
     
1991 1,720 15.70 5.18 10.52 
1992 1,730 15.53 5.34 10.19 
1993 1,760 15.58 5.31 10.27 
1994 1,755 15.31 5.4 9.91 
1995 1,775 15.50 5.6 9.90 
1996 1,760 15.18 5.71 9.47 
1997 1,770 15.07 5.59 9.48 
1998 1,465 12.43 5.64 6.79 
1999 1,555 12.89 5.73 7.16 
2000 1,680 13.76 5.68 8.08 
2001 1,400 11.65 5.71 5.94 
2002 1,340 11.02 5.73 5.29 
Sources: EYRC. 2002. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 2002  
 
clearly documented in Taiwan, where KAP (Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice) surveys 
have been conducted (Weinstein et al. 1990; Freedman et al. 1994). 
The preferred number of children remained quite high in Taiwan until 1970: the 
overall average number of children desired by married women aged 22-39 was 4.2 in 
1965, 3.8 between 1965 and 1970, 3.2 by 1973, 3.0 by 1980, 2.7 by 1985 and 2.5 by 
1991 (Freedman et al. 1994). Traditional attitudes persisted in slowing further progress 
in practicing birth control. For example, most Taiwanese couples used contraception in 
order to terminate childbearing (once they had all the children they wanted), not for 
spacing purposes. During that initial period (prior to 1970), very few younger and low 
parity wives used contraception in order to space their children. 
The strong preference for sons persisted much longer than the desire for a large 
family. According to the 1973 KAP survey, one daughter was considered enough by 
three-fifths (59 percent) of the respondents, while only one-sixth (17 percent) were 
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satisfied with one son (Freedman et a. 1974). Among couples with three children in 1976, 
only one-half (49 percent) of those with no sons practiced contraception, while five-
sixths (83 percent) of those with two or three sons were using contraception (Sun et al. 
1978). In the 1991 KAP, this phenomenon still existed (Freedman et al. 1994). Poston et 
al. (1997) found that cities have the highest median sex ratio at birth, followed by towns 
and then villages; nevertheless, each median was higher than biologically normal.  
Taiwan has had large developmental changes over the last thirty years, many of 
which are generally believed to be conducive to fertility decline (refer to Table 3.9). 
These include: increases in income while equality of income distribution was maintained 
(Ranis 1992); shifts from agriculture to industry and other sectors of a modern economy; 
rises in educational levels with increasing equity for women; expansion of the mass 
media and of facilities for communication and transportation; the blurred disparity of 
urban and rural areas; and major advances in health services and life expectancy. In 1952, 
life expectancy at birth was 59 and increased to 74 in 1991. The decline in the infant 
mortality rate has been impressive since World War II. By 1952, the infant mortality rate 
no longer exceeded 45 per thousand. It further declined to 20 by 1969 and to 10 per 
thousand by 1981. 
The resources and infrastructure created by these developmental changes have 
facilitated Taiwan’s effective family planning program, which has, in large measure,  
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Table 3.9 Socioeconomic Development Indicators of Taiwan 1955-1985. 
 
Year College    
Education 
(%) 
Illiteracy 
Rate 
(%) 
Per Capita 
Income           
(US Dollar) 
Industrial 
Employed 
Population 
(%) 
Infant Mortality 
Rate (0/00) 
1955 1.65 37.92  -- 12.46 36.90 
1956 1.66 37.12  -- 13.16 36.89 
1957 1.78 32.27  -- 13.02 37.32 
1958 1.78 30.94  -- 12.86 39.92 
1959 1.82 28.91 122 12.76 35.86 
1960 1.89 27.10 143 15.54 32.43 
1961 1.95 25.87 142 15.87 32.70 
1962 2.02 24.81 151  -- 31.27 
1963 2.17 24.30 166 20.85 28.43 
1964 2.27 22.47 189 22.07 25.53 
1965 2.32 23.12 203 22.30 23.67 
1966 2.47 23.16 221 23.40 22.10 
1967 2.97 19.56 249 25.10 21.14 
1968 4.68 23.66 283 24.90 21.34 
1969 4.91 21.59 320 26.40 19.46 
1970 5.23 20.58 360 28.30 17.41 
1971 5.68 19.42 410 30.30 15.96 
1972 6.10 18.35 482 32.10 16.40 
1973 6.01 17.31 642 34.00 16.21 
1974 6.49 16.59 852 24.50 14.08 
1975 6.69 15.70 888 35.50 13.86 
1976 7.41 14.90 1039 36.40 12.88 
1977 7.87 14.15 1189 37.60 12.40 
1978 8.46 13.44 1437 39.30 11.30 
1979 8.78 12.79 1748 41.80 10.98 
1980 9.08 12.21 2140 42.40 11.02 
1981 9.56 11.52 2424 42.20 10.05 
1982 10.08 11.03 2382 41.20 8.99 
1983 10.50 10.54 2515 41.10 8.34 
1984 10.94 10.05 2794 42.30 7.53 
1985 9.38 9.60 2868 --  7.37 
Source: EYRC 1985b. Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of China 1985. 
 
 
provided the contraceptive services that were the immediate major determinants of the 
decline in marital fertility. Table 3.10 shows that married women increased their practice 
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of contraception from 1965 to 1991. After 1980, younger married women practiced 
contraception to the same degree as the older cohorts. 
 
 
Table 3.10 Percent of Married Women Aged 20-39 Who Have Ever Practiced 
and Currently Practice Contraception, Taiwan, 1965-1985. 
 
Age Group 1965 1970 1976 1980 1985 1991 
Ever Practiced 
Contraception       
20-21 5 NA 33 54 68 68 
22-24 5 18 45 59 80 81 
25-29 20 41 72 78 89 87 
30-34 35 69 86 89 94 93 
35-39 41 74 89 92 92 94 
Total: 20-39 27 51 65 79 90 91 
Currently Practicing 
Contraception 
      
20-21 3 NA 19 37 51 49 
22-24 4 13 28 41 61 60 
25-29 17 30 55 64 72 69 
30-34 31 55 76 78 85 83 
35-39 36 63 79 84 86 88 
Total: 20-39 24 43 51 66 78 80 
Source: Freedman et al. 1994. 
 
The Taiwan government maintained a generally pro-natalistic attitude during the 
1950s. In spite of gradual changes during the 1960s, the government waited until 1968 
before giving official sanction, as well as a larger scope and a new impetus, to a program 
which developed independently. At the least, it did not discourage private initiatives, and 
transitions have been smooth from the pioneering private efforts to the official anti-
natalist policy, which has not been abandoned since its adoption in 1968. 
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A small "pre-pregnancy health program" started by the Provincial Health 
Department in 1959 was expanded in 1963 to cover one-third of the island's 361 
townships. A large-scale private experiment conducted in Taichung evolved from 1963 
on the way to an island-wide program (Freedman, Takeshita, et al. 1969). This expanded 
FPP (Family Planning Program) started in 1964 and by the end of the 1960s, impressive 
progress had been achieved in terms of contraceptive use. Between 1964 and 1970, 
about one-third of all married women aged 20-44 had a first IUD insertion, and their 
fertility declined accordingly. As the fertility of non-users decreased as well, although at 
a slower pace, Taiwan's TFR fell by 29 percent during the decade. By 1977, almost one 
half (49 percent) of Taiwanese women aged 20-24 who married between 1964 and 1977 
had an IUD inserted under the auspices of the program. The TFR further decreased by 
29 percent between 1970 and 1975 (from 4,000 to 2,830), as much in that five-year span 
as during the preceding nine years (1961-1970) (Sun 1976; Sun et al. 1978; Freedman et 
al. 1980).  
Without doubt, the Taiwanese Family program provided timely and sufficient 
contraceptive help to stop unwanted fertility and to merge actual and desired fertility. 
However, it is argued that the contribution of the program to the overall fertility decline 
has been much less important than has been the influence of rapid socioeconomic 
changes (Li 1973). Kingsly Davis succinctly concludes (Davis 1967:736): “In sum, the 
widely acclaimed family-planning program in Taiwan may, at most, have somewhat 
speeded the later phase of fertility decline which would have occurred anyway because 
of modernization.” Sun (2001, p. 86) assesses the role of family planning in Taiwan: “It 
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could be fair to say that Taiwan would have completed its demographic transition even 
without a family planning program, but it would have taken a much longer period of 
time. The family planning program contributed to the social and economic development 
by shortening the process.” 
Table 3.11 shows data from Jia (1989) that compares family planning programs 
in Taiwan and China in terms of family planning practices. Taiwan clearly has had all 
the necessary and sufficient elements for such demographic change so its fertility 
transition is voluntary and less traumatic, but has resulted in more lasting changes. 
China's enforced and well-organized style is impressive and stands contrary to 
Notestein's statement made in 1950s that family planning was more likely to bring 
governments than fertility down (Caldwell 1993). 
However, because family planning programs are conducted within modernization 
background and a wide-ranging socioeconomic development, it is understandable that 
their effects on fertility should be inclined to correspond with the effects of the 
modernization and development influences. Blake (1973) noted that social and economic 
structures and institutions tend to influence reproductive motivation and fertility by 
specifying the reward structures related with childbearing. Kelly and his colleagues 
argued that "the motivating effect of development on fertility should be mediated by 
more proximate variables" (1983, p. 92) such as family planning behaviors. Among the 
Chinese sub-regions, levels of female status are positively associated with levels of 
contraceptive behavior, which are in turn negatively associated with fertility levels 
(Poston and Gu 1987). Pritchett (1994a) concluded about reducing fertility that 
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improving economic and social conditions, especially for women will be more 
promising than contraceptive supply, even though he acknowledged a small effect of 
family planning programs is intuitively reasonable (1994b). When Gertler and 
Molyneaux (1994) discussed the reduced Indonesian fertility, they inferred that 
educational and economic factors, provided with an adequate contraceptive delivery 
system, can contribute dramatically to increased contraceptive use, and hence to fertility 
declines. Hirschman (1994) pointed out that family planning programs are 
disproportionately located in countries where social and economic conditions are already 
favorable for fertility declines. Schultz (1993), using 204 country-years from 68 
countries, deduced that increasing women’s education is the best indicator for reducing 
fertility, while family planning does not have a significant effect.  
Nortman (1985, p. 782) has noted that there is an important synergistic association 
between development and family planning variables and the "facilitating role of family 
planning programs in providing access to modern contraceptives." Since family planning 
efforts are "part and parcel of mutually reinforcing socioeconomic development policies 
and projects" (Nortman 1985, p. 781) 
From Birdsall and Jamison’s (1983) confirmation of lower fertility in higher-
income regions of China, Poston and Gu’s (1987) empirical analysis of Chinese fertility 
and regional development, to Poston’s (1998) comparison of fertility transition of 
Taiwan and China, they all endorse Tien's conclusion about the fertility transition of 
China that the "induced fertility transition of the recent past certainly deserves to be 
acclaimed as a population planning success sui generis, but its results up to now cannot, 
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and as the present findings suggest should not, be divorced from socioeconomic change, 
both in the past and the present" (1984, p. 400). 
 
 
 
Table 3.11 Similarities and Differences in Family Planning Programs between 
China and Taiwan. 
 
Indicators Mainland China  Taiwan 
1) Individual Approaches       
    Flies  Yes  Yes 
    Telephone Service Yes  Yes 
   Newsletter Yes  Yes 
2) Mass Communication    
    TV  Yes  Yes 
    Radio  Yes  Yes 
    Newspapers Yes  Yes 
    Magazines Yes  Yes 
    Mobile Film Shows Yes  Yes 
3) Special Activities    
    Propaganda Month Yes  Yes 
    Work Group Yes  Yes 
    Visitors Yes  Yes 
4) Training Program    
    Field Workers Yes  Yes 
    Physicians and Nurses Yes  Yes 
    Stuff Seminars Yes  Yes 
    Population Education Yes  Yes 
5) Population Research    
    Members Yes  Yes 
    Institutions Yes  Yes 
6) Health Service Yes  Yes 
7) Depots  Yes  Yes 
8) Private Sectors No  Yes 
9) Family Planning 
Network Complete  NO 
10) Government efforts Strong  Weak 
11) Punishment Policy Yes   No 
Source: Jia 1989   
 
 
 80
CHAPTER IV 
THEORIES OF WOMEN’S STATUS AND FERTILITY 
 
The link between fertility and women’s status in society is part of most 
contemporary theories of fertility decline (e.g., Cain 1984; Caldwell 1980, 1982; 
Handwerker 1986, 1989, 1991; Mason 1984; van de Walle and Foster 1990). For 
example, improved status of women is hypothesized to result from increased educational 
(Caldwell 1982) and economic opportunities (Handwerker 1991), leading to increased 
contraceptive use and declines in fertility. 
Although Caldwell rarely focuses directly on women, he implies that changes in 
women's status are central to the process of fertility decline (1982, p. 323). For instance, 
he discusses the "patriarchal family head" (1982, p. 301). The patriarch in pre-
transitional societies is the decision-maker both in the household and in the larger 
community, manipulating relationships in a system that rewards both age and maleness 
(pp. 311, 317). In pre-transitional societies both men and women benefit from high 
fertility. Low fertility, on the other hand, is associated with a more egalitarian family 
structure (pp. 320, 322) in which women participate more in financial matters (pp. 320, 
322) and, by looking out for their own interests as well as the educational and economic 
interests of their children, serve effectively to breakdown the rigid traditional family 
value system that supports high fertility (pp. 317-324). 
In contrast to Caldwell's viewpoint, Handwerker (1986, 1989, 1991) argues that 
women begin to reduce fertility when they can attain adult status, prestige, and wealth by 
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means other than having children. In Handwerker's view, fertility decline results from 
"changes in opportunity structure that increasingly reward educationally acquired skills 
and perspectives" (1986, p. 42). Such opportunities arguably are more available to 
educated women. 
According to Dixon-Mueller (1993) Education for women can indirectly 
decrease fertility in three ways. First, increasing the number of years that women are in 
school delays marriage and reduces the time duration that women are exposed to the 
possibility of conception. Second, education creates aspirations for a higher standard of 
living, thereby decreasing the number of children desired in a family. Education exposes 
women to “knowledge, attitudes, and practices favorable to birth control” that would 
enable them to have fewer children. Third, increased labor force participation gives 
women “alternative sources of social identity and economic support . . . [thereby 
reducing] women’s dependence on men and children” (Dixon-Mueller 1993, pp. 121-
123). 
A connection between women's status and fertility in a cross-sectional analysis of 
India was established by Dyson and Moor (1983). They introduced the concept of 
female autonomy. Female autonomy, they said, is “the capacity to manipulate one’s 
personal environment and the ability--technical, social and psychological--to obtain 
information and to use it as the basis for making decisions about one’s private concerns 
and those of one's intimates” (Dyson and Moor 1983, p. 250). 
Compared with women in northern India, women in southern India have both 
relatively greater autonomy and fewer children. Dyson and Moore explain this 
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correlation by proposing that men and women have different reproductive goals, and that 
women in southern India have greater autonomy (freedom to act according to their own 
needs), so they curtail the number of children they have. 
Another potential link between gender inequality and fertility, Cain (1984, p. 14) 
posits, “operates through security needs and the premium on sons that derives from 
women's position of economic dependence.” In contrast to Dyson and Moore, Cain 
(1984) suggests that the reproductive goals of men and women are not always different 
and fertility rates may be consistently high because of abiding insecurity and because of 
the preference for sons that the insecurity entails. His analysis also established a negative 
relationship between fertility rates and higher status of women across 21 countries (Cain, 
1984, p. 42).  
Poston and Gu (1987) found, however, that an index of women’s status did not 
correlate significantly with fertility rates in China (circa 1982), but did have significant 
indirect effects on fertility through family planning. The index Poston and Gu used 
consisted of three indicators: female life expectancy at birth, percentage of the female 
population that is literate, and percentage of females engaged in non-agricultural labor. 
Cleland (1996), as well, questions the connection between the social position of women 
and fertility decline.  
Nevertheless, while it is generally recognized that women's status does not 
necessarily change uniformly along a single dimension (Mason 1984; Whyte 1978), 
theoretical models of the relationship between women's status and fertility generally 
posit a strong negative relationship between the two. 
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Women's status is no doubt a multidimensional concept, and each aspect has a 
different association with fertility behavior. For research feasibility, however, the 
concept must be defined operationally. In this dissertation, therefore, the concept of 
woman’s status will refer to her employment situation and educational level. That is, 
education and employment will be separately examined to ascertain any relationship 
with fertility behavior.  
In the remainder of this chapter, the literature about influences of education and 
employment on fertility is reviewed more fully. 
 
Education and Fertility 
Among the socio-economic variables that have been studied in relation to 
demographic transition, women’s education is perhaps the variable most widely accepted 
for operationally defining the status of women. For example, particular concern for 
women’s empowerment was evident in the International Conference on Population and 
Development (ICPD), held in Cairo in 1994.  The Conference stressed that “beyond the 
achievement of the goal of universal primary education in all countries before the year 
2015, all countries are urged to ensure the widest and earliest possible access by girls 
and women to secondary and higher levels of education” (United Nations 1995a).  
Further, many studies consider women’s education an indicator of status that is a 
crucial factor in fertility decline. That is, high status is associated with low levels of 
fertility (Cochrane 1979 and Mason 1984). Researchers have pointed out that 
improvement in female education is associated with: (1) more opportunities for outside 
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employment; (2) increased aspirations for upward mobility, including a greater urge to 
educate one’s children; (3) more participation in decision-making; and (4) greater 
opportunity to interact with the outside world and acquire information through exposure 
to various media. All these aspects seem associated with the emergence of the small-
family norm. What, however, exactly constitutes the status and how it influences fertility 
is still subject to debate (Mason 1986; Jeffery and Basu 1996).  
As mentioned previously, education plays an important role in improving female 
autonomy (Dyson and Moore 1983). In the context of the impact of female autonomy on 
fertility, autonomy has been split into five categories (Jejeebhoy 1995): (1) knowledge 
autonomy--enhancement of women’s knowledge through exposure to the outside world, 
(2) decision-making autonomy--strengthening of women’s participation in family 
decisions concerning their lives and well-being, (3) physical autonomy in interacting 
with the outside world--fewer social and familial constraints on physical mobility, 
increased self-confidence and the ability to extract the most from available services, (4) 
emotional autonomy--a shift of women’s loyalties from extended kin to the conjugal 
family, and often associated with greater intimacy between spouses and between parents 
and children, and (5) economic and social autonomy--enhancement of self-reliance in 
economic matters, increased access to and control over economic resources, and 
increased reliance on one’s own ability to achieve social acceptance and status. 
Women’s education interacts with each of these aspects and ultimately leads to greater 
autonomy.  
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The degree of women’s autonomy is also, however, affected by cultural factors. 
Whether educated women can enjoy all types of autonomy within every culture has not 
been established. At the same time, even women who have little education may, in an 
egalitarian environment, achieve greater autonomy by offering services that earn income. 
Available fertility theories postulate various linkages between education and 
fertility. A framework widely used in this context is the one suggested by Easterlin 
(1975). It  provides a convenient and sensible model for synthesizing the proposed 
linkages. According to the framework, all intervening factors influencing fertility can be 
classified as (1) supply, (2) demand and (3) cost of fertility regulation. The supply of 
children is the number of surviving children a couple would have in the absence of 
fertility regulation. It takes into account both natural fertility and the mortality rate 
among children. The demand for children refers to the desire (preference) for a certain 
number of children. Various social, economic and cultural contexts shape the preference 
for children, for example, religious doctrines, moral codes, laws, education, customs, 
marriage habits and family organizations. This constellation of contextual determinants, 
in conjunction with consideration of the benefits and costs of having children, gives rise 
to the parents’ demand for children (Becker 1960). The cost of fertility regulation 
encompasses not only the economic costs of regulation, but also the social and the 
psychological costs. 
All three components--supply, demand and cost of fertility regulation--are 
important in shaping the ultimate fertility behavior of a population. When the supply of 
children exceeds the demand, which is generally true in most populations today, the 
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demand for and cost of fertility regulation assumes greater importance in affecting the 
ultimate fertility behavior. The relative role of supply and demand in engineering 
fertility decline is, however, still being debated. 
The extant studies relating education and fertility show that the relationship is not 
precisely understood. on one hand, mothers’ total years of schooling has a strong 
negative correlation both with the birth rate at the macro level and with family size at the 
micro level (Lal 1968; Kirk 1971; Schultz 1972; Farooq and Tuncer 1974; Heller 1976; 
and Cochrane 1978). on the other hand, at higher levels of education, either no 
relationship or a positive relationship is seen between total years of education and birth 
rate or family size (Graff 1979; Cochrane 1979). In a few groups with higher levels of 
socio-economic development and extremely advanced education, fertility tended to 
increase along with a woman’s education. Jejeebhoy (1995) has identified three distinct 
patterns of variation between women’s education and fertility.  She has labeled them 
(1)the reversed ‘U’, and (2) the reversed ‘J’ and (3) the‘7’. The reversed-U pattern is 
characterized by peak fertility for women with a small amount of education, higher than 
the education of illiterate women. The reversed-J shape relationship is observed where 
highly educated women end up with lower fertility than uneducated women. In both 
these patterns, the reversed-U shape and reversed-J shape, the least- and best-educated 
women show lower fertility than women with moderate educations. In a 7-shaped 
relationship, fertility remains practically unchanged until the woman attains a certain 
minimum level of education, then and starts declining once she crosses the threshold. 
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Cochrane (1979, p.6) mentioned: “In general, the evidence of an inverse relation 
between education and fertility in aggregate data is strongest for countries at the middle 
level of development.” Some others have contended that the negative relationship is 
likely to be strong in relatively developed areas and weak or absent in less developed 
areas (Jeerebhoy 1995; United Nations 1995b). In other words, the relationship between 
women's education and their fertility is not yet conclusive. According to Le Vine and 
others (1991), "The robust and widespread association found between women’s 
schooling and demographic variables are at once extremely familiar and persistently 
ambiguous . . . yet it has not adequately identified the intervening pathways or processes 
through which they are connected within any particular population, let alone the 
variability of the processes across populations past and present.” Several researchers 
have raised doubt about whether the education of women can be considered a causal 
factor affecting fertility, emphasizing that it works only indirectly. In other words, the 
strength of the relationship will depend on occupation, age at marriage, and so forth. 
(Radha Devi 1988). Similarly, arguably the strength of the relationship will depend on 
the extent to which education facilitates empowerment in terms of greater autonomy, 
media exposure and other factors. The available studies suggest that the degree to which 
fertility behavior may be modified through education in one population as opposed to 
another will be affected by the socio-cultural environment in which the women live 
(Radha Devi 1997). Therefore, the relationship between education and fertility is a 
subject that calls for more thorough investigation, especially contextual analysis. 
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Among empirical studies in Taiwan and China, most generally have no findings 
to contradict the negative effects of women’s education on declining fertility. Li and 
Choe (1995), using a hazard model combining logistic regression to analyze 1988 Two-
per-Thousand National Fertility Survey, state that a higher educational level is 
associated with a lower probability of a second birth in China. Zhang (1990) found a 
nonlinear J-shaped relationship between education and fertility in the 1985 
Comprehensive Fertility Survey in Hebei, Shaanxi and Shanghai. That is, over the age 
interval of 23-34 years, fertility is relatively high for women with either no schooling or 
primary education, lowest for those with secondary-school education, and highest for 
those with a high-school education. Schultz and Zeng (1995), focusing on rural fertility 
in China, found in a sample aged 15 to 34 that a woman with four more years of 
education than the average is expected to have two-tenths fewer children. on the other 
hand, women with that extent of education in an older sample aged 35 to 49 had 
displayed an even greater decrease in fertility. 
Using a time-series approach in Taiwan, however, Cheng and Nwachukwu (1997) 
failed to establish the existence of any relationship between fertility and education. 
Cheng (1999) found that education has a great influence on female labor participation, 
but not on fertility. He believes that little formal education has not had a negative impact 
because of the wide dissemination of contraceptive information and the successful 
promotion of family planning on the island. Freedman and his associates (1988) report a 
negative relationship in rural China between fertility and education, both in macro-level 
production brigades and on a personal level. They also note, however, that effective 
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family planning programs in China have resulted in a decrease in differences across 
educational levels in certain provinces after the 1970s. In this dissertation, I will 
empirically examine the effects of women’s educational status on fertility and 
contraceptive behavior of women in Taiwan and China. Further, the main focus of my 
multilevel analysis will be to see how the individual-education variable mediates 
between the influence of macro-level variables and personal fertility activities in China 
and Taiwan. The direct and indirect effects of macro-level female educational attainment 
on personal fertility decisions will be discussed in Chapter VI. 
 
Employment and Fertility 
The relationship between female employment and fertility continues to attract the 
attention of researchers in both developed and less developed countries (LDC).   How 
labor force participation influences fertility in developed countries has long been an 
important issue. Examining the trend of female labor force participation and fertility in 
the U.S. over time, Weller (1977) concluded that the incompatibility of work and 
childrearing is responsible for the decline of fertility. This conclusion can hardly be 
challenged. Bernhardt (1993) also reasoned that not childbearing, but childrearing is 
responsible for the incompatibility. Several mechanisms have been identified as sources 
of incompatibility between these two variables, employment and fertility. First, if 
childrearing leads a woman to quit her job, the loss of foregone wages may prevent her 
from having children (Calhoun and Espenshade 1989). Second, women with jobs may 
lack time for childrearing (Willis 1973). And, finally, if a woman wants to pursue a 
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career, childrearing might be a hindrance; so the pursuit of a career would decrease the 
probability of childbearing (Rindfuss and Brewster 1996).  
Some scholars have also proffered other impacts of employment on fertility. 
Employment is posited to affect childrearing in at least two ways. First, it occasions time 
conflicts between the job and family responsibilities. Glass and Camarigg (1992) found 
that schedule flexibility and ease of job performance influence the compatibility of 
fertility and female participation in the labor force. Jobs with more than thirty working 
hours per week are unlikely to allow these two features of flexibility and ease of 
performance. Second, employment can influence the timing of childrearing, women’s 
leaving, and re-entering the labor market (Presser 1989). Additionally, not only the 
demands of the job, but also different child parities may influence the compatibility of 
childrearing and paid work. Studies in Sweden have shown, for example, it is easier for 
working mothers to take care of their second and third child (Hoem and Hoem 1989).  
At the micro level, there is no doubt that female employment negatively impacts 
fertility. At the macro level, however, the positive co-variance reported between female 
labor-force participation and fertility recently caused a worldwide stir. Rindfuss and 
Brewster (2000) showed that in 1970, among advanced industrialized countries, the 
correlation coefficient between female labor-force participation and fertility was -.571. 
Yet in 2000, the correlation was .718. In other words, in 2000, countries with higher 
female labor force participation rates had higher fertility rates.  
The different trends between micro and macro data highlight that incompatibility 
between childrearing and paid work varies across countries and cultures. State policy has 
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been identified as a key variable that curtails the negative influence of work on fertility. 
Chesnais (1996), for example, found that countries that treat childrearing as the state’s 
responsibility, mainly the Nordic countries, have higher fertility. Pampel (1998) also 
argued that the “female-friendly” policies that allow women to work and rear a child at 
the same time are responsible for simultaneously higher female labor-force participation 
and fertility.  
In less developed nations where female employment is viewed as a potentially 
important factor influencing fertility decline, the nexus between employment and 
fertility seems more varied. Dixon (1976), for instance, asserted that female employment 
may not affect reproductive behavior unless the employment is outside the traditional 
sector of unpaid family work or subsistence agricultural labor. In other words, so long as 
employment opportunities for women are largely restricted to unpaid family work or 
poorly paid jobs requiring limited skills, no effect on fertility is likely. In accord with 
that notion is the work of Jaffe and Zaumi (1960) in Japan and Puerto Rico, one of the 
earliest studies showing a similarity in fertility of women involved in home-centered 
employment and those not in the labor force. They pointed out that women employed in 
home industries had fertility no less than that of women not in the labor force; however, 
women working outside the home had lower fertility. Likewise, in Thailand, Goldstein 
(1972) found that only Bangkok has an inverse relationship between female employment 
and fertility. In rural, agricultural households, on the other hand, there was evidence of a 
small positive relationship.  
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Similar findings have been reported for various countries representing different 
cultural, developmental, and economic systems. A conditional employment-fertility 
relationship has been reported for areas as diverse as Thailand, the Philippines, and 
Malaysia (Concepcion 1974; Goldstein 1972; Mason and Palan 1981), Chile (Miro and 
Mertens 1968; Peek 1975), Puerto Rico (Weller 1968), Egypt (Bindary et al. 1973), and 
Italy (Pinelli 1971). Those studies tend to demonstrate the expected fertility difference 
between working and nonworking women in large urban areas, but a weak, or 
nonexistent, or even positive relationship among rural women. Aggregate level analyses, 
by contrast, tend consistently to reveal a negative impact of female employment on 
fertility. A strong inverse relationship between the rate of female employment outside 
the home and fertility is reported in Kasarda's (1971) analysis of approximately 50 
nations and Heer and Thurner's (1965) analysis of Latin America. 
Traditionally, economic development has been viewed as expanding women’s 
participation into nontraditional productive spheres of society, which in turn would 
elevate their status. This belief was generally unquestioned until Boserup (1970) 
documented that the relationship between economic development and women’s status 
may be an inverse one. Since then, many other empirical investigations have 
demonstrated the existence of a gap in gender status in the industrialization process of 
many developing societies, despite differences in those societies’ particular schemes of 
development (Elliott 1977; Safa 1979). Likewise, even in contemporary Western 
industrialized societies such as the United States and Great Britain, where women have 
rapidly swelled the ranks of the labor force, the existence of sex segregation in the 
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workplace is regarded as one of the most persistent social phenomena of the past few 
decades (Gross 1968; Williams 1979; Beller 1984; Roos 1985). In Rosabeth Moss 
Kanter's (1997) impressive and exemplary groundbreaking book, Men and Women of 
the Corporation, she describes the phenomena of limited opportunity structures and 
“tokenism,” which entail structural limitations on women in the workplace, according 
them little power and few opportunities for advancement. 
As for empirical study of employment and fertility in China and Taiwan, Stokes 
and Hsieh (1983) conclude that in Taiwan female employment apparently has little 
impact on fertility preferences or behavior. Similarly, Cheng (1999), using multivariate 
time series analysis, finds that working women in Taiwan do not necessarily have fewer 
children. Also, comparing Hakka and Hokkien women in Taiwan, Wolf and Chuang 
(1994) conclude that although Hakka women (who did not practice foot-binding) go out 
to work, their fertility patterns are not different from those of Hokkiens, who practiced 
foot-binding and did not work outside the home. They further explain that Hakka women 
did not control the products of their labor, which may account for their failure to control 
their fertility. Peng (1989) asserts that female participation in the work force is very 
relevant to rural-urban differentials in fertility in China. on the other hand, Zhang (1990) 
using data from the 1985 China In-Depth Fertility Survey, reports that the relationship of 
the husband’s occupation to declining fertility rates is more significant than that of the 
wife's occupation. 
In this dissertation, because of data availability, female employment status in 
Taiwan and China is operationalized as classification into either agricultural 
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employment or non-agricultural. In addition, due to the sizeable number of women in 
Taiwan without an occupation, a “no-work status” variable for Taiwan is used in the 
analysis. In Chapter VI, the nexus between women’s employment status and their 
fertility and sterilization behaviors will be explored at both an individual level and an 
aggregate level (by province or county). Also interaction between macro-level female 
employment structure and personal characteristics will be examined.  
 
Familial Structure 
In Western literature, educational level and employment status are regarded as 
the most important factors in the population fertility transition. In Taiwan, however, the 
family, to which the core of cultural values is attached, has long been the most important 
unit of social organization. Because Taiwan has been a society of immigrants from 
China since the seventeenth century, families in Taiwan have perpetuated the patrilineal 
and patrilocal characteristics of the Chinese society. In spite of social change on the 
heels of industrialization, urbanization and contact with Western ideas, the deep-seated 
values and behavioral patterns associated with Chinese family life have not been 
uprooted. Given this situation, it can be understood that childbearing decisions for 
women are made in an atmosphere of immense traditional social pressure. Ironically, 
through a process of revolutionary policies and the 1979 one-child policy (Peng 1991), 
China seems to have abandoned more traditional familial traits than Taiwan. The results 
of empirical studies, however, show that the traditional Chinese family values are still 
deeply imbedded in that socialist country.  
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According to the economic approach called the household-production model, 
family structure is positively related to fertility to the extent that the time of other family 
members can readily substitute for the wife’s time.  It is implied that a couple living in 
an extended family has lower-priced substitutes for the wife's time, because when the 
services of extended family members are used, they are likely to be paid for at a rate 
lower than the prevailing market wage, if paid for at all. Accordingly, the opportunity 
costs of children are lower for extended families than for nuclear families. However, 
Nag (1975) and Burch (1983) could not find empirical support for the idea that extended 
family/kinship relations are associated with higher fertility. At most, they concluded, 
extended family relationships only facilitate early marriage and reproduction and spread 
the costs and responsibilities of childbearing.  Likewise, Vlassoff and Vlassoff (1983) 
found in the Maharashtra State that when age or stage of family life cycle was controlled, 
there was little connection between family type and fertility. Conversely, however, 
Jejeebhoy (1984) reported higher lifetime fertility among nuclear households in 
Maharashtra at all ages, even though recent fertility was only higher in nuclear families 
was among young women. Jejeebhoy thinks that instead of being a determinant of 
fertility, household type is more likely merely a function of past fertility and other life-
cycle variables. 
These findings differ from those of Freedman, Chang and Sun (1982) in Taiwan. 
Using residence histories to measure the length of time a couple has spent in a nuclear 
household, they found that couples who had always lived as a nuclear couple 
consistently ranked lowest in actual fertility, preferred fertility and underlying fertility 
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preference; they also ranked high in percentage who used contraception to space 
childbirths. This was true both before and after adjustment for education and duration of 
marriage. As possible influences leading to higher fertility among couples living in 
extended households, the following factors are suggested: lower perceived costs of 
children, old age support, grandparents' pressure for children, and frequent expression of 
traditional filial sentiments. These suggestions are supported by other research as well 
(Weinstein et al. 1990; Yen et al. 1989). While also affirming the positive effects of 
patriarchal family structure on fertility in Taiwan, Hsiung (1988) reports that it is 
moderated by female educational level and occupational status. In China, Li (1995) finds 
that living with parents or parents-in-law also increases the probability of having another 
child, suggesting a persistent cultural preference among elderly people for a large family 
and its impact on their children's fertility behavior. 
In this dissertation, to see whether there is an association between an extended-
family residential arrangement and fertility behavior, I operationalize family influence 
by comparing respondents on basis of whether or not they live with their parents. 
 
Sterilization 
Shapiro (1985) uses the phrase "institutionalized discrimination" to describe how 
implementation of sterilization in the United States is systematically biased against the 
poor and women on welfare. Previous research has indicated that the form of 
sterilization used among couples is influenced in part by aspects of women's status. For 
instance, variability in male sterilization among couples in China is not only a function 
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of socioeconomic and cultural factors, but also of women's status (Xu 1993). The 
economic and medical advantages of vasectomy are obvious, but the male sterilization 
rate is much lower than the female sterilization rate in most parts of this world. Aird 
(1990, pp. 25-26) documented that in China’s second family planning campaign in the 
1960s there was an effort to promote vasectomy but that it encountered strong resistance 
from the populace. 
In China, under the one-child policy in the early 80s, sterilization emerged as the 
principle technical measure for birth control. Starting in 1982, in order to effectively 
control its burgeoning population in the vast rural areas, China adopted a birth control 
policy of "IUD insertion after the first birth and sterilization after the second birth" 
(SFPCC 2004). 
Analyzing data from the One-Per-Thousand Fertility Survey of China, Poston 
(1986) found that the most popular contraceptive methods used by married fecund 
women of reproductive age (15-49) in 1982 were  IUD (intrauterine device) and female 
sterilization. In Heilongjiang province, most women have used only one method: either 
the IUD or sterilization (Kaufman et. al. 1992). Couples with two or more children were 
designated as persons who should be sterilized. Official statistics revealed that 
sterilizations in China increased sharply in 1983 to nearly three times the number in the 
previous peak year, which was 1979 (Table 4.1). of the 20.8 million sterilizations in 
1983, almost 80 percent were of females (Aird 1990).  
Yet the male sterilization rate in China is not low. According to Ross (1992), 
China has over one-half of the total sterilization users in the world, and vasectomy 
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reaches an appreciable level, where husbands of 10 percent of married women of 
reproductive age in 1985 were using this method. Based on a statistical survey 
conducted by the Health Ministry, about 30.4 million couples relied on vasectomy 
during 1971-1989, compared with 74.2 million women who accepted tubal ligation; the 
ratio of male to female sterilization during this period was, therefore, 0.41 to one. 
Conversely, Sun (2001) reports that in Taiwan, of the 8 million people who accepted 
government-provided contraceptive methods from 1964 to 1991, female sterilization was 
the method chosen by 9%, while male sterilization was just 0.6%. Lethbridge and Wang 
(1991) studied contraceptive usage in Taiwan with data collected from 159 married 
women of childbearing age in Taipei. None of the spouses of these women had 
undergone a vasectomy.  
In China, parity status and age are the main determinants of the choice to accept 
sterilization. In China’s 1984 one-per-thousand fertility sample survey, ethnic minorities 
used it less than the Han. The effect of education on contraceptive usage in China has 
also has been acknowledged. Li and Lin (2000) studied on Chinese contraceptive choice 
in 1998, they reported that the percentage of sterilization in illiterate females was 50.6%; 
for women with elementary school, it was 43.5%; for women with junior-high schooling, 
36.1%; and for women with high-school education and above, 25.7%. Zhong (2000) 
found that women with low education generally have little knowledge of contraceptive 
methods. 
Zhou's study of Chinese women's contraceptive patterns found that the general 
contraceptive rate of urban women was higher than that of rural women. For urban 
 99
women, sterilization was the second most widely chosen contraceptive method, but it 
was the first choice among rural women (Zhou 1991). 
Short and colleagues. (2000) discovered the following association in China 
between sterilization usage and local birth planning policies: the risk of sterilization is 
highest in communities where the birth planning policy is least robust. “When other 
methods (including perhaps abortion) can be used more effectively, birth planning 
cadres may be less likely to promote sterilization" (Short et al. 2000, p.280). 
In this dissertation, I identify sterilization as a dependent variable to see whether 
individual-level women's status influences sterilization behaviors. In addition, in the 
multilevel analysis, the degree to which aggregate-level women's status mediates the 
influence of personal characteristics on sterilization behavior will be a main concern. It 
is expected that, the personal characteristics of Taiwanese women may play a salient role 
in the decision to choose sterilization. In China, due to the enforced-policy orientation 
there, it is expected that the macro-level effectiveness of family program promotion will 
be a decisive factor. 
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Table 4.1 Birth Control Surgeries in China: 1971-1986. 
 
Year IUD Vasectomies Tubal Abortions 
  Insertions   Ligations   
     
1971 6172889 1223480 1744644 3910110 
1972 9220297 1715822 2087160 4813452 
1973 13949569 1933210 2955617 5110405 
1974 12579886 1445251 2275741 4984564 
1975 16743693 2652653 3280042 5084260 
1976 11626510 1495540 2707849 4742946 
1977 12974313 2616876 2776448 5229569 
1978 10962517 767542 2511413 5391204 
1979 13472392 1673947 5289518 7856587 
1980 11491871 1363508 3842006 9527644 
1981 10344537 649476 1555971 8696943 
1982 14069161 1230967 3925927 12419663 
1983 17755736 4359261 16398378 14371843 
1984 11751146 1293286 5417163 8890140 
1985 9576980 575564 2283971 10931565 
1971-85 182691497  24996383  59051848  111960895  
Source: Aird 1990. p. 40 
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CHAPTER V 
DATA, VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
The individual-level data for China to be used in this dissertation are from the 
1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey in which the State Family Planning 
Commission in China surveyed 2,151,212 women from 30 provinces and other regions 
in July 1988,. I restricted the total sample to married women whose husbands live in the 
same household. From this revised sample, I took a 10% sample. After dropping women 
older than 58 years, duplicates and some bad data entries, I obtained 30,013 observations 
(Table 5.1). The provincial data are adopted from the 1990 Census of China. The 1990 
China Census data are accessible and are chronologically close to 1988. I correlated 
some developmental indicators based on data from the 1982 China Census with those 
from the 1990 China Census and found that the pairs are highly correlated. For example, 
the correlation coefficient of Population in Agriculture to Total Employed Population 
(agr) between 1982 and 1990 is .94 (Table 5.2). So I feel it is safe to use the 1990 China 
Census data as macro-level resources. Since data for Tibet are lacking, I have data for 
only 29 provinces (Table 5.3). 
The data for Taiwan to be used in my dissertation include 11,690 respondents 
from a sample drawn from the 1992 “Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice” (KAP) survey 
of family planning among married women. It is an island-wide survey based on 
probability samples representing married women of childbearing age from 20 to 45. 
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics of Individual and Provincial Variables in China. 
 
Individual Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Children Ever Born 30,013 2.714 1.979 0 15 
Sterilization Status 30,013 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Male Sterilization Status 30,013 0.065 0.246 0 1 
Female Sterilization Status 30,013 0.277 0.447 0 1 
The Duration between marital month to first 
pregnancy ending month 30,013 28.756 97.438 0 524 
The Duration between first pregnancy ending 
month to second pregnancy ending month 23,707 29.001 17.467 0 240 
The Duration between second pregnancy ending 
month to third pregnancy ending month 16,759 31.087 19.479 0 240 
Wife's Education 30,013 1.610 1.439 0 14 
Husband's Education 30,013 2.380 1.277 0 14 
Marital Period in Month 30,013 180.293 130.081 6 574 
Married More than 14 years 30,013 0.451 0.498 0 1 
Wife's Age 30,013 35.880 9.856 16 58 
Husband's Age 30,013 38.643 10.997 16 86 
Han Status 30,013 0.897 0.303 0 1 
Three-Generation Familial Structure 30,013 0.079 0.269 0 1 
Wife's Agricultural Occupation 30,013 0.752 0.432 0 1 
Husband's Agricultural Occupation 30,013 0.668 0.471 0 1 
Number of Dead Children 30,013 0.246 0.666 0 9 
Number of Boys 30,013 1.402 1.245 0 12 
Number of Girls 30,013 1.314 1.309 0 14 
No One-child Certificate 30,013 0.840 0.366 0 1 
Experience of Childbirth with Quota 30,013 0.340 0.474 0 1 
Living in Rural Area 30,013 0.815 0.388 0 1 
Provincial Variable      
Total Fertility Rate 30,013 2342.1 728.5 1304.8 4609.3 
o-year-old Mortality Rate 30,013 0.026 0.015 0.006 0.068 
Female Occupation Participation Rate 30,013 0.711 0.079 0.536 0.812 
Female Divorce Rate 30,013 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.027 
Female College Gradation Rate 30,013 0.005 0.008 0.001 0.046 
Agricultural Participation Rate 30,013 0.517 0.157 0.085 0.704 
One-Child Certificate Rate 30,013 0.068 0.050 0.021 0.257 
Source: SFPCC 1989, and NBSC 1991
 
 Table 5.2 Correlation Matrix of 1982 and 1990 Census Variables in China. 
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birthr imr82 colr agr82 indr empr fopr imr tfr fdr agr fcr papr
              
birthr              
              
              
              
              
              
              
             
              
              
             
             
              
1.00
imr82 0.72 1.00
colr -0.24 -0.28 1.00
agr82 0.44 0.44 -0.77 1.00
indr -0.52 -0.52 0.77 -0.98 1.00
empr -0.34 -0.31 0.37 -0.12 0.28 1.00
fopr 0.21 0.30 -0.32 0.65 -0.55 0.43 1.00
imr 0.72 0.89 -0.39 0.55 -0.60 -0.35 0.42 1.00
tfr 0.31 0.27 -0.43 0.54 -0.51 0.00 0.50 0.30 1.00
fdr 0.48 0.55 0.19 -0.18 0.10 -0.19 -0.18 0.41 0.01 1.00
agr 0.28 0.37 -0.81 0.94 -0.92 -0.18 0.69 0.52 0.54 -0.28 1.00
fcr -0.18 -0.26 0.94 -0.66 0.67 0.36 -0.32 -0.36 -0.48 0.21 -0.76 1.00
papr -0.40 -0.39 0.79 -0.85 0.87 0.45 -0.36 -0.49 -0.53 0.20 -0.84 0.72 1.00
Source: NBSC 1991and NBSC 1983 
              
              
ote:              
     
            
N
birthr: Birth  Rate (unit: 0.1%), 1982      imr: Infant Mortality Rate, 1989 
imr82: Infant  Mortality  Rate (unit: 0.1%), 1982    fopr: Female Occupation Participation Rate, 1990 
colr: Number  of  College  Graduates  Per  10,000  Population (unit: 0.1%), 1982 fdr: Female Divorce Rate, 1990 
agr82: Population in Agriculture  to  Total  Employed  Population (unit: %), 1982 fcr: Female College Gradation Rate, 1990  
indr: Industrial Population to Total Employed Population. (unit: %), 1982 agr: Population in Agriculture  to  Total  Employed 
empr: Employed Population to  Total  Population.  (unit: %), 1982   Population (unit: %), 1990  
tfr: Total Fertility Rate, 1989      
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Province Children
Ever Born 
Sterilization 
Rate 
Male 
Sterilization  
Rate 
Female 
Sterilization  
Rate 
Female 
Occupation 
Particip. Rate 
o-year-old 
Mortality 
Rate 
Total Fertility 
Rate 
Female 
Divorce Rate 
Agricultural 
Participation 
Rate 
Female 
College 
Gradation Rate 
One-Child 
Paper Rate 
Beijing            2.517 0.163 0.004 0.159 0.638 0.009 1304.820 0.007 0.130 0.072 0.163
Tianjin            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
2.745 0.225 0.014 0.210 0.644 0.006 1658.610 0.005 0.210 0.035 0.185
Hebei 3.282 0.428 0.049 0.379 0.701 0.010 2351.070 0.002 0.607 0.006 0.049
Shanxi 3.815 0.349 0.006 0.344 0.587 0.019 2415.420 0.003 0.466 0.008 0.035
Neimenggu 3.818 0.440 0.007 0.433 0.619 0.029 1969.490 0.003 0.465 0.012 0.057
Liaoning 2.972 0.363 0.003 0.360 0.645 0.019 1499.930 0.006 0.356 0.019 0.131
Jilin 2.998 0.402 0.003 0.399 0.586 0.025 1784.170 0.006 0.405 0.016 0.100
Heilongjiang 3.176 0.386 0.001 0.385 0.536 0.019 1698.050 0.006 0.350 0.019 0.098
Shanghai 2.088 0.266 0.064 0.202 0.687 0.013 1333.580 0.009 0.085 0.039 0.257
Jiangsu 2.953 0.160 0.021 0.139 0.782 0.015 4609.270 0.002 0.476 0.012 0.086
Zhejiang 3.167 0.512 0.029 0.482 0.659 0.018 1398.560 0.002 0.409 0.006 0.054
Anhui 3.947 0.079 0.013 0.065 0.787 0.025 2497.460 0.002 0.661 0.005 0.034
Fujian 3.768 0.562 0.130 0.441 0.600 0.024 2376.970 0.002 0.476 0.008 0.037
Jiangxi 4.288 0.553 0.012 0.540 0.737 0.043 2467.020 0.002 0.588 0.005 0.027
Shandong 2.547 0.454 0.184 0.273 0.772 0.014 2467.180 0.002 0.632 0.004 0.058
Henan 3.773 0.186 0.046 0.142 0.782 0.019 2902.260 0.002 0.682 0.006 0.030
Hubei 3.688 0.424 0.060 0.365 0.772 0.026 2510.590 0.003 0.580 0.012 0.065
Hunan 3.878 0.548 0.155 0.394 0.742 0.039 2381.210 0.003 0.626 0.005 0.036
Guangdong 3.724 0.595 0.145 0.454 0.703 0.016 2489.930 0.002 0.460 0.006 0.035
Guangxi 4.430 0.119 0.034 0.086 0.787 0.047 2741.480 0.003 0.676 0.004 0.021
Hainan 4.440 0.371 0.041 0.330 0.724 0.029 2846.330 0.003 0.540 0.007 0.024
Sichuan 3.539 0.578 0.444 0.144 0.806 0.039 1761.880 0.004 0.682 0.009 0.093
Guizhou 4.852 0.422 0.198 0.227 0.808 0.054 2977.570 0.003 0.704 0.009 0.028
Yunnan 4.632 0.198 0.071 0.127 0.812 0.068 2571.360 0.005 0.696 0.010 0.028
Shaanxi 3.692 0.284 0.026 0.258 0.699 0.023 2688.180 0.003 0.584 0.011 0.049
Gansu 4.154 0.550 0.005 0.545 0.783 0.033 2320.840 0.003 0.655 0.010 0.038
Qinghai 4.503 0.256 0.005 0.251 0.729 0.068 2419.990 0.012 0.531 0.011 0.038
Ningxia 3.645 0.288 0.000 0.288 0.745 0.038 2612.390 0.004 0.555 0.007 0.026
Xinjiang 3.408 0.412 0.032 0.379 0.680 0.060 3188.950 0.027 0.479 0.009 0.050
Source: SFPCC 1989, and NBSC 1991
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Table 5.4 Descriptive Statistics of Individual and County Variables in Taiwan. 
  
Individual Variable Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Children Ever Born 11,502 2.479 1.185 0 9 
Sterilization Status 11,502 0.285 0.451 0 1 
Male Sterilization Status 11,502 0.014 0.119 0 1 
Female Sterilization Status 11,502 0.270 0.444 0 1 
The Duration between marital month to first 
pregnancy ending month 10,971 18.125 17.490 0 220 
The Duration between first pregnancy ending 
month to second pregnancy ending month 9,656 24.039 16.384 0 169 
The Duration between second pregnancy 
ending month to third pregnancy ending 
month 6,151 28.797 21.182 0 505 
Wife's Education 11,502 9.062 3.674 0 17 
Husband's Education 11,499 10.126 3.575 0 17 
Marital Period in Month 11,499 138.703 79.777 1 376 
Wife's Age 11,499 34.083 5.867 21 45 
No work Status 11,502 0.289 0.453 0 1 
Mainlander Status 11,502 0.142 0.350 0 1 
Whether owning Piano 11,502 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Three-Generation Familial Structure 11,502 0.353 0.478 0 1 
Wife's Agricultural Occupation 11,502 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Husband's Agricultural Occupation 11,502 0.067 0.251 0 1 
Number of Dead Children 11,253 0.044 0.242 0 6 
Number of Boys 11,499 1.273 0.911 0 6 
Number of Girls 11,499 1.205 1.064 0 9 
      
County Variable      
Total Fertility Rate 11,502 1752.315 203.115 1365 2135 
o-year-old Mortality Rate 11,502 0.026 0.016 0.014 0.069 
Female Occupation Participation Rate 11,502 0.526 0.083 0.367 0.660 
Female Divorce Rate 11,502 0.006 0.002 0.0026 0.009 
Female College Gradation Rate 11,502 0.052 0.030 0.028 0.167 
Agricultural Participation Rate 11,502 22.652 16.230 1.2 57.8 
Source: TAPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
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COUNTY Children
Ever Born 
Sterilization 
Rate 
Male 
Sterilization 
Rate 
Female 
Sterilization 
Rate 
Female 
Occupation 
Participation Rate 
o-year-old 
Mortality 
Rate 
Total 
Fertility Rate 
Female 
Divorce 
Rate 
Agricultural 
Participation 
Rate 
Female 
College 
Gradation 
Rate 
Taipei City 1.996         0.183 0.020 0.163 0.660 17.120 1365.000 8.100 1.200 0.167 
Keelong City 2.250         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
0.264 0.023 0.241 0.389 15.450 1590.000 8.700 3.800 0.045 
Taichung City 2.229 0.232 0.008 0.224 0.425 23.420 1660.000 7.400 10.600 0.098 
Tainan City 2.358 0.306 0.017 0.288 0.466 14.490 1485.000 6.800 12.600 0.066 
Koushiang City 2.226 0.275 0.008 0.266 0.500 16.740 1475.000 8.200 6.900 0.060 
Shinchu City 2.383 0.205 0.023 0.182 0.582 14.770 1785.000 6.500 10.900 0.065 
Chayee City 2.375 0.290 0.013 0.277 0.392 14.120 1510.000 5.800 10.500 0.072 
Ilan County 2.650 0.280 0.022 0.258 0.417 21.840 1880.000 5.700 22.800 0.056 
Taipei County 2.381 0.227 0.015 0.213 0.581 14.920 1695.000 7.600 3.800 0.039 
Taoyuan County 2.443 0.282 0.025 0.257 0.611 25.770 1840.000 7.100 16.800 0.040 
Shinchu County 2.599 0.259 0.022 0.235 0.630 53.450 2135.000 5.200 25.400 0.035 
Maoli County 2.628 0.267 0.010 0.251 0.594 29.520 2030.000 4.900 26.600 0.042 
Taichung 
County 2.535 0.313 0.016 0.297 0.496 24.470 1875.000 5.200 25.200 0.034 
Changhua 
County 2.748 0.416 0.015 0.401 0.452 13.940 1945.000 3.400 33.500 0.034 
Nantou County 2.624 0.340 0.008 0.332 0.623 26.820 1965.000 5.300 41.200 0.036 
Yulin County 2.709 0.370 0.011 0.359 0.559 40.180 1920.000 3.400 57.800 0.052 
Chayee County 2.842 0.381 0.017 0.364 0.540 29.450 1940.000 2.600 55.000 0.038 
Tainan County 2.565 0.425 0.021 0.404 0.505 21.760 1730.000 4.500 38.500 0.033 
Koushiang 
County 2.485 0.228 0.009 0.219 0.493 19.080 1735.000 6.100 26.400 0.059 
Pinton County 2.559 0.286 0.005 0.282 0.543 18.700 1775.000 6.200 43.400 0.032 
Taidon County 2.855 0.328 0.000 0.328 0.571 69.430 1995.000 9.000 40.700 0.038 
Hualain County 2.580 0.282 0.012 0.270 0.367 61.170 1875.000 9.700 28.000 0.032 
Penghu County 2.822 0.290 0.000 0.290 0.470 62.960 1700.000 5.000 37.600 0.028 
Source: TAPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
 
 107
After deleting cases with missing values on demographic variables, 11,502 women 
remain (Table 5.4). The county data are from the Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact 
Book 1992. I have data on 23 counties or cities (Table 5.5).  In both China and Taiwan 
the dependent variable of children ever born is measured by the number of all live-born 
children the respondent reported. The dependent variable of sterilization status is 
represented by a dummy variable; 1 is coded when either member of the married couple 
has undergone sterilization, and 0 is coded for no sterilization. The dependent variables 
of male sterilization status and female sterilization status are measured in a similar way. 
Three aspects of dependent variables are computed in months: the duration from 
marriage to first pregnancy, duration from first pregnancy to second pregnancy, and 
duration from second pregnancy to third pregnancy, regardless of whether the outcome 
of the pregnancy was live childbirth, stillbirth, or miscarriage. 
The independent variables pertain both to individuals (level-1) and to their 
aggregate units (level-2, province or county). For both Taiwan and China, there are ten 
common micro-level variables and five common macro-level variables. For China, to 
measure the effect of the one-child policy on fertility behavior, I also include both a 
macro-level and a micro-level variable of whether respondents received a one-child 
certificate. For China I also include a micro-level variable of whether the respondent 
reports accepting a locally prescribed birth quota. Feeney and Wang (1993) described 
the difficulty of classifying people into three living residence categories--village, town 
and city--for the 1988 Two-per-Thousand Fertility Survey. Because, however, abundant 
research literature supports an obvious difference in fertility behavior between rural and 
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city dwellers in China, I constructed an index of rural status by calculating the 
percentage of persons designated as farmers for each of 3,184 sample units of the 1988 
survey. Observations in the sample unit with percentages over 50 were classified as 
living in rural areas. In addition, because the fertility policy in China has been more 
strictly enforced since the 1970s, I attempt to control this effect by constructing an index 
of age groups based on whether couples had been married longer than 14 years in 1988. 
Presumably, a couple who married in 1974 or later would have fewer fertility behaviors 
because of the implementation of “Wan-Xi-Shao” (“Later-Longer-Fewer”) policy in 
1973 and the one-child policy in 1979 (Xie 2000).  
With the Taiwanese data, I examined the effect of different living standards or 
wealth levels. Pianos in Taiwan are imported and expensive, so they symbolize the 
luxury of leisured classes. Also, Freedman (1972) found that couples successfully 
planning their family size also manage their economic affairs so that they can save and 
enjoy more modern consumer goods. Therefore, I include, as an indicator of wealth, a 
variable of whether the household owns a piano.  
With the level-1 variables, I will mainly examine the effects of women's status on 
fertility behavior. One of the most important women's status variables is educational 
attainment. In Taiwan, this variable is measured as the number of school years 
completed from 0 to 17. In the China data, however, there are only five categories, from 
0 (standing for illiterate) to 5 (standing for college graduation); for the purpose of 
converting it to an interval variable, I recoded the illiterate category as 0 schooling years, 
the just literate category as 2 schooling years, the primary school category as 6 schooling 
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years, the junior high school category as 9 schooling years, the senior high school 
category as 11 schooling years, and the college category as 14 school years. In Taiwan, 
women's average schooling years are 9.1, compared with 10.1 for their husbands (Table 
5.4). In China, women's average number of school years is 6.2, compared with 8.5 for 
their husbands (Table 5.1). 
Labor force experience is measured as a dummy variable, whether the wife and 
husband's occupations were agricultural. In China, 75.2% of wives and 66.8% of 
husbands are working in agricultural fields, compared with 3.3% of wives and 6.7% of 
husbands in Taiwan. In addition, with the Taiwanese data, I recoded an extra variable--
no work status for wives if they never worked outside the home.  Slightly more than a 
fourth, 28.9%, of women have never worked outside the home. This variable may give 
us a clear picture of the effect of work experience on the issues in question. 
To examine the effects of familial structure on women's fertility behavior, in 
Taiwan if respondents answered they currently live with parents, and in China if 
respondents and parents lived together in the household unit, then the dummy variable of 
three-generation familial structure is coded as 1. In China, only 7.8% of respondents live 
with their parents, compared with 35.3% in Taiwan. 
Marital period in months may stand for the measure of age at marriage and 
marital experience. In China, the wife's average marital period is 180.3 months, 
compared with 138.7 months for their Taiwanese counterparts. In this dissertation, 
women's average age in China is 35.9 years and in Taiwan, 34.1. In China, the minority 
nationalities (non-Han) are noted for higher fertility, partly due to policy laxity. Previous 
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studies also show that those who have immigrated to Taiwan since 1949, also known as 
"mainlanders," have lower fertility rates. Therefore, if wives or husbands are Han or 
mainlanders, then the dummy variables are recoded as 1. Almost 90% of respondents in 
China are Han, and 14.2% of respondents in Taiwan are mainlanders. The "number of 
dead children" is defined as a live birth but dead within one year. Chinese women have 
an average of 0.25, larger than the 0.04 for Taiwanese. Chinese women have 1.4 boys, 
while Taiwanese have 1.3.  
In China, 82% of the women in the 1988 survey live in a rural area as already 
operationally defined. Forty-five percent of the women have been married for more than 
14 years. Those who accept the one-child certificate will get better benefits but will be 
punished if they violate the agreement. In our sample, 16% of respondents claim that 
they accepted this certificate. Thirty-four percent of women have experience in 
accepting the locally prescribed birth quota. As mentioned above, in Taiwan, whether 
the household owns a piano indicates higher living standards; almost 13% of 
respondents in the 1992 KAP have a piano at home. 
I use six common my level-2 independent variables, and one more variable for 
China. 
The first aggregate variable is the total fertility rate (TFR). In China, the 1989 
TFR is 2370; the 1991 TFR for Taiwan is 1752. 
The second aggregate variable is the rate of occurrence of child death before one 
year of age, called 0-year-old-age mortality rate (0MR) as a proxy for the infant 
mortality rate. In China, the 1989 0MR is 2.8%; the 1991 Taiwanese 0MR is 2.6%. 
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The third aggregate variable is the female occupation participation rate, which is 
measured as the proportion of total female workers to the total number of women older 
than 15 years. In China, the 1989 female occupation participation rate is 71.6%; the 
Taiwanese rate is 52.6%. 
The fourth aggregate variable is the female divorce rate, which is measured as 
the proportion of total divorced females to the total number of women older than 15 
years. In China, the 1989 female divorce rate is 0.04%; the Taiwanese rate is 0.06%. 
The fifth aggregate variable is the female college graduation rate, which is 
measured as the proportion of females 25 years old and above with at least a college 
degree to all women 25 years and older. I use data from the 1988 fertility survey for 
China and the 1992 KAP Survey for Taiwan. In China, the female college graduation 
rate is 1.3%; the Taiwanese rate is 5.2%. 
The sixth aggregate variable is the agricultural participation rate, which is 
measured as the proportion of agricultural workers to the total population older than 15 
years. In China, the 1989 agricultural participation rate is 52.7%; the Taiwanese rate is 
22.7%. 
Freedman and his associates (1988) consider the one-child ratio as a plausible 
proxy for program effect. Accordingly, I examine the prevalence of one-child certificates 
at the provincial level, calculated from the 1988 fertility survey. The average rate is 
6.5%. According to Table 5.3, Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing are the three provinces 
with the greatest prevalence of certificates.  
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Hypotheses  
In this research, I propose to test 7 macro-level and 14 micro-level hypotheses 
based on the literature and theoretical review in Chapter IV. In terms of the cross-level 
effects for multi-level analysis, I expect that macro-level (level-2) variables generally 
affect the slope of the micro-level (level-1) variables on the outcome variables, so that 
the final result of fertility behavior will be consistent with the relationship presented by 
the macro-level hypotheses.  
The macro-level hypotheses are the following:   
(1)  The higher the total fertility rate in the province or county, the greater the number of 
children a woman will have ever born, and the lower her or her husband’s probability of 
being sterilized. 
(2)  The higher the 0-year-old-age mortality rate in the province or county, the greater 
the number of children a woman will have ever born, and the lower her or her husband’s 
probability of being sterilized. 
(3)  The lower the female occupation participation rate in the province or county, the 
greater the number of children a woman will have ever born, and the higher her 
probability of being sterilized. 
(4)  The lower the female divorce rate in the province or county, the greater the number 
of children a woman will have ever born, and the higher her probability of being 
sterilized. 
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(5)  The lower the female college graduation rate in the province or county, the greater 
the number of children a woman will have ever born, and the higher her probability of 
being sterilized. 
(6)  The higher the agricultural participation rate in the province or county, the greater 
the number of children a woman will have ever born, and the lower her or her husband’s 
probability of being sterilized. 
(7)  The lower the one-child certificate rate in the Chinese province, the greater the 
number of children a woman will have ever born, and the lower her or her husband’s 
probability of being sterilized. 
The micro-level hypotheses are the following: 
(1)  The lower the wife's education, the greater the number of children she will have ever 
born, the greater her probability of being sterilized, the less her husband’s probability of 
being sterilized, and the greater the hazard of going from the marriage or birth event to 
the next birth.  
(2)  The lower the husband's education, the greater the number of children his wife will 
have ever born, the greater his and his wife’s probability of being sterilized, and the 
greater the hazard of going from the marriage or birth event to the next birth. 
(3)  The longer the wife's marital period, that is, the younger the marital age, the greater 
the number of children she will have ever born, the greater her and her husband’s 
probability of being sterilized, and the greater the hazard of going from the marriage or 
birth event to the next birth. 
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(4)  Those who are Han in China or mainlanders in Taiwan should have fewer children 
ever born, a greater probability of being sterilized, and a lower hazard of going from the 
marriage or birth event to the next birth than those not having this race status. 
(5)  Those who live with parents should have more children ever born, a lower 
probability of being sterilized, and a greater hazard of going from the marriage or birth 
event to the next birth than those not living with parents. 
(6)  The greater the number of dead children, the greater the number of children a 
woman will have ever born, the lower her and her husband’s probability of being 
sterilized, and the greater the hazard of going from one birth event to the next. 
(7)  The greater the number of male births, the greater the probability of being sterilized, 
and the less the hazard of going from one birth event to the next. 
(8)  Wives who are in agricultural occupations should have more children ever born, a 
lower probability of being sterilized, and a greater hazard of going from the marriage or 
birth event to the next birth, than those who are not. 
(9)  Wives with husbands who are in agricultural occupations should have more children 
ever born, a lower probability of being sterilized, and a greater hazard of going from the 
marriage or birth event to the next birth, than those who do not. 
(10)  Wives in Taiwan who have never worked outside the home should have a greater 
number of children ever born, a greater probability of being sterilized, and a greater 
hazard of going from the marriage or birth event to the next birth, than those who work 
outside the home. 
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(11)  Those in Taiwan who have a piano at home should have fewer children ever born, 
a lower probability of being sterilized, and a lower hazard of going from the marriage or 
birth event to the next birth, than those who do not have one. 
(12)  Those in China who do not accept the one-child certificate should have more 
children ever born, a lower probability of being sterilized, and a greater hazard of going 
from marriage or birth event to the next birth, than those who do not accept one. 
(13)  Those in China who have experience accepting the birth quota should have less 
children ever born, a higher probability of being sterilized, and a less hazard of going 
from marriage or birth event to the next birth, than those who do not have one. 
(14)  Those in China who live in rural areas should have more children ever born, a 
higher probability of being sterilized, and a greater hazard of going from marriage or 
birth event to the next birth, than those who do not have one. 
 
Methods 
Six methods of analysis are applied to the data in this study. A Robust 
Regression Model is used to examine effects of the independent variables at the macro 
level. Poisson, logistic and survival analyses are individual-level methods. Bernoulli and 
Poisson models of Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling (HGLM) are methods of 
multilevel analysis. 
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Robust Regression Model 
To determine the relationship between the predictors and dependent variables at the 
macro level, I regress the number of CEB (children ever born) and the sterilization rate 
at the provincial and county levels on aggregate level predictors acquired from Table 5.3 
for China and Table 5.5 for Taiwan. Although OLS is an efficient estimator given 
normally distributed errors, it loses efficiency when error distributions have heavier than 
normal tails. When the distribution of the residuals includes outliers, and/or is abnormal 
with heavy tails, robust techniques yield estimates which are more efficient than OLS 
estimates (Hamilton 1992).   
On the L-R chart (please refer to Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.2), the horizontal and 
vertical lines mark the mean of leverage (horizontal line) and the mean of squared 
residuals (vertical line). Leverage Scores indicate each observation’s (i.e., province’s) 
potential to influence the regression model due to its unusual combination of values on 
one or more X variables. Large values on the squared residuals indicate observations 
with Y values, in this case CEB, which are very much different from those predicted by 
the OLS regression model. 
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x: Yunnan y: Shaanxi z: Gansu  
 
Figure 5.1 Leverage-vs-Squared-Residuals Plot for CEB OLS Models of Provinces in China  
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 Figure 5.2 Leverage-vs-Squared-Residuals Plot for CEB OLS Models of Cities/Counties in Taiwan 
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Table 5.6 Leverages of Provinces/Counties Bigger Than 0.2 for CEB OLS Models of China and 
Taiwan. 
 
China  Taiwan 
Province Leverage   County Leverage 
      Beijing    0.934       Keelong City   0.263 
      Tianjin    0.207      Taichung City   0.300 
 Heilongjiang    0.232     Koushiang City   0.224 
     Shanghai    0.567        Chayee City   0.229 
      Jiangsu    0.757        Ilan County   0.248 
     Zhejiang    0.211      Taipei County   0.252 
      Sichuan    0.247     Shinchu County   0.260 
       Yunnan    0.307    Changhua County   0.265 
      Qinghai    0.252       Yulin County   0.214 
     Xinjiang    0.907      Chayee County   0.219 
       Taidon County   0.415 
      Hualain County   0.499 
          Penghu County   0.621 
Source: SFPCC 1989, and TAPIFP 1992 
 
 
 
Hence, Jiangsu is an obvious outlier in China; Taidon and Taichung for Taiwan. 
Plus, referred with the Table 5.6, we can see the leverages of Beijing, Shanghai, Jiangsu,  
Xinjiang in China, and Penghu County in Taiwan are over 0.5, the so-called “avoid if 
possible” rule of thumb value. Besides, according to the caution of Hamilton (1992), 
there are four OLS coefficients are more than one robust standard error from the 
corresponding robust coefficient in China and one in Taiwan (please, refer to Table 5.7) . 
These diagnosis results suggest the legitimacy of using robust regression rather than 
OLS for province/county level analysis.  
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Table 5.7 Comparisons of Results of CEB OLS and Robust Models of China and Taiwan. 
 
 China Taiwan 
 OLS Estimates  Robust Estimates  OLS Estimates Robust Estimates  
            
CEB      Coef.  Std. Err.        Coef.   Std. Err. 
Compare/
by robust 
standard 
error 
    Coef.   Std. Err.       Coef.    Std. Err.  
Compare/by 
robust 
standard 
error 
 fopr  -0.769  1.017   0.453  0.798  -1.531  -0.239  0.255 -0.264  0.218  0.112  
  imr  29.020  5.546   20.848  4.118  1.984  0.006  0.001 0.005  0.001  0.875  
  tfr  0.000  0.000   0.000  0.000  -0.977  0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.204  
  fdr  -54.597  16.907  -49.582  12.869 -0.390  -0.051  0.012 -0.063  0.010  1.156  
  fcr  6.742  6.536   41.335  15.683 -2.206  -2.244  0.887 -2.221  0.759  -0.030  
 papr  -5.734  1.999   -10.274  3.395  1.338       
_cons 3.732  0.605   2.701  0.390  2.646  2.516  0.310 2.674  0.265  -0.597  
tfr: Total Fertility Rate                    fdr: Female Divorce Rate   
imr: Infant Mortality Rate                 fcr: Female College Gradation Rate    
fopr: Female Occupation Participation Rate   papr: One-Child Certificate Rate   
 
Source: SFPCC 1989, and TAPIFP 1992 
 
I will use only one type of robust regression. This method is based on iteratively 
reweighted least squares (IRLS) with Huber and bi-weight functions, instead of ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression. 
 
Poisson Model 
The dependent variable of children ever born is a count variable; that is, it is a 
"nonnegative integer-valued random variable" (Cameron and Trivedi 1998, p. 1). In the 
data, this variable is not normally distributed.  It ranges from 0 to 15 in China and 0 to 9 
in Taiwan, and is quite skewed to the left (please refer to Figure 5.2). In data such as 
these, Cameron and Trivedi caution that "common regression estimators and models,   
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Figure 5.3 Observed CEB Distribution and Poisson Distribution for China and Taiwan 
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such as ordinary least squares (OLS) in the linear regression model, ignore the restricted 
support for the dependent variables" (1998, p. 2). Therefore, to avoid producing biased, 
inefficient, and inconsistent estimates, maximum likelihood Poisson regression will be 
used instead of OLS regression. For graphic verification, the distribution of the CEB 
variables is examined. Indeed the observed distribution of the CEB variables for China 
and Taiwan in Figure 5.2 resembles a Poisson distribution (green line).Also graphed in 
Figure 5.2 is the univariate Poisson distribution (brown line) for the China and Taiwan 
means, according to the univariate Poisson formula: 
Pr(Y = y)=exp(-µ) µ
y  
  ,   y = 0, 1, 2,.... 
                        y!
 
where Pr is the Poisson probability for each value of the count variable, and µ  is the 
mean of the univariate Poisson distribution. In the case of the Poisson distribution shown 
in Figure 5.2, µ =2.71 for China and µ =2.48 for Taiwan, and y  is the value of the 
count variable, that is, the number of CEB, ranging from 0 to 9 in Figure 5.2.  
The univariate Poisson distribution, Poston (2002b) cautions, should not be 
expected to perfectly predict the proportions of women at each count of CEB, because 
this distribution does not take into account the heterogeneity of the women. Also, Poston 
warns, although use of the Poisson regression model is appropriate when the mean and 
the variance of the count distribution are similar, it is less applicable when the variance 
of the distribution exceeds the mean (also called over-dispersion). The distributions of 
the CEB data for China and Taiwan are close enough to Poisson distributions, however, 
to justify use of Poisson regression as a modeling strategy. In the actual estimation of the 
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Poisson regression models in Chapter VI, I introduce a Poisson Goodness of Fit χ2 
statistic that functions formally to test whether the CEB data are Poisson distributed. 
In a Poisson regression model, the dependent variable (the number of events, i.e., 
the number of children ever born) is a nonnegative integer and has a Poisson distribution 
with a conditional mean that depends on the characteristics (the independent variables) 
of the women. The model therefore incorporates observed heterogeneity according to the 
following structural equation: 
)...(exp 2211 kkiiii bXbXbXa ++++=µ  
µi=exp(a + X1ib1 + X2ib2+......Xkibk) 
where iµ  is the expected number of children ever born for the ith woman; X1i, X2i ... 
Xki are her characteristics; and a, b1, b2 ... bk are the Poisson regression coefficients. 
The Poisson regression model is a nonlinear model, predicting for each 
individual woman the number of children she has had ever born to her, iµ . The X 
variables are related to iµ nonlinearly.  
 
Logistic Model 
Logistic regression is applied to examine the probabilities that respondents use 
sterilization as their contraceptive method. This is a dummy variable with a binary 
category, and the maximum-likelihood (ML) method is used. In the logistic regression 
model, the maximum likelihood method, which yields values for the unknown 
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parameters that maximize the probability of obtaining the observed set of data, provides 
the foundation for estimating the probabilities of the chosen dependent variables. 
Mathematically, it is specified as 
Log {Prob(using sterilization)/Prob(not using sterilization)} =b0+ b1X1+....bpXp
or      P   =ea+b1X1+...bpXu 
      1- P 
where b0 and b1 represent coefficients of log odds and X1 represents the predictor 
variables. The logistic coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the log odds (or 
odds) associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. The odds ratio is 
the probability that the specified change in the independent variable will occur, divided 
by the probability that it will not occur (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Instead of 
assuming that the relationship between p and Xi is linear, we instead assume that the 
relationship is linear between the logarithm of the odds of success, i.e., ln[p/(1-p)], and 
Xi . 
 
Survival Analysis 
Survival analysis, also called event history analysis, has the advantage of 
modeling time-dependent variables and their duration. Specifically, it focuses on the 
analysis of the duration of the "nonoccurrence of certain events" during the risk period; 
stated differently, it focuses on whether an event occurs during the risk period. Event 
history models the “instantaneous probability” (Tuma and Hannan 1984) of having a 
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certain event at time t given that the event has not occurred before time t. This 
probability is called the “hazard rate” or “risk.” 
The hazard model is computed as follows: 
hj(t|t0)=lim  
     Sj(t|t0)- Sj(t+∆t|t0)
  
           
 ∆t→0
            
 Sj(t|t0) ∆t                    
 
where hj denotes the risk, and Sj denotes the survival function, which is the probability 
that the event does not occur at time t.  In other words, the survival function (Sj) is the 
ratio of all people who do not have the event at time t divided by the number of people at 
risk at time t. 
One major advantage of the hazard-rate model in analysis of duration data, 
according to Yamaguchi (1991) is its capacity to handle various kinds of “censored” 
observations. That is, it allows estimation of the number of people who do not 
experience the event, thereby making the event-history models statistically more 
powerful. Because the observation period of each analysis is always limited, the concept 
of censoring is introduced to refer to lack of complete information about the duration of 
the risk period (Yamaguchi 1991, p. 3). More precisely, censoring occurs when we have 
some information about the individual’s survival time, but the exact survival time is 
unknown. For example, OLS can model variation in the length of the interval that 
precedes a birth (i.e., the birth interval), but women who had not given birth by the time 
of the interview would be excluded. Conversely, a logistic model can examine the 
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probability of having or not having a particular birth, but it cannot include variation in 
the timing of having the birth. This limits its statistical power (Yamaguchi 1991).  
In my research, I assume that a Chinese couple would not be at risk for 
pregnancy until they are married, even though the period in which a couple is at risk is 
for pregnancy could in actuality begin before the marriage date. I try to identify the 
effects of women’s characteristics and of their living patterns on their hazard of having 
the first, second and third childbirths, respectively. For the first scenario of childbirth, 
once women were married, then their risk period started during the observation period 
and ended either with the event of first childbirth or with the moment when the survey 
ended in August 1988. For the second scenario of childbirth, once women had their first 
childbirth, then their risk period started during the observation period and ended either 
with the event of second childbirth or without the event of second childbirth when the 
survey was done. Similarly, in the third scenario of childbirth, once women had their 
second childbirth, their risk period started during the observation period and closed 
either when the event of third childbirth happened or when the survey terminated. 
Several statistical models are available for doing survival analysis. Here, the Cox 
proportional hazard model is chosen to investigate the effects of the variables in question. 
Unlike other models that are parametric, the Cox model is only partially parametric, 
which means that it does not specify how time distribution is to be modeled. The Cox 
proportional hazards model is a partial-likelihood estimation method. According to 
Yamaguchi (1991, p. 101), it is one of the most popular event-history analysis methods 
in the social sciences, mainly because the investigator does not have to model time. 
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The two main advantages of the Cox continuous-time proportional hazards 
model over ML continuous-time models and discrete-time models are discussed by 
Yamaguchi (1991). As noted, the first and most significant advantage is that the Cox 
model allows the equation to assume time dependence but does not need to specify how 
time enters the equation can assume time dependence without having to specify its form 
(Yamaguchi, 1991, p. 102). In contrast to the ML continuous model that requires us to 
specify how time would enter the equation, the Cox model is solved using a partial 
likelihood (PL) approach, which gives it its advantage the PL method. When all of the 
dependent variables are time-dependent (which means that the values of the independent 
variables do not change over time) the Cox model may be represented as follows: 
Log h(t) =log h0 (t) +b1X1 + b2X2 +….+BiXi  
where log h(t) is the hazard rate (or, hazard function); it expresses the instantaneous risk 
of occurrence of the event of interest during the interval from t to t+s, given that the 
event did not occur before time t (Allison 1984, p. 34). Rather actually being a 
probability, it is a rate. Therefore, the values of the hazard function range from zero to 
infinity: h0(t) is any function of time t which need not be specified; and X1 to Xi are 
independent variables. 
The form of Cox’s model can alternatively be represented as 
R(t)=q(t)f(x(t)) 
In other words, Cox’s model assumes that each transition rate R(t) has two 
components. One is an unknown, possibly time-dependent nuisance function q(t) that 
affects the rate of every member of the population in the same way. The second is f(x(t)), 
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which is assumed to depend on a vector of observed causal variables x(t), on parameters 
to be estimated, and possibly to depend also on time t.  
The partially parametric approach does not require specification for q(t); 
however, it does require parametric assumptions about the dependence of f(x(t)) on the 
observed variables x(t). Usually it is assumed that the rate of an event is a log-linear 
function of the current values of observed variables: 
F(x(t))=eαx(t) 
where α is an unknown vector of parameters to be estimated. 
The second advantage of Cox’s method is that it has the ability to use stratified 
models that permit us to control for categorical independent variables that may interact 
with time in a complicated fashion, yet it does not require that we specify the form of the 
interaction effects. This is an advantage when we are not interested in the effects of 
given specific covariates and their interactions with time, but rather the effects of other 
covariates. A stratified model allows us to control for the categorical variables without 
stratifying the complicated interaction between those variables and time (Yamaguchi 
1991, p. 102). Running a stratified model “is equivalent to estimating separate Cox 
proportional hazard models under the constraint that the coefficients, but not the baseline 
hazard functions, are equal”(STATA 6.0 1999, p. 380). Because there are different 
baseline hazard functions, the fitted stratified Cox model will yield different estimated 
survival curves for any two groups compared. To test for the equality of survivor 
functions for several categorical variables such as rural, farmer, three generation 
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household, I will use log-rank test, which tests the null hypothesis of a common survival 
curve for the two groups of subjects (Kleinbaum 1996; STATA 6.0 1999, p. 460). 
 
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM) 
One of the basic problems of the social sciences, Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) 
observed, is relating properties of individuals to the properties of the groups and 
structures in which the individuals function. Individuals are not scattered in the society, 
but function within specific differentiated groups, and each group has its own 
characteristics that not only distinguish it from other groups, but also generate effects on 
the individuals who belong to it. When individuals are grouped into larger units, each 
unit comprises a number of individuals,  and the data structures become nested or 
hierarchical. But when values of higher-order variables are assigned to an individual, the 
classical assumption of independence is violated. The main problem with this kind of 
disaggregation is that although individuals in different groups are independent, 
individuals in each specific group share the same values on the group variable. It also 
does not make sense to aggregate the individual-level variables to the higher level, 
because in so doing a large portion of within-group information will go unobserved. 
Also, relations among aggregated variables are often stronger and different from the 
relations at the individual level (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). 
Over the last two decades, multilevel models (i.e., models characterized by the 
advantages of modeling social-scientific data within a hierarchical nested structure) have 
become widely used and accepted (Poston 2002a). These models are also called 
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contextual models, hierarchical linear models, hierarchical liner regression, random 
coefficients models, hierarchical mixed linear models, or Bayesian linear models (Kreft 
et al. 1990). Traditionally, the micro-level coefficient is expressed as an exact function 
of macro-level variables and are known as fixed effects. The new models, by specifying 
the regression coefficients as random effects, contain error terms in the macro equations. 
The inclusion of these error terms at the macro-level implies a more complex error 
structure in the single-equation version of the multilevel model. 
The purposes of using multilevel modeling, as suggested by DiPrete and Forristal 
(1994), are to explain micro-level outcomes in two ways: (1) by showing as a function of 
context the parameters of models specified at the micro-level and (2) by expressing 
micro-macro interactions in terms of characteristics of the context. By these new 
techniques, “we can now pose hypotheses about relations occurring at each level and 
across levels and also assess the amount of variation at each level. . . . The applications 
to date have been encouraging in that they have both afforded an exploration of new 
questions and provided some empirical results that might otherwise have gone 
undetected” (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992, p. 3). 
Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM), first introduced by Bryk and Raudenbush in 
1988, is one of several kinds of hierarchical models for analyzing hierarchically 
structured data. Instead of using standard HLM, which assumes a normal distribution of 
the dependent variable, I will estimate two non-linear models. First, given the binary 
nature of the dependent variable and the two levels of predictors used in the analysis, I 
will use the Bernoulli (or binary) method for the dependent variable--sterilization status. 
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Second, as mentioned in the discussion of the Poisson analysis, the dependent variable of 
children ever born, which Bryk and his colleagues (1996) call count data, is skewed. 
Therefore, a Poisson non-linear model is used for the dependent variable of children ever 
born. 
The HGLM, also known as the generalized linear model with random effects 
(Schall 1991) or the generalized linear mixed model (cf. Berslow and Clayton 1993) is 
preferred over the standard HLM when the dependent variables are binary or counts. As 
Bryk and his colleagues (1996) observed, the standard HLM is appropriate for two- and 
three-level data when the random effects at each level are normally distributed or when 
the outcome variable is continuous. However, when the assumption of normality at 
level-1 is not realistic, as in the case of CEB and contraceptive usage, the use of standard 
HLM would be biased. Consequently, the assumption of normal distribution with 
homogeneous variance is not satisfied (Bryk et al. 1996; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). 
In fact, Bryk and his colleagues (1996) considered the standard HLM model a special 
case of Hierarchical Generalized Linear Model (HGLM) in which the sampling model is 
normal and the link function is the identity link.  
When the level-1 sampling model is binomial, as for the dependent variable 
sterilization, HGLM uses the logit link function: 
ηij = log         
φij        
                 
  1-φij 
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In the level-1 model, ijη is the predicted log-odds of success, or the logit. In the 
level-1 model, φij is the probability of success. If, for example, φij is 0.5, the odds of 
success is 1.0, and the log-odds, or the logit, is zero. When the probability of success is 
less than 0.5, the odds are less than one and the logit is negative. Conversely, and when 
the probability is greater than 0.5, the odds are greater than unity and the logit is positive.  
The Bernoulli nonlinear approach in HGLM will be estimated for the logit link function. 
When the level-1 sampling model is Poisson, such as the values of CEB, HGLM 
uses the log link function, expressed as 
ηij = log( λij ) 
In other words, ηij is the log of the event rate. When the event rate, λij, is one, the log is 
zero. When the event rate is less than one, the log is negative; when the event rate is 
greater than one, the log is positive. Thus, whereas λij is constrained to be non-negative, 
ηij can be any real value.  The Poisson nonlinear approach in HGLM will be estimated 
for the log link function.  
In Chapter VI, I use two separate steps to process the multilevel analysis. The first 
step is the One-way ANOVA Model and the second step is the Intercept- And Slopes-
As-Outcomes Model (Arnold 1992). 
 
One-way ANOVA Model 
I begin the analysis of the data with a simple model without predictors at either 
level: a one-way ANOVA model. This analysis makes available baseline information 
about the outcome variables of CEB and sterilization status. Specifically, it shows how 
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much variation is at the individual-level and how much is at the province-level or 
county-level. In this way, the within-province and between-province variance in the 
probability for each value of CEB or in the risk of sterilization can be compared. 
According to Bryk and Raudenbush (1992), the One-way ANOVA results offer the 
following introductory information about the possibility of the numbers of CEB or 
sterilizations in the 27 provinces of China or the 23 counties of Taiwan: (1) an estimate 
of the grand mean; (2) an estimate of the level-2 variance component, which can be used 
to calculate the intra-class correlation based on the concept of a “latent variable”; (3) a 
measure of the reliability of each state’s sample mean likelihood as an estimate of its 
true population mean; and (4) a test of the hypothesis that all provinces have the same 
risk of sterilization, or the same rate of CEB. 
The level-1 one-way ANOVA model is basically: 
ηij  =β0j 
where ηij is the predicted log-odds of success, i.e., the logit of being sterilized, or the 
predicted log of the CEB event rate.  
β0j is the intercept of province j of China or county j of Taiwan from the aggregate-
level model specified below; it is the average log of the CEB event rate or average log 
odds of sterilization for the jth province or county. 
The level-2 one-way ANOVA model is denoted as: 
 β0j = γ00 + µ0j
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where γ00 is the average log of the CEB event rate or the average log-odds of being 
sterilized across all provinces in China or all counties in Taiwan, while µ0 is a random 
error associated with province j or county j and has a normal distribution with a mean of 
0 and a constant variance of τ00. The value of τ00 is the variance between provinces or 
counties in province-or-county-average log of the CEB event rate or province-or-county-
average log odds of sterilization. As mentioned before, this aggregate-level equation is 
estimated in order to provide the intercepts for each of the provinces or counties. Each 
province-or-county-average log of the CEB event rate or province-or-county-average log 
odds of sterilization is a function of the grand average log of the CEB event rate or log 
odds of sterilization, together with a random error.  
By merging the between-state equation into the within-state equation, a combined 
model is derived: 
ηij  = γ00 + µ0j
This equation is equivalent to a one-way ANOVA with grand average log of the 
CEB event rate or grand average log-odds of sterilization. Because no predictor is 
specified at either level, the model is fully unconditional. It provides information that 
can be used to calculate the variability occurring at each of the two levels, and also the 
reliability of each state’s sample mean as an estimate of its true population mean. All of 
these features contribute to a useful set of preliminary information in the hierarchical 
data analysis. If the variance between provinces (or counties) is not significantly 
different from zero, then there is no need to estimate a multi-level model. 
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Intercept- and Slopes-As-Outcomes Model 
The Intercept- and Slopes-As-Outcomes Model estimates the variability of 
intercepts and slopes across level-2 units. The individual women are the level-1 units of 
analysis, and the states are the level-2 analysis units.  
To enhance the interpretability of the province or county effects, the individual 
covariates are centered around the group means, while the state-level variables are 
centered around the grand mean. With mean centering, the individual-level intercept 
becomes the average log odds for the group in a province or county, adjusted for the set 
of individual-level covariates. In addition, by centering the variables around their 
respective state means,  β0j denotes the average log odds or log of the event rate in 
province or county j. In this way, the between-province or between-state equation for β0j 
stands for the regression of average log odds on state characteristics and is equivalent to 
using the state as the unit of analysis. 
I have included below an example using as the dependent variable Chinese 
women’s sterilization status. The Bernoulli nonlinear approach in HGLM for the logit 
link function is displayed. 
The level-1 structural model is as follows (bold: group-mean centering): 
 
 
ηij = log         
φij       =         
                    1-φij                         
 
β0j + β0j(Rural)ij+ β2j(Education)ij+ β3j(Han)ij+  β4j(HAge)ij+    
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β5 Myears)ij+ β6j(ThreeG)ij+ β7j(Farmer)ij+ β8j(Nopap)ij+  β9j(Noindex)ij+  j(
rij 
 
where ηij is the log odds of sterilization for women i in China’s province j or Taiwan’s 
county j; β0j is the intercept, or the average log odds of sterilization in China’s province 
j or Taiwan’s county j; and β0j , β1j .. β9j are the coefficients associated with level-1 
variables Rural, Education, Han, HAge, Myears, ThreeG, Farmer, Nopap, and Noindex 
for Women i in China’s province j, respectively; or the slopes of independent variables 
on the log odds of sterilization. 
The level-2 structural model is specified as (Italic bold: grand-mean centering): 
β0j=γ00+ γ01(FOPR) j+ γ02(IMR) j+ γ03(TFR) j+ γ04(FDR) j+ γ05(AGR) j+  
γ06(FCR) j+ γ07(PAPR) j+µ0 j 
β1j=γ10+ γ11(FOPR) j+ γ12(IMR) j+ γ13(TFR) j+ γ14(FDR) j+ γ15(AGR) j+  
γ16(FCR) j+ γ17(PAPR) j+µ1 j 
β2j=γ20+ γ21(FOPR) j+ γ22(IMR) j+ γ23(TFR) j+ γ24(FDR) j+ γ25(AGR) j+  
γ26(FCR) j+ γ27(PAPR) j+µ2 j 
β3j=γ30+ γ31(FOPR) j+ γ32(IMR) j+ γ33(TFR) j+ γ34(FDR) j+ γ35(AGR) j+  
γ36(FCR) j+ γ37(PAPR) j+µ3 j 
β4j=γ40+ γ41(FOPR) j+ γ42(IMR) j+ γ43(TFR) j+ γ44(FDR) j+ γ45(AGR) j+  
γ46(FCR) j+ γ47(PAPR) j+µ4 j 
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β5j=γ50+ γ51(FOPR) j+ γ52(IMR) j+ γ53(TFR) j+ γ54(FDR) j+ γ55(AGR) j+  
γ56(FCR) j+ γ57(PAPR) j+µ5 j 
β6j=γ60+ γ61(FOPR) j+ γ62(IMR) j+ γ63(TFR) j+ γ64(FDR) j+ γ65(AGR) j+  
γ66(FCR) j+ γ67(PAPR) j+µ6 j 
β7j=γ70+ γ71(FOPR) j+ γ72(IMR) j+ γ73(TFR) j+ γ74(FDR) j+ γ75(AGR) j+  
γ76(FCR) j+ γ77(PAPR) j+µ7 j 
β8j=γ80+ γ81(FOPR) j+ γ82(IMR) j+ γ83(TFR) j+ γ84(FDR) j+ γ85(AGR) j+  
γ86(FCR) j+ γ87(PAPR) j+µ8 j 
β9j=γ90+ γ91(FOPR) j+ γ92(IMR) j+ γ93(TFR) j+ γ94(FDR) j+ γ95(AGR) j+  
γ96(FCR) j+ γ97(PAPR) j+µ9 j 
 
where  
γ00is the expected intercept or the average log odds of sterilization for provinces, 
γ10, γ20.... γ90 are the expected slopes for a province with values of zero on the 
level-2 independent variables FOPR, IMR, TFR, FDR, AGR, FCR, and PAPR, 
respectively, 
γ01, γ02, γ03....... γ95, γ96,  and γ97 are the regression coefficients associated with 
mean values of level-2 variables FOPR, IMR, TFR, FDR, AGR, FCR, and PAPR, 
respectively, 
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µ0 j,  µ1 j...... µ9 j  are the unique random effects associated with province j. 
When the level-2 equations are replaced within the level-1 model equation, the 
following integrated equation results: 
 
ηij = log         
φij           =     
                    1-φij                         
γ00+ γ01(FOPR) j+ γ02(IMR) j+ γ03(TFR) j+ γ04(FDR) j+ γ05(AGR) j+  
γ06(FCR) j+ γ07(PAPR) j+ γ10(Rural)ij + γ11(FOPR) j(Rural)ij + 
 γ12(IMR) j(Rural)ij + γ13(TFR) j(Rural)ij + γ14(FDR) j(Rural)ij + γ15(AGR) 
j(Rural)ij + γ16(FCR) j(Rural)ij + γ17(PAPR) j(Rural)ij+γ20(Education)ij + 
γ21(FOPR) j(Education)ij + γ22(IMR) j(Education)ij + γ23(TFR) j(Education)ij + 
γ24(FDR) j(Education)ij + γ25(AGR) j(Education)ij + γ26(FCR) j(Education)ij + 
γ27(PAPR) j(Education)ij+γ30(Han)ij + γ31(FOPR) j(Han)ij + γ32(IMR) j(Han)ij + 
γ33(TFR) j(Han)ij + γ34(FDR) j(Han)ij + γ35(AGR) j(Han)ij + γ36(FCR) j(Han)ij + 
γ37(PAPR) j(Han)ij+γ40(HAge)ij + γ41(FOPR) j(HAge)ij + γ42(IMR) j(HAge)ij + 
γ43(TFR) j(HAge)ij + γ44(FDR) j(HAge)ij + γ45(AGR) j(HAge)ij +  
γ46(FCR) j(HAge)ij + γ47(PAPR) j(HAge)ij+γ50(Myears)ij + γ51(FOPR) j(Myears)ij 
+ γ52(IMR) j(Myears)ij + γ53(TFR) j(Myears)ij + γ54(FDR) j(Myears)ij + 
 γ55(AGR) j(Myears)ij + γ56(FCR) j(Myears)ij + γ57(PAPR) j(Myears)ij 
+γ60(ThreeG)ij + γ61(FOPR) j(ThreeG)ij + γ62(IMR) j(ThreeG)ij + 
 γ63(TFR) j(ThreeG)ij + γ64(FDR) j(ThreeG)ij + γ65(AGR) j(ThreeG)ij +  
γ66(FCR) j(ThreeG)ij + γ67(PAPR)j(ThreeG)ij+γ70(Farmer)ij + 
 γ71(FOPR) j(Farmer)ij + γ72(IMR) j(Farmer)ij + γ73(TFR) j(Farmer)ij + 
 γ74(FDR) j(Farmer)ij + γ75(AGR) j(Farmer)ij + γ76(FCR) j(Farmer)ij + 
γ77(PAPR) j(Farmer)ij+ γ80(Nopap)ij + γ81(FOPR) j(Nopap)ij + 
 γ82(IMR) j(Nopap)ij + γ83(TFR) j(Nopap)ij + γ84(FDR) j(Nopap)ij +  
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γ85(AGR) j(Nopap)ij + γ86(FCR) j(Nopap)ij + γ87(PAPR) j(Nopap)ij+γ90(Noindex)ij 
+ γ91(FOPR) j(Noindex)ij + γ92(IMR) j(Noindex)ij + γ93(TFR) j(Noindex)ij + 
γ94(FDR) j(Noindex)ij + γ95(AGR) j(Noindex)ij + γ96(FCR) j(Noindex)ij + 
 γ97(PAPR) j(Noindex)ij+µ9 j+µ8 j +µ7 j+µ6 j +µ5 j+µ4 j +µ3 j+µ2 j +µ1 j+µ0 j  
 
This model asserts that an individual woman’s average risk of being sterilized is a 
function of the following: 
●  the overall effect  γ00 , or the expected log-odds of sterilization for a Chinese 
woman with values of zero on the predictors:  in other words, for a non-Han, non-farmer 
Chinese woman without any years of schooling,  without living in a three-generation 
household, with husband aged zero, with a zero marriage year, without taking a one-
child certificate, and without violating the childbirth quota. This expected log-odds of 
sterilization may be thought of  as a probability of sterilization, following the formula: 
1 / ( 1+ exp {- predicted log-odds coefficient}). 
●  the main effect of FOPR-  Female Occupation Participation Rate, γ01 
●  the main effect of  IMR- 0-year-old-age Mortality Rate, γ02 
●  the main effect of TFR-  Total Fertility Rate, γ03 
●  the main effect of FDR-  Female Divorce Rate, γ04 
●  the main effect of AGR-  Agricultural Participation Rate, γ05 
●  the main effect of FCR-  Female College Graduation Rate, γ06 
●  the main effect of PAPR-  One-child Certificates Prevalence Rate, γ07 
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●  the main effect of  Rural, γ10 
●  the main effect of  Education, γ20 
●  the main effect of  HAN, γ30 
●  the main effect of  HAge, γ40 
●  the main effect of  Myears, γ50 
●  the main effect of  ThreeG, γ60 
●  the main effect of  Farmer, γ70 
●  the main effect of  Nopap, γ80 
●  the main effect of  Noindex, γ90 
and the following cross-level interactions engaging both level-1 and level-2 
characteristics: 
● γ11 is the FOPR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ12 is the IMR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ13 is the TFR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ14 is the FDR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ15 is the AGR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ16 is the FCR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
● γ17 is the PAPR effect of Rural-Sterilization slope, 
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● γ21 is the FOPR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ22 is the IMR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ23 is the TFR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ24 is the FDR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ25 is the AGR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ26 is the FCR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ27  is the PAPR effect of Education-Sterilization slope, 
● γ31 is the FOPR effect or Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ32 is the IMR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ33 is the TFR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ34 is the FDR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ35 is the AGR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ36 is the FCR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ37  is the PAPR effect of Han-Sterilization slope, 
● γ41 is the FOPR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ42 is the IMR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ43 is the TFR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ44 is the FDR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
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● γ45 is the AGR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ46 is the FCR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ47  is the PAPR effect of HAge-Sterilization slope, 
● γ51 is the FOPR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ52 is the IMR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ53 is the TFR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ54 is the FDR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ55 is the AGR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ56 is the FCR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ57  is the PAPR effect of Myears-Sterilization slope, 
● γ61 is the FOPR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ62 is the IMR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ63 is the TFR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ64 is the FDR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ65 is the AGR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ66 is the FCR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ67  is the PAPR effect of ThreeG-Sterilization slope, 
● γ71 is the FOPR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
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● γ72 is the IMR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ73 is the TFR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ74 is the FDR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ75 is the AGR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ76 is the FCR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ77  is the PAPR effect of Farmer-Sterilization slope, 
● γ81 is the FOPR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ82 is the IMR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ83 is the TFR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ84 is the FDR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ85 is the AGR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ86 is the FCR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ87 is the PAPR effect of Nopap-Sterilization slope, 
● γ91 is the FOPR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
● γ92 is the IMR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
● γ93 is the TFR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
● γ94 is the FDR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
● γ95 is the AGR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
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● γ96 is the FCR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
● γ97  is the PAPR effect of Noindex-Sterilization slope, 
                                                                                                                                                      
Hierarchical Generalized Linear Modeling is a multilevel modeling procedure 
that operates across more than one scale or level, so that an overall model can handle 
both individual and aggregate level data. It makes use of maximum information and is 
more precise in predicting the outcome with independent variables at different levels. 
HGLM presents four major advantages:  
First, HGLM adopts the empirical Bayes approach (Lindley and Smith 1972) to 
estimate each level-1 coefficient, with unconditional and conditional shrinkage 
estimators. Traditional OLS might offer imprecise estimates of each group’s regression 
when a particular level-2 unit has a restricted range on group-level characteristics or a 
small sample. For instance, Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) found negative estimates of 
the SES-achievement relationship and apparent dispersion of the OLS estimates of the 
true slope variance. Whereas unconditional shrinkage pulls each OLS regression line 
toward the sample average of the regression line, with the empirical Bayes approach, the 
estimates of each school’s regression slope tend to be more concentrated around the 
sample average. 
Second, HGLM can model cross-level effects. It can model simultaneously the 
effects on the dependent variable at both levels, using level-1 characteristics as 
predictors of the dependent variable at level-1, and level-2 characteristics as predictors 
of the dependent variable at level 2. In the same overall equation, it can also consider the 
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cross-level effects of a level-2 predictor on the slopes of level-1 predictors on the 
dependent variable. This modeling framework provides a significant advantage over 
traditional methods. 
Third, HGLM can partition variance-covariance components. HGLM produces 
the estimations of variance and covariance components with unbalanced, nested data. 
The multilevel approach enables a decomposition of the variation in the individual level 
into within- and between-group components (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). In other 
words, HGLM can take a level-1 outcome and partition its variance among the units of 
two levels. That analysis, therefore, identifies differences within the contextual level that 
conventional models would not have detected, because conventional models do not 
allow the partitioning of individual variable’s variance into within- and between-group 
components.  
Fourth, HGLM can improve estimation of individual effects. For example, some 
contextual groups are too small to develop reliable predictions by using standard 
regression methods. By borrowing strength from the entire collection of data, HGLM is 
able to make efficient use of all available information to provide each minority group 
with separate prediction equations for large and small groups. The estimator for each 
contextual group is actually a weighted composite of the information from that group. 
Hence, HGLM can provide improved estimation of individual effects (Bryk and 
Raudenbush 1992). In Chapter VI, I will take advantage of these merits of the HGLM 
approach to examine how the effects of predictors influence the dependent variables of 
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CEB and sterilization status when between-group and between-individual heterogeneity 
can be both specified and estimated. 
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CHAPTER VI 
ANALYSIS FINDINGS 
 
In this chapter, to identify the effects of the predictors of CEB, sterilization and 
childbirth intervals, I present the statistical results of the macro-level analysis from the 
Robust Regression Model, and the results of the micro-level analysis from the Poisson, 
Logistic and Survival Models. Then, I proceed into the main focus of the dissertation, 
the multi-level analysis. I verify that the bivariate assumption of the absence of 
excessive multicollinearity is met (Belsey 1991; Hamilton 1998). In other words, I verify 
that none of the independent variables is highly correlated with another independent 
variable or any linear combination of other independent variables. To accomplish that, I 
examine the correlation matrix of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2 to detect any high correlation 
between two variables.  
In Table 6.1, based on the bold numbers, which are bigger than 0.7, the following 
three individual-level variables are highly correlated: Marital Period in Month, Marital 
years over 14 years, and Wife's Age. Because every woman in this study is married and 
most older women should have relatively longer marital periods, I exclude Marital 
Period in Months from further analysis. 
Wife's Agricultural Occupation is highly correlated with rural status. At the 
aggregate level, Agricultural Participation Rate is also highly correlated with Female 
Occupation Participation Rate, Female College Graduation Rate and One-Child 
Certificate Rate. So, I exclude Agricultural Participation Rate from further analysis.  
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In Table 6.2, for the 1992 Taiwan KAP data, the individual-level variables of 
Marital Period in Months, and Wife's Age are highly correlated. County-level 
Agricultural Participation Rate also is correlated with Female Divorce Rate, Total 
Fertility Rate, and Female College Graduation Rate. As with the data for China, I 
therefore exclude Marital Period in Months and County-level Agricultural Participation 
Rate.   
In addition, in both the China and Taiwan data, women’s educational level and 
men’s educational level are highly correlated. To avoid interference from the correlation 
of these two variables, along with wife’s agriculture status and husband’s agriculture 
status I separate the education-level variable into two models. With other predictors, I 
classify wife’s education and wife’s agricultural occupation together as Model I, and 
husband’s education and husband’s agricultural occupation together as Model II. 
 
Robust Regression Model 
In order to identify the relationship between predictors and dependent variables 
at the all macro level, I run robust regression models, using 1990 China province-level 
data and 1992 Taiwan county-level data. From Table 6.3, in 1990 China province-level 
data, 0-year-old Mortality Rate, Female Divorce Rate, Female College Graduation Rate 
and One-Child Certificate Rate pass the significance tests for the number of Children 
Ever Born (refer to Table 6.3). 
 
 
 Table 6.1 Correlation Matrix of Individual and Provincial Variables in China. 
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 chil ste fst mst e1 e2 mag age agr rur thr fag hag dea han nop noi tfr imr fop fdr fcr 
chi 1             Note:             mag: Marital Period in Month            
ste         0.19 1 chi: Children Ever Born     agr:  Marital years over 14 years      
fst           0.15 0.86 1 ste: Sterilization Rate    rur:  Living in Rural Area        
mst        0.10 0.37 -0.15 1 fst :  Male Sterilization  Rate     thr:  hree-Generation Familial Structure       
e1        -0.33 -0.13 -0.10 -0.07 1 mst:  Female Sterilization  Rate    fag:  Wife's Agri. Occup.         
e2          -0.26 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.48 1 e1:    Wife's Education    hag:  Husband's Agri. Occup.        
mag         0.58 0.13 0.09 0.08 -0.40 -0.27 1 e2: Husband's Education    pap:  With One-child Paper before First Childbirth      
age         0.54 0.10 0.07 0.08 -0.33 -0.22 0.90 1 age1: Wife's Age     nop:  No One-child Paper          
agr               0.49 0.15 0.12 0.08 -0.32 -0.22 0.82 0.78 1 noi:  Number of Birth without Quota         
rur               0.14 0.12 0.09 0.07 -0.34 -0.26 0.00 -0.08 0.01 1 dea:  Number of Dead Children    
thr               -0.21 -0.11 -0.09 -0.05 0.12 0.11 -0.27 -0.28 -0.21 0.05 1 tfr: Total Fertility Rate       
fag             0.14 0.13 0.08 0.09 -0.35 -0.25 -0.01 -0.08 0.01 0.73 0.02 1 imr: Infant Mortality Rate       
hag                0.16 0.11 0.08 0.06 -0.34 -0.30 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.59 -0.01 0.63 1     fop: Female Occupation Participation Rate 
dea                 0.58 0.00 -0.02 0.04 -0.19 -0.18 0.30 0.27 0.23 0.10 -0.09 0.10 0.11 1 fdr: Female Divorce Rate  
han                 -0.06 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.04 -0.07 -0.05 1 fcr: Female College Graduation Rate 
nop                  0.26 0.21 0.17 0.09 -0.35 -0.25 0.16 0.08 0.18 0.54 0.01 0.50 0.43 0.11 -0.06 1 agr: Agricultural Participation Rate     
noi                  -0.41 -0.24 -0.21 -0.10 0.25 0.21 -0.48 -0.45 -0.49 -0.03 0.15 -0.04 -0.05 -0.18 0.00 -0.21 1 pap: One-Child Certificate Rate 
tfr                         0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.15 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.18 0.02 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.13 -0.04 1
imr                         0.20 0.02 -0.03 0.09 -0.15 -0.13 0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.11 -0.02 0.16 0.18 0.17 -0.30 0.15 -0.03 0.12 1
fop                         0.07 -0.04 -0.13 0.16 -0.19 -0.12 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.00 0.25 0.19 0.11 -0.06 0.14 -0.03 0.51 0.42 1
fdr                         -0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.07 0.12 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.25 0.00 -0.25 -0.18 -0.02 -0.13 -0.18 0.03 -0.32 0.22 -0.30 1
fcr                         -0.11 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 0.19 0.11 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 -0.25 0.03 -0.27 -0.26 -0.07 0.04 -0.22 0.05 -0.40 -0.33 -0.30 0.43 1
agr                    0.15 0.05 -0.03 0.15 -0.24 -0.15 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.31 -0.03 0.37 0.32 0.13 -0.09 0.28 -0.05 0.45 0.54 0.70 .48 -0.73 
pap                       -0.18 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 0.22 0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 -0.29 0.01 -0.33 -0.30 -0.10 0.08 -0.30 0.06 -0.44 -0.45 -0.33 0.49 0.7
   agr pap
agr   1
pap -.80 1 
 
Source: SFPCC 1989, and NBSC 1991
 
 Table 6.2 Correlation Matrix of Individual and County Variables in Taiwan. 
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                      chi ste fst mst e1 e2 mag age thr fag hag dea boy gir out now pia tfr imr fop fdr
chi 1               Note:                             
ste              0.38 1 chi: Children Ever Born  mag:Marital Period in Month 
fst            0.38 0.96 1 ste: Sterilization Rate  thr:Three-Generation Familial Structure   
mst              0.03 0.20 -0.07 1
fst: Male Sterilization  Rate  
fag:Wife's Agricultural Occupation 
e1           -0.49 -0.27 -0.27 0.00 1 mst: Female Sterilization  Rate hag:Husband's Agricultural Occupation   
e2        
  
     -0.42 -0.23 -0.24 0.01 0.71 1
e1: Wife's Education   
dea:Number of Dead Children 
mag                0.65 0.33 0.31 0.09 -0.51 -0.38 1 e2: Husband's Education  boy:Number of Boys 
age          0.48 0.28 0.26 0.07 -0.32 -0.19 0.84 1 age1: Wife's Age  gir:Number of Girls tfr: Total Fertility Rate 
thr -0.04 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.17 -0.20        1 out:Mainlander Status  imr: Infant Mortality Rate 
fag 0.15 0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.16 -0.12 0.14      0.10 0.03 1 now:Nowork Status fdr: Female Divorce Rate 
hag                  0.18 0.11 0.12 -0.02 -0.18 -0.17 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.50 1 pia:Whether owning Piano 
dea              0.19 0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.09 0.06 -0.01 0.02 0.04 1 fop:Female Occupation Participation Rate  
boy                 0.51 0.34 0.33 0.03 -0.33 -0.27 0.43 0.32 -0.02 0.10 0.12 0.13 1 fcr:Female College Graduation Rate  
gir                 0.67 0.13 0.13 0.00 -0.26 -0.23 0.35 0.26 -0.02 0.08 0.10 0.09 -0.30 1 agr:Agricultural Participation Rate   
out -0.20 -0.10 -0.11 0.03 0.24 0.26                -0.10 -0.04 -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.03 -0.14 -0.11 1
now 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00                -0.09 -0.07 -0.01 -0.10 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 1
pia -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.24 0.26                 0.05 0.11 -0.04 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.09 0.04 0.05 -0.01 1
tfr                  0.18 0.09 0.09 0.00 -0.20 -0.20 0.03 -0.07 0.16 0.13 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.10 -0.17 -0.05 -0.09 1
imr                        0.09 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 -0.04 0.07 0.12 0.13 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 0.50 1
fop                        -0.08 -0.07 -0.08 0.02 0.12 0.12 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.12 -0.02 0.03 -0.22 -0.02 1
fdr                        -0.15 -0.12 -0.12 0.00 0.17 0.17 -0.02 0.06 -0.16 -0.14 -0.20 -0.02 -0.10 -0.08 0.20 0.05 0.08 -0.67 -0.13 0.25 1
fcr                     -0.18 -0.11 -0.11 0.01 0.26 0.24 -0.06 0.07 -0.12 -0.12 -0.16 -0.05 -0.12 -0.09 0.19 0.02 0.10 -0.81 -0.32 0.51 0.58
agr                    0.17 0.12 0.13 -0.01 -0.20 -0.18 0.03 -0.08 0.17 0.20 0.26 0.04 0.12 0.08 -0.20 -0.04 -0.08 0.71 0.48 -0.26 -0.80 
   fcr agr
fcr   1
agr   -0.69 1
 
Source: TAPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
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Table 6.3 Robust Regression Models of Children Ever Born, Sterilization Rate and Female 
Sterilization Rate for 1990 China and 1991 Taiwan. 
 
 China -Province Level-  
Taiwan 
-County Level- 
 
Children 
Ever Born  
Couple 
Sterilization  
Rate 
 
Wife 
Sterilization  
Rate 
  
Children 
Ever Born  
Couple 
Sterilization  
Rate 
 
Wife 
Sterilization  
Rate 
 
Female Occupation 
Participation Rate 0.45    -0.39    -0.93   -0.26  -0.01   0.01   
o-year-old Mortality 
Rate 20.85  6.63  -0.61   
 0.0045 0.0031 0.0035 *
Total Fertility Rate 0.0002  
 
-0.0001 -0.0001  
 
 0.0002 
 
-0.0003 -0.0003 *
Female Divorce Rate -49.58  -41.38  -4.98  
 
 -0.06 -0.03  -0.03  *
Female College 
Graduation Rate 41.34  -14.57   
-3.60  
 
 -2.22 -1.31  -1.38  *
One-Child Certificate 
Rate -10.27  2.40   
-0.43  
 
  
 
 
 
  
cons 
2.70  
*
0.89  1.18  
*
 2.67 
*
0.97  
*
0.99  *
N 29   29   29     23   23   23   
Note: * p<.05 
Source: TPIFP 1992, EYRC 1992, SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991  
 
 
 
In terms of the hypothetical relationship between predictors and CEB, 0-year-old 
Mortality Rate is expected to have a positive effect on CEB; that is, when a province has 
higher 0-year-old Mortality Rate, number of Children Ever Born will be higher. Female 
Divorce Rate and One-Child Certificate Rate conform to the hypotheses in Chapter V; 
that is, they have negative effects on CEB. When they are higher in a province, then a 
province has lower CEB. The significant effect of Female College Graduation Rate is, 
however, contrary to the hypothesis. The reversed ‘U’ pattern postulated by Jejeebhoy 
(1995) for the relationship between education and fertility gains some support in this 
macro-level analysis.  
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In Table 6.3, male sterilization data for China and Taiwan are not included 
because no predictor passes the significance test. Judging from Table 5.3 and Table 5.5, 
male sterilization rate is uniformly low, so it is not difficult to understand that the failure 
of all predictors to pass the significance test is due to lack of variance in the dependent 
variable. Regarding couple sterilization rate in the second column of Table 6.3, 0-year-
old Mortality Rate, Total Fertility Rate, and Female Divorce Rate have significant 
effects. The variable of 0-year-old Mortality Rate shows a positive effect on the 
sterilization rate, which does not conform to the hypothesis in Chapter V that posits that 
if people perceive a high risk of being bereaved of children, they are more likely to seek 
security by producing more children and that consequently the sterilization rate should 
be low. However, it is not difficult to understand this empirical result. When a province 
has a higher 0-year-old Mortality Rate, the pace of its economic development may well 
be sluggish, so that alternatives to sterilization may not be available. As mentioned in 
Chapter IV, Short and her associates (2000) revealed that the risk of sterilization is 
highest in communities where the birth planning policy is least robust. As expected, the 
Total Fertility Rate is negatively related to couple sterilization status. Female Divorce 
Rate likewise shows a negative effect with couple sterilization status. The provinces with 
higher Female Divorce Rates, such as Shanghai (0.9%) and Beijing (0.7%) also have 
higher living standards and higher women’s status, so it is understandable that women 
and men living in these provinces can find other alternatives for birth control. Only 
Female Occupation Participation Rate shows a significantly negative effect on female 
sterilization rate (in the third column of Table 6.3, wife sterilization status). This result 
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accords with the hypothesis in Chapter V that when women live in provinces that have 
higher female employment rates, women’s status should concomitantly be higher, so 
they tend to use sterilization less frequently as a measure to control childbirth. 
In the 1992 Taiwan county-level data in the fourth column of Table 6.3, 0-year-
old Mortality Rate, Female Divorce Rate, and Female College Graduation Rate pass the 
significance tests on the number of Children Ever Born. As in the data for China, 0-year-
old Mortality Rate and Female Divorce Rate confirm the hypotheses. Unlike the results 
in China’s data, however, the higher the Female College Graduation Rate is in counties, 
the lower the number of Children Ever Born. That result conforms with the hypothesis 
that when women achieve higher educational levels, they prefer to have fewer children. 
In the fifth column of Table 6.3, the couple sterilization rate at the county level is 
significantly influenced by 0-year-old Mortality Rate, Total Fertility Rate, Female 
Divorce Rate, and Female College Graduation Rate. These predictors function the same 
way in China’s data for the couple sterilization rate. Also, the higher Female College 
Graduation Rate is associated with a lower sterilization rate at the county level. In the 
sixth column of Table 6.3, female sterilization rate has the identical predictors and 
relationship direction as couple sterilization. This pattern diverges significantly from that 
seen regarding the female sterilization rate in China. 
 
Individual-level Poisson Analysis 
How well do the four Poisson regression models of children ever born improve 
our ability to predict the probabilities of a woman’s having each count of children (that 
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is, 0 children, 1 child, 2 children, etc. up to 15 children, in the 1988 China data; or up to 
9 children in the 1992 Taiwan data). Based on the independent variables, every woman 
will have a predicted probability of having 0 children, a probability of having 1 child, a 
probability of having two children, etc., up to a probability of having 9 or 15 children; 
these probabilities will be based on the knowledge of each woman’s values on the 8 
independent variables for two models of Taiwan and the 10 independent variables for the 
two models of China (refer to Table 6.3 and 6.4).  
These predicted probabilities can be compared with the observed empirical distribution 
of children at each count; likewise, the probabilities predicted by the Poisson model can 
be compared the probabilities shown by the univariate Poisson distribution with a mean 
of 2.71 for China and 2.48 for Taiwan (refer to Figure 5.3). 
 
 155
--Model I-- 
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
or
 P
ro
ba
bil
ity
1988 China--Wif e's Education & Agriculture Occupation
Number of Children ever Born 
 Observed CEB Distribution  Univariate Poisson, mu = 2.71
 Prediction from PRM
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
                           
 
Figure 6.1 Distributions of CEB, Univariate Poisson, and Poisson Regression Model for 
1988 China Data 
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Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
 
Figure 6.1 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.2 Distributions of CEB, Univariate Poisson, and Poisson Regression Model for 1992 
Taiwan Data 
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Source: TPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992  
 
 
Figure 6.2 (Continued) 
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To summarize the predictions of the Poisson regression model, the mean 
predicted probability for each count, m, can be used: 
                                               ^   ^ 
m
_                     1 N         exp(-µi) µi   
Pr( y = m) =  N ∑       
                          i=1              m! 
 
               
^ 
where -µi is the number of predicted CEB based on the Poisson regression model for 
each of the ith Chinese or Taiwanese women in the samples. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 are the 
Distributions of CEB, Univariate Poisson, and Poisson Regression Model for China and 
Taiwan. 
Also, in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5, I examine the formal “goodness of fit” test 
presented in the last two rows, comparing the observed empirical distribution with the 
distribution predicted by the Poisson regression model. The null hypothesis (H0) is that 
there is no difference between the observed data and the modeled data, indicating that 
the model fits the data.  
A small value of chi-square is expected, with a probability > 0.05. If there is a 
small chi-square, it indicates that the model fits the data. Although the values for the 
goodness of fit tests in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 are not perfect, they are satisfactory for 
my models. They signify that the models fit the data very well; specifically, the 
goodness of fit χ2 test indicates that, given the Poisson regression models, I cannot reject 
the null hypothesis that the observed data are Poisson distributed. 
 Table 6.4 Poisson Regression Models Predicting Number of Children Ever Born for 1988 China Data. 
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Model I  Model II 
 (Wife's Education and  Agricultural Occupation)  (Husband's Education and  Agricultural Occupation)  
 b  min->max   
0->1    
0->1   IRR(e^b) %  e^bStdX  
%StdX 
%StdX    b  
min-
>max   
0->1     
0->1   IRR(e^b) %  e^bStdX   %StdX   
Number of Dead Children 0.23  * 15.47  0.58  1.26  25.7  1.16  16.4   0.23  * 15.19  0.58  1.25  25.4  1.16  16.3    
  
    
  
    
        
        
  
  
        
          
  
              
       
  
            
Han Status -0.08  * -0.20  -0.20  0.92  -7.7  0.98  -2.4   -0.08  * -0.19  -0.19  0.93  -7.4  0.98  -2.3  
Three-Generation Familial 
Structure -0.38  -0.77  -0.77  0.69  
-
31.2  0.90  -9.6   -0.37   -0.77  -0.77  0.69  -31.1  0.90  -9.5  
No One-child Certificate 0.33  * 0.71  0.71  1.39  39.1  1.13  12.8   0.33  * 0.71  0.71  1.39  39.3  1.13  12.9  
Experience of Childbirth with 
Quota -0.31 * -0.71  -0.71  0.73  
-
26.6  0.86  -13.7   -0.31  * -0.71  -0.71  0.73  -26.7  0.86  -13.7  
Wife's Education -0.01  * -0.34  -0.03  0.99  -1.0  0.96  -4.0     
Husband's Education    -0.01  * -0.27  -0.02  0.99  -0.8  0.97  -2.8  
Wife's Age 0.02  * 1.87  0.02  1.02  1.8  1.19  19.1   0.02  * 1.93  0.02  1.02  1.8  1.20  19.8  
Married More than 14 years 0.11  * 0.27  0.27  1.12  11.9  1.06  5.8   0.12  * 0.28  0.28  1.12  12.2  1.06  5.9  
Wife's Agricultural Occupation 0.04  * 0.08  0.08  1.04  3.6  1.02  1.5     
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation   0.07  * 0.15  0.15  1.07  6.7  1.03  3.1  
Living in Rural Area 0.05  * 0.11  0.11  1.05  4.6  1.02  1.8   0.04  * 0.10  0.10  1.04  4.5  1.02  1.7  
      constant  0.05    0.01   
Goodness-of-fit chi2  22623.50       22591.71  
 Prob > chi2  1.0000 (30002 cases) 
 
        
1.0000 (30002 
cases) 
 
          
Note:      
b = raw coefficient                                             Min->Max: change in predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum 
0->1: change in predicted probability as x changes from 0 to 1            
      
     
  
IRR (e^b)--Incidence Rate Ratios = exp(b) = factor change in expected count for unit increase in X    
%--The Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios = percent change in expected count for unit increase in X      
e^bStdX--Incidence Rate Ratios Standardized on the X Variable  = exp(b*SD of X) = change in expected count for SD increase in X
Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
      
 
 Table 6.5 Poisson Regression Models Predicting Number of Children Ever Born for 1992 Taiwan Data. 
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Model I Model II 
 (Wife's Education and  Agricultural Occupation)   (Husband's Education Agricultural Occupation)  
 b  
min-
>max   
    0-
>1   IRR(e^b) %  e^bStdX  
 
%StdX    b  
min-
>max   
    0-
>1   IRR(e^b) %  e^bStdX   %StdX   
Number of Dead Children 0.18  * 4.58  0.47  1.19  19.4  1.04  4.4   0.18  * 4.674  0.48  1.20  19.6  1.04  4.4    
    
  
  
  
        
        
  
    
         
              
       
  
           
Three-Generation Familial 
Structure 0.03 * 0.08  0.08  1.03  3.1  1.01  1.5   0.04  * 0.085  0.09  1.04  3.5  1.02  1.7  
Nowork Status 0.05  * 0.12  0.12  1.05  4.9  1.02  2.2   0.04  * 0.106  0.11  1.04  4.4  1.02  2.0  
Mainlander Status -0.14  * -0.33  -0.33  0.87  
-
13.3  0.95  -4.8   -0.14  * -0.334  -0.33  0.87  
-
13.4  0.95  -4.9  
Whether owning Piano 0.03   0.08  0.08  1.03  3.3  1.01  1.1   0.02   0.036  
 
0.04  1.01  1.5  1.00  0.5  
Wife's Education -0.04  * -1.70  -0.13  0.96  -3.9  0.87  -13.5    
Husband's Education    -0.03  * -1.466  -0.11  0.97  -3.3  0.89  -11.1  
Wife's Age 0.03  * 1.64  0.03  1.03  2.9  1.18  18.0   0.03  * 1.879  
 
0.03  
 
1.03  
 
3.3  1.21  
 
20.9  
 Wife's Agricultural Occupation 0.11  * 0.28  0.28  1.11  11.5  1.02  2.0    
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation    0.13  * 0.323  0.32  1.13  13.4  1.03  3.2  
      constant  0.25  *  0.088   
Goodness-of-fit chi2  4220.18       4327.80  
 Prob > chi2  1.0000 (11247 cases) 
 
        1.0000 (11244 cases) 
  
    
 
    
Note:    
b = raw coefficient                   
        
          
      
    
    
  
 
Min->Max: change in predicted probability as x changes from its minimum to its maximum    
0->1: change in predicted probability as x changes from 0 to 1    
IRR (e^b)--Incidence Rate Ratios = exp(b) = factor change in expected count for unit increase in X    
%--The Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios = percent change in expected count for unit increase in X  
e^bStdX--Incidence Rate Ratios Standardized on the X Variable  = exp(b*SD of X) = change in expected count for SD increase in X 
%StdX--Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios Standardized on the X Variable = percent change in expected count for SD increase in X 
Source: TPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
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Several indicators show the effects of the predictors on CEB. In Table 6.4, the 
raw coefficient is in the first column. Each predictor in the Model I and Model II is 
statistically significant. In terms of the hypotheses proposed in Chapter V, each predictor, 
with the sole exception of Three-Generation Familial Structure, matches the original 
expectation. Because the predicted number of children ever born for each woman is 
nonlinearly related to the independent variables, the cumulative change in the expected 
number of children ever born to each woman must be investigated independently for 
each dependent variable. For a dummy independent variable, the distinct changes can be 
interpreted by looking at the 0->1 column (the third and tenth columns of Table 6.4). For 
the rural variable, the number of children ever born increases to 0.11 as the rural dummy 
changes from 0 to 1 (rural). Holding the other independent variables at their means, rural 
women have 0.11 more children than non-rural women. For the variable of Wife's 
Agricultural Occupation, an increase of .08 children ever born is seen as the dummy 
changes from 0 to 1 (Wife's Agricultural Occupation). Women with Agricultural 
Occupation, therefore, have 0.08 more children than non-farming women, holding the 
other independent variables at their means. Husbands with Agricultural Occupation have 
0.15 more children than non-farming husband, holding the other independent variables at 
their means. Those married more than 14 years have 0.27 more children than those not, 
holding the other independent variables at their means. 
For interval variables, I examine the amount of change in the dependent variable 
as the independent variable goes from its minimum to maximum values; this statistic 
appears in the min->max column (the second and ninth columns of Table 6.4). So, the 
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wife’s education variable ranges from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 14 years; 
over this 14 years of education, there is an average total reduction in CEB of 0.34 
children, holding the other independent variables at their means. For husband’s 
education, the range is also from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 14 years, with an 
average total reduction in CEB of 0.27 children. 
Long (1997, p. 228) has noted, “the simplest way to interpret the results” of the 
Poisson Regression coefficient is “by using the factor changes in the expected count.” 
The Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) coefficients in the fourth and eleventh columns 
of Table 6.4 are interpreted just like odds ratios. The IRR for Han status is 0.92 = e-.08. 
Being a Han woman, therefore, multiplies the expected number of children by a factor of 
0.92, holding the other independent variables constant. Another way to express this 
statistic is to say that the number of children ever born to a Han woman is 8 percent 
(=100 (e-.08-1)) less than the CEB of a non-Han woman. 
The Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios in the fifth and twelfth 
columns of Table 6.4 shows that for every additional child death for the independent 
variable of Number of Dead Children, a Chinese woman’s mean production of children 
increases by 25.7%, holding all other variables constant. Women without a one-child 
certificate have 39.1% more children, holding all other variables constant. 
In the sixth and thirteenth columns of Table 6.4 are Poisson Incidence Rate 
Ratios (standardized on the independent variable). The Poisson effects can be interpreted 
in a standardized way, by calculating IRR coefficients standardized on the independent 
variable. This is done by exponentiating the Poisson b coefficient after it has been 
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multiplied by its standard deviation. For each standard deviation increase in the wife’s 
age, a woman’s mean CEB production is multiplied by a factor of 1.19, holding all other 
variables constant. 
Concerning the seventh and twelfth columns of Table 6.4, Percent Change in 
Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios Standardized on the Independent Variable, several 
observations are in order. Regarding the effect of wife’s age, for each standard deviation 
increase in the woman’s age, her mean production of children increases by 19.1%, 
holding all other variables constant. Although it is illogical to interpret dummy variables 
(such as “rural” or “Han”) in terms of coefficients that have been standardized on the 
independent variable, such standardized coefficients are useful to gauge the relative 
impacts on CEB of all of the independent variables. Therefore, from Table 6.4, in terms 
of absolute impacts on fertility behavior (positive or negative), the woman’s age has the 
greatest impact, followed number of dead children, followed by the two policy variables: 
Experience of Childbirth with Quota, No One-child Certificate 
In Table 6.5, the first column, the raw coefficient is shown. Most predictors in 
Model I and Model II are statistically significant. Owning a piano, however, is not. All 
of them are in agreement with the hypotheses proposed in Chapter V. For a dummy 
independent variable, the distinct changes can be observed by looking at the 0->1 
column, the third and tenth columns of Table 6.5. For the Nowork variable, we observe 
an increase of 0.12 in the number of children ever born as the Nowork dummy changes 
from 0 to 1 (no work). Taiwanese women who do not have any work outside the home 
have 0.12 more children than non-rural women, holding the other independent variables 
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at their means. For the variable of Wife's Agricultural Occupation, an increase is shown 
of 0.08 children ever born, as the dummy changes from 0 to 1 (Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation). Women with Agricultural Occupations have 0.28 more children than non-
farming women, holding the other independent variables at their means. Husbands with 
Agricultural Occupations have 0.32 more children than non-farming husbands, holding 
the other independent variables at their means. Women who live in three-generation 
familial structure have 0.08 more children than those who do not, holding the other 
independent variables at their means. 
For interval variables, the min->max columns (the second and ninth columns of 
Table 6.5) are examined. The wife’s education variable ranges from the minimum of 0 to 
the maximum of 17 years; over this 17 years of education, there is an average total 
reduction in CEB of 1.70 children, holding the other independent variables at their 
means. For husband’s education, the range is also from the minimum of 0 to the 
maximum of 17 years, with an average total reduction in CEB of 1.47 children. 
The Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios (IRR) coefficients in the fourth and eleventh 
columns of Table 6.5 show Incidence Rate Ratios for Mainlander status of 0.87 = e-.14. 
Therefore, being a Mainlander woman multiplies the expected number of children by a 
factor of 0.87, holding the other independent variables constant. Expressing the statistic 
in another way, the number of children ever born to a Mainlander woman is 13 percent 
(=100 (e-.14-1)) less than the CEB of a non-Mainlander woman. 
The Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios, in the fifth and twelfth 
columns of Table 6.5, shows that for every additional child death indexed by the 
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independent variable of Number of Dead Children, a Taiwanese woman’s mean 
production of children increases by 19.4%, holding all other variables constant. In the 
sixth and thirteenth columns of Table 6.5 are Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios standardized 
on the independent Variable. For each standard deviation increase in the wife’s age, a 
woman’s mean CEB production is multiplied by a factor of 1.18, holding all other 
variables constant. 
Concerning Percent Change in Poisson Incidence Rate Ratios Standardized on 
the independent variable, in the twelfth columns of Table 6.5, when the wife’s age 
increases by one standard deviation, her mean production of children augments by 
18.0%, holding all other variables constant. Judging from Table 6.5 for absolute impacts 
on fertility behavior (positive or negative), the woman’s age has the greatest impact (as 
was true with the data from China), followed by women’s education or husband’s 
education, followed by Mainlander status. This pattern is different from that seen in 
China’s data.  
 
Logistic Analysis 
The micro-level logistic regression results are displayed in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 for 
China and Taiwan, respectively. To test the null hypothesis that all the X variables’ 
coefficients are zero (this is similar to the global F-test in OLS regression), the 
“likelihood ratio chi-square” statistic, also called LR chi-square (LRχ2), is examined; its 
values are shown in third line from the bottom of Table 6.6 and 6.7. The probability of a 
greater value of LRχ2 is P = 0.000; the null hypothesis is thus rejected that the 
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coefficients on the three independent variables are all zero. The bottom row of each table 
shows the values of Pseudo R2, which does not have the "explained variance" 
interpretation of the R2 in OLS, but indicates how well the model fits the data. In 
addition, ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curves in Figure 6.3 and Figure 6.4, 
function in a similar way. A model with no predictive power would be a 45° line. The 
greater the predictive power of the model, the more bowed the curve, so that the area 
beneath the curve is often used as a graphic measure of the model’s predictive power. A 
model with no predictive power has an area of 0.5; a perfect model has an area of 1.0. 
The areas under the ROC curves in Figure 6.3 and 6.4 range from 0.76 to 0.66. on 
average, the 1992 Taiwan data produce bigger ROC areas than do the 1988 China data. 
In the couple sterilization status columns of Table 6.6, except for rural status for Model I, 
all predictors have passed statistical the significance test; that is, P-values are less than 
0.05. In addition, the same predictors for Model I and Model II have similar statistical 
results. Both of the main variables reflecting women’s statuses--education and 
agriculture status--have different effects on sterilization status. For each additional year 
of women’s formal education, other things being equal, the odds of being sterilized are 
multiplied by 0.99 of the odds ratio; that is, they decrease by 1%. Other things being 
equal, for women working in an agricultural occupation, the odds of being sterilized are 
26% higher than for those not. Those results agree with the hypotheses in Chapter V. 
More highly educated women know more options to control their fertility. Farming 
women are more inclined to end their reproduction by sterilization. However, the 
husband’s education and agricultural occupation status both have positive effects on  
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Figure 6.3 Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve for 1988 China Data 
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Female Sterilization: Model I 
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Figure 6.3 (Continued) 
Male Sterilization: Model I 
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Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
 
 
Figure 6.3 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.4 Receiver Operating Characteristics Curve for 1992 Taiwan Data 
Female Sterilization: Model I 
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Figure 6.4 (Continued) 
n: Model I Male Sterilizatio
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Figure 6.4 (Continued) 
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overall sterilization for the marital couples in China. The logit coefficient for the 
husband’s agricultural occupation variable is 0.16; its odds ratio,Ω, is e0.16, or 1.17.  
This means that, other things being equal, the odds of being sterilized are 1.2 
times higher for farming husbands than for non-farming husbands. Or one could say that 
being farming husbands increases the odds of being sterilized by 17%. In terms of 
husband’s education, it means that for every additional year of schooling, other things 
being equal, the odds of being sterilized are multiplied by 1.01; that is, the odds increase 
by 1%.  
Comparing these semi-standardized coefficients across independent variables 
reveals the relative strength or importance of each X variable’s effect on Y, which in the 
case of logistic regression is the ln odds(Y=1). The value may be interpreted as the 
amount of change in the ln odds(Y=1) associated with a one standard deviation 
difference in the X variable. The experience of childbirth with quota, owning one-child 
certificates, and the number of boys show the three most important effects on 
sterilization status. The first two can be called policy influence. Couples with the 
experience of the childbirth quota have a 64% lower probability of sterilization than 
those without that experience. This result makes sense when we understand that couples 
fortunate enough to have a record of good compliance with the quota systems set up by 
their local cadres likely live in areas that furnish more extensive facilities and services to 
control fertility. So the couples can be programmed to the local quota system. In such 
cases, the probability of sterilization as a last resort to control fertility should be less than 
those in areas less adequately served. A converse rationale can be applied for the couples  
 
 Table 6.6 Micro-level Logistic Regression Models Predicting Three Sterilization Status for 1988 China Data. 
 Couple Sterilization Status   Wife Sterilization Status   Husband Sterilization Status  
 Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II
 
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education and 
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education and 
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education and 
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation) 
 b 
Odds 
Ratio   bStdX▲   b
Odds 
Ratio   bStdX  b 
Odds 
Ratio   bStdX     b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX  b 
Odds 
Ratio   bStdX 
Number of Boys 0.26* 1.29 0.32  0.26* 1.30 0.32  0.25* 1.29 0.31  0.25* 1.29 0.3151  0.08* 1.08 0.10  0.08* 1.08 0.098 
Number of Dead Children -0.38* 0.68 -0.25  -0.37* 0.69 -0.25  -0.42* 0.66 -0.28  -0.41* 0.66 -0.273  -0.05 0.95 -0.03  -0.03 0.97  
            
           
   
   
-0.023
Han Status 0.56* 1.75 0.17  0.55* 1.74 0.17  0.48* 1.62 0.15  0.48* 1.62 0.1465  0.43* 1.53 0.13  0.42* 1.52 0.127 
Three-Generation Familial Structure -0.92* 0.40 -0.25  -0.94* 0.39 -0.25  -0.88* 0.41 -0.24  -0.88* 0.41 -0.238  -0.63* 0.53 -0.17  -0.67* 0.51 -0.180 
No One-child Certificate 1.17* 3.22 0.43  1.21* 3.34 0.44  1.15* 3.15 0.42  1.15* 3.16 0.4218  0.84* 2.31 0.31  1.00* 2.72 0.366 
Experience of Childbirth with Quota -1.02* 0.36 -0.48  -1.03* 0.36 -0.49  -0.95* 0.39 -0.45  -0.97* 0.38 -0.4578  -0.68* 0.51 -0.32  -0.69* 0.50 -0.325 
Wife's Education -0.01* 0.99       -0.01* 0.99 -0.04      -0.01 0.99 -0.04     
Husband's Education -0.05  0.01* 1.01 0.04   0.01* 1.01 0.0361  0.01 1.01 0.038
Wife's Age -0.02* 0.98 -0.23  -0.02* 0.98 -0.21  -0.03* 0.97 -0.29  -0.03* 0.97 -0.2665  0.01* 1.01 0.12  0.01* 1.01 0.107 
Married More than 14 years 0.19* 1.21 0.09  0.20* 1.22 0.10  0.21* 1.23 0.10  0.21* 1.24 0.1069  -0.04 0.96 -0.02  0.00 1.00 -0.001 
Wife's Agricultural Occupation 0.23* 1.26 0.10      -0.02 0.98 -0.01      1.12* 3.07 0.49     
Husband's Agricultural Occupation 0.16* 1.17 0.07   0.10* 1.10 0.0454   0.25* 1.28 0.116
Living in Rural Area -0.03 0.97 -0.01  0.10* 1.11 0.04  0.02 1.02 0.01  0.00 1.00 -0.0002  -0.28* 0.75 -0.11  0.41* 1.50 0.158 
      constant  -1.49    -1.75*    -1.37    -1.63*    -4.82*    -4.87*   
LR chi2:   3980.250   3963.391   2982.260   2986.206   795.108   676.743  
Prob > LR: 0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000  
McFadden's Adj(Pseudo) R2: 0.103   0.102   0.084   0.084 
 
  0.054 
 
  0.045 
 
  
 Note:  * p<0.05.      ▲bStdX: semi-standardized hazard ratio        
Source: SFPCC 1989 
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 Table 6.7 Micro-level Logistic Regression Models Predicting Three Sterilization Status for 1992 Taiwan Data. 
 
 Couple Sterilization Status 
 
  Wife Sterilization Status   Husband Sterilization Status  
 Model I Model II  Model I Model II  Model I  Model II 
 
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
    
 
(Husband's Education and 
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education 
and Husband's 
Agricultural Occupation)  
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education and 
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation) 
 b 
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX▲ b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX   b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX  b 
Odds 
Ratio   bStdX   b
Odds 
Ratio  bStdX 
Number of Boys 0.63* 1.88  0.57   0.64 * 1.90 0.58   0.63* 1.88  0.57   0.64*  1.90 0.58   0.21* 1.23  0.19   0.21* 1.24  0.19 
Number of Dead Children -0.05 0.95  -0.01   -0.05   
   
    
    
         
   
  
           
          
      
0.95 -0.012 -0.02 0.98  0.00  -0.02  0.98 -0.004  -0.63  0.53  -0.15   -0.63  0.53  -0.15
Three-Generation Familial 
Structure 0.05 1.05  0.02   0.06  1.06 0.027  0.06 1.06  0.03  0.074  1.08 0.036   -0.23  0.80  -0.11   -0.23 0.80 -0.11
Nowork Status 0.06 1.06  0.03   0.03  1.03 0.014  0.07 1.07  0.03  0.037  1.04 0.017   -0.14  0.87  -0.07  -0.12  0.89  -0.06
Mainlander Status -0.23* 0.79  -0.08   -0.23*  0.79 -0.080  -0.35* 0.70 -0.12 -0.35* 0.71 -0.120   0.71* 2.04  0.25   0.66  1.94  0.23
Whether owning Piano 0.27* 1.31  0.09   0.25  1.28 0.082  0.25* 1.28  0.08  0.23*  1.26 0.077   0.29  1.34  0.10   0.25  1.29  0.08
Wife's Education -0.09* 0.92  -0.32     -0.09* 0.91 -0.35     0.04  1.04  0.15     
Husband's Education     -0.08*  0.92 -0.287  -0.09*  0.92 -0.315    0.05* 1.05 0.19
Wife's Age 0.07* 1.07  0.40   0.08  1.08 0.449  0.06* 1.06  0.36  0.07*  1.07 0.41   0.11* 1.11  0.62   0.10* 1.11 0.61
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation 0.57* 1.76  0.10     0.60* 1.83  0.11      -0.74 0.48  -0.13     
Husband's Agricultural 
Occupation   0.38  1.46 0.096  0.40*  1.50 0.102    -0.63 0.53 -0.16
      constant  -3.51*    -3.78*   -3.31* 0.28 -3.58*  -8.71* 0.28  
 
-8.82*  
LR chi2:   1857.855   1832.659   1819.192   1798.077   91.496  95.191  
Prob > LR: 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
McFadden's Adj(Pseudo) 
R2: 0.135      0.134     0.136     0.134      0.041      0.043     
Note:  * p<0.05. ▲bStdX: semi-standardized hazard ratio          
Source: TPIFP 1992 
 
 
176 
 
 177
who do not own a one-child certificate and who have a 222% higher probability of being 
sterilized than those with this certificate. 
For each increment in age of the women, other things equal, the odds of being 
sterilized are multiplied by 0.98 of the odds ratio; that is, couples probability of 
sterilization decrease by 2%. This is also the case for the wife sterilization model, but not 
for the male sterilization model.  
For each additional son, other things equal, the odds of being sterilized are 
multiplied by 1.29 of the odds ratio; that is, the couple’s probability of sterilization 
increases by 29 %. This is in agreement with the hypothesis that when couples have 
more sons to satisfy the aspiration of son preference, they may feel that their fertility 
mission has been fulfilled. Other predictors also comport with the hypothetical 
expectations for influence on sterilization status. Other things being equal, the odds of 
having had sterilization are 1.21 times higher for the group married more than 14 years 
than for the group married less than 14 years. Han status increases the odds of 
sterilization by 75%, while three-generation familial structures lower the odds of 
sterilization by 60%. 
For the wife’s sterilization status in Models I and II in Table 6.6, the results are 
almost identical to the couple sterilization status because women are more often the 
partner who is sterilized. The wife’s agricultural occupation variable shows no statistical 
significance, but the husband’s agricultural status is positively related to the wife’s 
sterilization. That means that whether the wife’s occupation is farming does not 
influence the wife’s sterilization status. Neither the wife’s nor the husband’s educational 
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status affects the husband’s sterilization status. Also failing to pass the significance test 
are the predictors Number of children and whether or not married more than 14 years. 
Notably, the wife’s agricultural occupation variable not only is statistically significant, 
but also shows the strongest effect in terms of the semi-standardized coefficients. Other 
things being equal, the odds of one’s husband’s sterilization are 3.07 times higher for 
farming wives than for other wives. 
In Table 6.7, Taiwan sterilization logistic models, number of boys is the most 
important predictor for the models of couple’s sterilization and wife’s sterilization; for 
the husband’s sterilization models, wife’s age is the most important predictor. Number 
of dead children, three-generation familial structure, and wife without work status fail to 
pass the significance test. Owning piano status, and wife’s and husband’s agricultural 
occupation status have affirmative effects on the couple’s and wife’s sterilization model, 
but not on the male sterilization model. Other things being equal, Mainlander status 
decreases the odds of couple’s and wife’s sterilization by an average of 20%. But the 
odds of the husband’s being sterilized for is almost 100% more for Mainlanders than for 
non-Mainlanders. 
 
Survival Analysis 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9, for China and Taiwan, respectively, display Cox proportional 
hazards models for the hazard of having first, second, and third childbirth. The last two 
models in each table (for second childbirth and third) have two more variables: whether.
 
 Table 6.8 Cox Proportional Hazards Models for the Hazard of Having First to Third Childbirth for 1988 China Data. 
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 The First Childbirth   The Second Childbirth   The Third Childbirth  
Model I Model II Model I Model II Model I Model II
 
(Wife's Education 
and Wife's 
Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's 
Education and 
Husband's 
Agricultural  
(Wife's Education 
and Wife's 
Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's 
Education and 
Husband's 
Agricultural  
(Wife's Education 
and Wife's 
Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's Education 
and Husband's 
Agricultural 
Occupation) 
 b 
Haz. 
Ratio  bStdX▲         b
Haz. 
Ratio   bStdX  b 
Haz. 
Ratio    bStdX b
Haz. 
Ratio bStdX B
Haz. 
Ratio    bStdX b
Haz. 
Ratio    bStdX 
Previous child born was a boy         -0.05* 0.95 0.98  -0.05* 0.95 0.98  -0.14* 0.87 0.94  -0.14* 0.87 0.94 
Previous child born was dead child         0.42* 1.52 1.15  0.42* 1.52 1.15  0.28* 1.32 1.14  0.27* 1.32 1.14 
Han Status 0.14* 1.15 1.04  0.14* 1.16 1.04  0.01 1.01 1.00  0.01 1.01 1.00  -0.11* 0.90 0.97  -0.11* 0.90 0.97 
Three-Generation Familial Structure 0.13* 1.14 1.03  0.12* 1.13 1.03  0.29* 1.34 1.08  0.29* 1.34 1.08  0.17* 1.19 1.05  0.17* 1.19 1.05 
No One-child Certificate 0.05* 1.05 1.02  0.02 1.02 1.01  0.33* 1.39 1.13  0.32* 1.38 1.13  0.29* 1.34 1.11  0.30* 1.35 1.12 
Experience of Childbirth with Quota -0.23* 0.79 0.90  -0.22* 0.80 0.90  0.26* 1.29 1.13  0.26* 1.29 1.13  0.50* 1.65 1.27  0.50* 1.65 1.27 
Wife's Education 0.03* 1.03 1.13      0.01* 1.01 1.02      0.00 1.00 0.99     
Husband's Education     0.01* 1.01 1.02      0.01* 1.01 1.02      0.00 1.00 1.00 
Wife's Age -0.04* 0.96 0.66  -0.05* 0.96 0.64  -0.02* 0.98 0.82  -0.02* 0.98 0.93  -0.01* 0.99 0.91  -0.01* 0.99 0.91 
Married More than 14 years -0.17* 0.84 0.92  -0.18* 0.83 0.91  0.21* 1.23 1.11  0.21* 1.23 7.70  0.07* 1.08 1.04  0.08* 1.08 1.04 
Wife's Agricultural Occupation -0.11* 0.90 0.95      -0.05* 0.95 0.98      0.08* 1.08 1.03     
Husband's Agricultural Occupation     -0.17* 0.84 0.92      -0.04* 0.96 0.98      0.07* 1.07 1.03 
Living in Rural Area 0.33* 1.38 1.13  0.27* 1.31 1.11  -0.05* 0.95 0.98  -0.08* 0.93 0.97  -0.01 0.99 1.00 
 
 0.01 1.01 1.00 
LR chi2:   6190.910   5979.310   1728.010  
   
 
  1726.430   1971.160 
 
1972.630 
 
 
Prob > LR: 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000  
Pseudo R2: 0.013   0.012   0.003   0.003   
 
0.005 
 
  0.005 
 
  
Note:  * p<0.05. ▲bStdX: semi-standardized hazard ratio        
Source: SFPCC 1989 
 
 
 
 Table 6.9 Cox Proportional Hazards Models for the Hazard of Having First to Third Childbirth for 1992 Taiwan Data. 
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 The First Childbirth   The Second Childbirth   The Third Childbirth  
Model I  Model II     Model I Model II  Model I Model II 
 
(Wife's Education and 
Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's 
Education and 
Husband's 
Agricultural 
(Wife's Education 
and Wife's 
Agricultural 
Occupation)  
(Husband's 
Education and 
Husband's 
Agricultural 
(Wife's Education 
and Wife's 
Agricultural 
Occupation) 
(Husband's 
Education and 
Husband's 
Agricultural    
Haz. 
Ratio    b bStdX▲     b
Haz. 
Ratio  bStdX b
Haz. 
Ratio   bStdX  b 
Haz. 
Ratio    b 
Haz. 
Ratio     bbStdX bStdX 
Haz. 
Ratio  bStdX 
Previous child born was a boy                    
                   
                  
                  
               -0.34*   
                  
                  
                  
                  
     
   
  
 
 -0.13* 0.87 0.98 -0.13* 0.87 0.94 -0.58* 0.55 0.76 -0.56* 0.56 0.77
Previous child born was dead child  0.57* 1.71 1.00 0.59* 1.77 1.01 0.82* 2.37 1.16 0.83* 2.43 1.17
Three-Generation Familial Structure 0.07* 1.06 1.03 0.07* 1.07 1.04 0.09* 1.10 1.22 0.10* 1.11 1.04 0.17* 1.24 1.08 0.17* 1.24 1.09
Nowork Status 0.03 1.04 1.01 0.04* 1.05 1.02 0.00 1.01 1.03 0.00 1.01 1.00 0.05 1.06 1.02 0.03 1.04 1.01
Mainlander Status -0.19* 0.82 0.94 -0.18* 0.83 0.94 -0.34* 0.70 1.00 -0.34* 0.70 0.95 -0.37* 0.68 0.88 0.70 0.89
Whether owning Piano 0.06* 1.07 1.02 0.07* 1.07 1.02 0.03 1.04 0.96 0.02 1.02 1.00 -0.07 0.93 0.98 -0.11* 0.90 0.96
Wife's Education -0.02* 0.98 0.93  -0.04* 0.95 1.35  -0.09* 0.91 0.72 
Husband's Education     -0.02* 0.97 0.92      -0.04* 0.96 1.14      -0.08* 0.92 0.76 
Wife's Age -0.01* 0.99 0.49 -0.01* 0.99 0.94 0.01* 1.01 0.23 0.01* 1.01 0.47 0.01* 1.02 1.09 0.02* 1.02 1.14
Wife's Agricultural Occupation -0.20* 0.83 1.00  -0.01 0.99 1.00  0.31* 1.34 1.06 
Husband's Agricultural Occupation     -0.08* 0.93 0.98      0.06 1.06 1.00   0.39* 1.47 1.10
LR chi2:   161.560   167.440  645.130   627.280  1574.050   1482.210  
Prob > LR: 0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  0.000  
Pseudo R2: 0.001   0.001   0.004   0.004   0.015 
 
  
 
0.014   
Note:  * p<0.05. ▲bStdX: semi-standardized hazard ratio             
Source: TPIFP 1992        
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the previous child born was a boy and whether the previous childbirth was a dead 
childbirth (i.e., the previous childbirth was miscarried, stillborn, or died within one year). 
To test the null hypothesis that all the X variables’ coefficients are zero (this is 
similar to the previous logistic analysis), values of LR chi-square (LRχ2 ), are examined, 
which are in the third line from the bottom of Tables 6.8 and 6.9. All of the probabilities 
of a greater value of LRχ2 are P = 0.000, so I reject the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on all independent variables are all zero. Pseudo R2 in the bottom row 
indicates how well the model fits the data. 
In the first childbirth columns of Table 6.8, all predictors pass the significance 
test for Model I and Model II, except experience in childbirth with quota. The important 
women’s status variables in Table 6.8 are the positive hazard coefficient for wife’s 
educational level and the negative hazard coefficient for wife’s agriculture occupation. 
This suggests that women whose schooling increases one more year, have a significantly 
higher probability of going on to have a first birth. Its hazard ratio is 1.03. This means 
that among married Chinese women, obtaining one more schooling year increases the 
hazard of having a first birth by 3% or [100(1.03-1=.03)]=3. This is net of the effects of 
the other co-variates. For women’s agriculture occupation’s hazard ratio, it means that 
among married Chinese women, being a farmer decreases the hazard of having a first 
birth by 10% or [100(.90-1=.10)] =10. This is contrary to the theoretical hypothesis, as is 
the husband’s agricultural occupation. Also opposed to the hypotheses: (1) adding one 
year to wife’s age decreases the hazard of having a first birth by 4%, (2) being the group 
married more than 14 years reduces the hazard by 16%, and (3) being Han increases the 
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hazard by 15%. The other predictors, however, are in agreement with the hypotheses. 
Three-generation familial structure, no one-child certificate, and living in rural area have 
positive effects on transition to the first childbirth after marriage. Comparing these semi-
standardized coefficients across predictors, we see the first three relatively important 
factors are living in rural area, wife’s education and Han status. 
In the models of the second childbirth, only Han status shows no statistical 
significance. The two new predictors--whether the previous child born was a boy and 
whether last birth was dead child--agree with the hypotheses presented earlier. To have a 
boy reduces the hazard of transition to a second childbirth by 5%; to experience having 
lost children increases the hazard of proceeding to a second childbirth by 52%. Three 
predictors change their direction of influence. Experience of childbirth with quota 
increases the hazard of having a second childbirth by 29%. Living in rural area lowers 
the hazard by 5%. Neither of these results is in line with the hypotheses posited for this 
dissertation. However, being married more than 14 years increases by 23% the hazard of 
having a second child, which comports with the relevant hypothesis. In terms of the 
semi-standardized coefficients, the first three relatively important predictors are whether 
the previous childbirth was a dead child, no one-child certificate, and experience of 
childbirth with quota. 
In the models of the third childbirth, wife’s and husband’s education no longer 
show significant influence, nor does living in a rural area. Han status, however, again 
shows a significant effect, but it changes to reduce the hazard of proceeding to the third 
childbirth by 10%. Wife’s and husband’s agricultural occupation also show directional 
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change in that they increase by 8% the hazard of having the third childbirth. This 
transformation agrees with the hypothesis. Evaluating the semi-standardized coefficients, 
the first three relatively important predictors are the same as for the model of the second 
childbirth--whether the previous child born was a dead child, no one-child certificate, 
and experience of childbirth with quota. The survival analysis of 1988 China data 
demonstrates the degree to which the predictors influence childbirth of different parity. 
In this analysis, son preference is empirically affirmed again. The two fertility-policy 
variables play important roles in affecting higher parity fertility, but women’s 
educational status shows no effect on the third parity. 
In the first childbirth columns of Table 6.9 for the 1992 Taiwan data, no-work 
status in Model I and husband’s agriculture occupation in Model II fail to pass the 
significance test, but the rest of the predictors pass the significance test. In Table 6.9, 
both the hazard coefficient for wife’s educational level and the hazard coefficient for 
wife’s agriculture occupation are negative. This connotes that women whose schooling 
increases one more year, have a significantly diminished probability of going on to have 
a first birth. Its hazard ratio is 0.98. This means that among married Taiwanese women, 
attaining one more schooling year shrinks the hazard of having a first birth by 2% or 
[100(.98-1=.02)]=-2. This is net of the effects of the other co-variates. For wife’s 
agriculture occupation’s hazard ratio, it means that among married Taiwanese women, 
being a farmer diminishes the hazard of having a first birth by 17% or [100(.83-1=.10)] 
=17. The effect of the wife’s increased schooling is in accord with the hypothesis, and so 
is the effect of the husband’s educational level in Model II. The negative effect of the 
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wife’s agriculture occupation does not, however, conform with expectations, nor does 
the effect of the husband’s agricultural occupation. As with China’s data, adding one 
more year to the wife’s age decreases the hazard of having a first child by 1%. Owning-
piano status encourages the first childbirth by 7%. on the other hand, two other 
predictors are in agreement with the hypotheses. Three-generation familial structure has 
a positive effect on transition to the first childbirth after marriage by 6%. Being a 
Mainlander lessens the hazard of having a second child by 18%. Comparing these semi-
standardized coefficients across predictors, we see that the two relatively more important 
factors are the three-generation familial structure and owning a piano (the wealth effect). 
In the models of the second childbirth, no work status, owning piano, and 
agriculture occupation in Model I and Model II lose statistical significance. Both of the 
new predictors--whether the previous child born was a boy and whether the previous 
birth was a dead child, support the hypotheses. Having had a boy reduces the hazard to a 
second childbirth by 5%; having lost a child increases the hazard of a second childbirth 
by 71%. Wife’s age is a predictor that changes its direction of affecting the transition to 
the next childbirth. Increasing the wife’s age one more year increases the hazard of 
having a second childbirth by1%. In terms of the semi-standardized coefficients, the 
most important predictors are family structure, education status, and having experienced 
losing a child.  
In the models of the third childbirth, no work status and owning piano fail to pass 
the significance test. Wife’s and husband’s agricultural occupation switch to increase the 
hazard of having the third childbirth by 34%. This transformation is similar to China’s 
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situation. Evaluating the semi-standardized coefficients, the first three relatively 
important predictors are whether the previous child born was a dead child, family 
structure, and wife’s age. It is different from China that in Taiwan adding a year to the 
wife’s age increases the probability of having the third childbirth. When women in 
China increase their age, there is less of a probability to have a third childbirth. From the 
survival analysis of the 1992 Taiwan data, we see that without strong policy interference, 
family structure demonstrates its influence on fertility. Son preference is also empirically 
affirmed in this analysis. In addition, losing children shows a stronger effect than son 
preference. In Taiwan, women’s education status retains its reducing effect through the 
third childbirth, which is not the case for China. 
One way to describe the survival-time data is to graph their Kaplan-Meier (K-M) 
survivor functions (Kaplan and Meier 1958; Hamilton 1998). This function is defined as 
follows: For the first group of women, let nt represent the number of women who have 
not given birth to a second child and are not censored at the beginning of time period t; 
dt represents the number of second children born to these women during time period t. 
The formula (below) is the Kaplan-Meier estimator of surviving beyond time t (i.e., not 
having a second birth beyond time t), and is the product of survival probabilities in t and 
the preceding periods.  
nt represents the number of observations that have not failed (i.e. childbirths one 
to three not having occurred) and are not censored at the beginning of time period t; dt 
represents the number of failures (the number of childbirths) that occur to these 
observations during time period t. The Kaplan-Meier estimator of surviving beyond time 
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t is the product of survival probabilities in t and the preceding periods: 
           t 
S(t) =∏ { (nj – dj )/ nj } 
         j=t0 
In Figures 6.5 and 6.6, I have graphed S(t) against the number of months between the 
marriage to the first birth, the first birth to the second birth, and the second birth to the 
third birth. The K-M survivor curve in Figure 6.5 for 1988 China data shows the 
probabilities of surviving the hazard of having the first to the third birth for each month 
of analysis time. The curve steps down rapidly from a probability of near 1.00 of 
surviving just a few months the hazard of having a childbirth, to a probability of 
around .15 by about the 200th month, leveling off by the 400th month to a probability of 
surviving having a birth of about .1. The second and the third birth curves are not so 
smooth as the first birth curve and require more months to step down. However, when 
comparing Figure 6.5 with Figure 6.6 for Taiwan 1992 data, it is obvious that the third 
birth curve for Taiwan looks very different than that for China.  
The curve of the third birth in Taiwan spends almost 500 months to level off, 
while but China’s does so in 200 months. From Figure 6.7 to Figure 6.12, I generate 
companion K-M survivor curves and inspect graphically the dichotomous predictors for 
the first birth to the third birth in the China and Taiwan data.  In general, it is observed 
that there are more obviously different survivor curves associated with predictors in the 
first birth in China’s data (such as family structure, rural area, and marriage group), but 
in Taiwan, that is seen in data for the third birth. 
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Figure 6.5 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the First to Third Childbirth in 1988 China Data 
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Figure 6.5 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.6 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the First to Third Childbirth in 1992 Taiwan Data 
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Figure 6.7 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the First Childbirth in 1988 China Data, Stratified by Dichotomous Predictors 
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Figure 6.7 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.8 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the Second Childbirth in 1988 China Data, Stratified by Dichotomous Predictors 
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Figure 6.9 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the Third Childbirth in 1988 China Data, Stratified by Dichotomous 
Predictors 
 
 
197
 Ka p l a n -M e i e r s u rv i v a l  e s t im a te s , b y  h a n
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
S urvival A nalysis by Han
An a l y s i s  T i m e : M o n th
0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0
0 .0 0
0 .2 5
0 .5 0
0 .7 5
1 .0 0
h a n  0
h a n  1
Ka p l a n -M e i e r s u rv i v a l  e s t im a t e s , b y  b o y
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
S urvival A nalysis by whether to have boy
An a l y s i s  T i m e : M o n th
0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0
0 .0 0
0 .2 5
0 .5 0
0 .7 5
1 .0 0
b o y  0
b o y  1
Ka p l a n -M e i e r s u rv i v a l  e s t im a te s , b y  d e a d
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
S urvival A nalysis by whether to have dead child 
An a l y s i s  T i m e : M o n th
0 2 0 0 4 0 0 6 0 0
0 .0 0
0 .2 5
0 .5 0
0 .7 5
1 .0 0
d e a d  0
d e a d  1
 
Figure 6.9 (Continued) 
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 Figure 6.10 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the First Childbirth in 1992 Taiwan Data, Stratified by Dichotomous 
Predictors 
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Source: TPIFP 1992     
Figure 6.10 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.11 Probability of Surviving the Hazard of Having the Second Childbirth in 1992 Taiwan Data, Stratified by Dichotomous 
Predictors 
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Figure 6.11 (Continued) 
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Figure 6.12 Probability of Surviving th
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Multi-level Analysis  
On  AN V
s m io w h e u e  l o e  
hierarchical linear model, analysis star ating a one-way ANOVA model 
(fully unconditionedmodel) before proceeding to multi-level analysis. The one-way 
ANOVA model partitio ce in the outcome variable across individual and 
aggregate levels by providing the intra-class correlation and displaying whether a multi-
(1992) warn that the intra-class correlation—the ratio of level-2 variance to the total 
  in o unctions, because the level-1 
variance is now heteroscedastic. Snijders and Brsker (1999) and Long (1997) write that a 
substitute way to calculate an int class cor elation f r a nonlinear multilevel Model is 
evel-1 o el nd its d pe de t variab e  e ms of a late iable and 
c e intra-class co e ion by the formula  
ρ +π /3)  
he e e -2 var nce co ponent a d e el-1 v riance omponent is the 
c /3 ab  6  show  t e n -way NO  mode  f r  Poisson and 
near multilevel m de with C in out any 
d. For these twenty Hierarchical Generalized Linear 
M ility in the possibility of having the number of children ever born and 
(in a pr vince or Chin , and in a county for Taiwan) ranges  
 
e-way O A Model 
A ent ned in Chapter V, it in th  struct r  of a typica tw -lev l
ts with estim
ns the varian
level analysis is proper (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). However, Bryk and Raudenbush 
variation--is less f rmative in the case of nonlinear link f
ra- r o
to consider the l m d  a e n n l in t r nt var
ompute th rr lat
=τ00/ (τ00 2
in which τ00 is t  l v l ia m n  l v a c
onstant π2 . T le .10 s h o e A VA ls o the
Bernoulli non-li o ls h a and Taiwan data, with
independent variables include
odels, the variab
being sterilized o f a
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Table 6.10: One-way ANOVA Model for Poisson and Bernoulli Non-linear Multilevel Models 
ata. 
s τ00 a e /3)
   
with China and Taiwan D
 
Model P-v lu   (τ00+π2 τ00/ (τ00+π2/3) 
Poisson--Children Ever Born  
Ch 0.04021ina_All  0.000 3.33007 1.21% 
Chi yrs 0.05823 0.000 3.34809 na_marital years<14 1.74% 
China_ 0.03783 0.000 3.32769 Rural 1.14% 
Taiwa 0.00681n_All  0.000 3.29667 0.21% 
Taiwan_35yrs younger 0.00806 0.000 3.29792 0.24% 
Be atus 
China_A 0.50651
rnoulli--Sterilization St     
ll  0 0. 00 3.79637 13.34% 
Ch rs 0.60509 0.000 3.89495 15.54%ina_marital years<14y  
China 0.53889_Rural  0.000 3.82875 14.07% 
Taiw 0.08127an_All  0.000 3.37113 2.41% 
Ta 0.11585iwan_35yrs younger  0.000 3.40571 3.40% 
Be terilization 
at     
0.55136
rnoulli--Wife S
us St
China_All  0.000 3.84122 14.35% 
hina_marital years<14yrs 0.67895 0.000 3.96881 17.11% C
hina_Rural 0.61249 0.000 3.90235 15.70% C
Taiwan_All 0.09252 0.000 3.38238 2.74% 
Taiwan_35yrs younger 0.13317 0.000 3.42303 3.89% 
Bernoulli--Husband Sterilization 
Status     
China_All 2.60531 0.000 5.89517 44.19% 
China_marital years<14yrs 2.48233 0.000 5.77219 43.00% 
China_Rural 3.251 0.000 6.54086 49.70% 
Taiwan_All 0.09252 0.000 3.38238 2.74% 
Taiwan_35yrs younger 0.13317 0.000 3.42303 3.89% 
Source: TPIFP 1992, EYRC 1992, SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
 
 
from 0.21% to 49%. Three sterilization status models in China have the bigger portion of 
the variance between provinces, especially, in the male sterilization models in China, 
which hints that the contextual variables play more important roles in influencing male 
sterilization decisions. All X2 tests are values highly implausible (p<0.0001) under the 
null hypotheses. It can be concluded that there is significant variation among provinces 
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and counties in women’s fertility; hence, a province/county level variance is worthy of 
studying using HGLM methods. 
 
Multi-
From Table 6.11 to Table 6.15, I present HGLM analysis results for three groups 
of 1988 China data and two groups of 1992 Taiwan data. The rationale is to see whether 
there is any analysis dissimilarity due to the different demographic base. On the basis of 
the literature review and the previous analyses reported in this chapter, I first use the 
whole sample of 1988 China Fertility data with 30013 cases, as shown  
in Table 6.11. Women having marital years less than fourteen years from 1988 data, who 
should suffer the brunt of China’s fertility policy from mid-1970, are a subset with 
16470 cases in Table 6.12. So, I also take out the variable of marital years more than 14. 
Table 6.13 has 24461 cases for Chinese women living in rural areas, so the rural variable 
is not entered in the models. In Table 6.14, 11253 cases are for the whole 1992 KAP 
Taiwan data. Nevertheless, 6396 cases of ages younger than 35 years old are split from 
1992 data in Table 6.15. Grouped together in Model I are wife’s education and wife’s 
agricultural occupation.  Placed together in Model II are husband’s education and 
husband’s agricultural occupation. 
level Models 
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Table 6.11 Multilevel Analyses: Effects (Gamma Coefficients) of Individual and Provincial 
Characteristics on the Likelihood of Number of Children Ever Born and Being Sterilized: 1988 
China Data. 
 
China All  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 For INTRCPT1                         
INTRCPT2 G00  0.903 *  0.903 *  -0.733 *  -0.737 *  -0.960 *  -1.260 *  -1.835 *  -1.038 *
Female Occup. Partici. R. G01  -0.370  -0.368  -0.679  -0.663  -2.825  -4.140  2.229  2.929 *
 0-year-old Mortality R. G02  7.942 *  7.936 *  -6.980  -6.950  -8.138  -11.525  0.687  -3.724 
 Total Fertility R. G03  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G04  -13.076  -12.915  11.031  11.219  17.583  21.346  -9.908  -21.946 
 Female College Grad. R. G05  2.067  2.101  -  -21.205  -12.127  -13.673  -8.857  -9.889 
One-Child Certificate R. G06  -2.183 *  -2.196 *  -4.228  -4.204  -6.071  -9.329  1.609  1.064 
 For Living in Rural Area  B1    B1    B1    B1   B1    B1   B1   B1  
INTRCPT2 G10  0.112 *  0.139 *  0.014  0.237 *  0.056  0.211 *  0.024  -0.026 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G11  -0.274  0.128  -2.165  -1.839  -1.434  -2.618  -0.504  0.040 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G12  3.153  2.289  9.137  17.403  5.322  16.176  4.134  6.195 
 Total Fertility R. G13  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G14  -15.975  -7.045  -  -21.097  -20.572  -7.202  -7.756  -12.510 
 Female College Grad. R. G15  3.872  4.710  2.444  5.670  0.232  6.128  1.363  -6.678 
One-Child Certificate R. G16  -0.478  -1.031  0.177  -0.332  0.751  -0.539  -0.261  0.512 
 For Married More than 14 years  B2    B2    B2    B2   B2    B2   B2   B2  
INTRCPT2 G20  0.055 *  0.058 *  0.199 *  0.205 *  0.211 *  0.237 *  -0.011  -0.009 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G21  -0.156  -0.134  1.177  1.124  1.005  1.563  0.488  0.058 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G22  -0.645  -0.936  7.113  7.567  1.600  3.438  4.818  4.481 
 Total Fertility R. G23  0.000  0.000  -0.000 *  -0.000 *  -0.000 *  -0.000 *  -0.000  -0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G24  -0.111  2.396  5.093  3.676  21.028  30.535  -10.201  2.084 
 Female College Grad. R. G25  -1.767  -1.782  -9.450  -8.463  -6.954  -7.983  -4.349  -9.372 
One-Child Certificate R. G26  0.546  0.379  2.121  1.550  0.111  -0.999  2.288  3.099 
 For Wife's Education  B3       B3      B3      B3     
INTRCPT2 G30  -0.022 *     -0.029     -0.029     -0.011    
Female Occup. Partici. R. G31  0.042     -0.135     0.087     -0.177    
 0-year-old Mortality R. G32  -0.409     1.765     1.038     0.737    
 Total Fertility R. G33  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
 Female Divorce R. G34  0.438     -8.641     -5.990     -3.804    
 Female College Grad. R. G35  -1.459 *     -0.264     -0.171     -0.650    
One-Child Certificate R. G36  0.019     0.177     0.291     -0.046    
 For Husband's Education      B3       B3       B3      B3  
INTRCPT2 G30     -0.023 *     0.028     0.022     0.006 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G31     0.022     -0.174     0.025     -0.104 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G32     -0.070     1.275     1.395     0.350 
 Total Fertility R. G33     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G34     0.102     -7.492     -3.443     -9.964 
 Female College Grad. R. G35     -0.915     2.337     1.866     1.139 
One-Child Certificate R. G36     -0.103     -0.381     -0.034     -0.243 
 For HAN Status  B4    B4    B4    B4   B4    B4   B4   B4  
INTRCPT2 G40  -0.008 *  -0.007 *  0.350 *  0.328 *  0.274 *  0.334 *  0.200  0.111 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G41  0.393  0.392  -1.886  -2.371  -2.013  -2.780  -0.619  -0.393 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G42  4.310  4.429  5.179  8.730  7.923  14.639  -3.995  -3.010 
 Total Fertility R. G43  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G44  -22.440 *  -21.163 *  45.223  44.516  41.208  41.720  20.420  28.254 
 Female College Grad. R. G45  -1.414  -2.370  -  -12.105  -9.265  -16.284  -2.705  -6.084 
One-Child Certificate R. G46  3.816 *  4.018 *  4.099  4.952  3.908  10.389  0.056  0.913 
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Table 6.11 (Continued) 
 
China All  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 For Wife's Age  B5    B5    B5    B5   B5        B5  B5  B5    
INTRCPT2 G50  0.027 *  0.027  -0.016 *  -0.015  *  -0.019 *  -0.024 *  0.002  0.005 
Female Occup. Partici. G51  0.040  0.037  0.023  0.030  0.036  0.052  -0.025  -0.022 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G52  -0.379 *  -0.354 *  -0.164  -0.184  0.075  -0.029  -0.214  -0.260  
 Total Fertility R. G53  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  
 Female Divorce R. G54  0.968  0.849  -0.265  -0.342  -1.220  -1.563  0.891  1.451  
 Female College Grad. G55  -0.110  -0.079  0.106  0.011  0.117  -0.025  -0.018  0.183  
One-Child Certificate R. G56  0.005  0.017  0.033  0.098  0.091  0.147  -0.068  -0.106  
 For 3-Generation  B6    B6    B6    B6   B6    B6   B6   6.000  
INTRCPT2 G60  -0.385 *  -0.381 *  -0.719 *  -0.755 *  -0.614 *  -1.092 *  -0.050  -0.231 
Female Occup. Partici. G61  0.336  0.352  0.416  0.246  1.981  1.555  -1.574  -1.538 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G62  -4.935  -5.595  2.968  4.401  4.561  2.726  -0.821  -1.586 
 Total Fertility R. G63  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G64  31.189 *  37.825 *  -17.199  -26.951  -25.986  -56.269  12.722  -18.923 
 Female College Grad. G65  -0.234  -0.955  12.636  12.066  8.834  11.214  3.893  8.939 
One-Child Certificate R. G66  0.662  0.581  1.218  1.825  2.114  -0.061  -0.564  -0.051 
For Number of Dead         B7    B7   B7    B7   B7   B7  
 INTRCPT2 G70        -0.383 *  -0.381 *  -0.360 *  -0.404 *  -0.043  -0.046 
 Female Occup. Partici. G71        0.404  0.371  0.470  0.353  -0.325  -0.015 
o-year-old Mortality R. G72        2.460  2.921  3.673  4.420  -1.358  -0.404 
Total Fertility R. G73        0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Female Divorce R. G74        6.397  2.867  -6.704  -10.469  13.814  13.930 
Female College Grad. G75        2.750  2.863  1.926  1.518  1.415  -0.915 
 One-Child Certificate G76        0.272  0.356  0.578  0.616  -0.600  -0.003 
 For Wife's Agri. Occup.   B7       B8      B8      B8     
INTRCPT2 G80  0.077 *     0.274 *     0.181     0.152    
Female Occup. Partici. G81  0.459     -0.464     -0.927     0.425    
 0-year-old Mortality R. G82  -0.448     5.567     1.923     3.143    
 Total Fertility R. G83  0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
 Female Divorce R. G84  8.417     16.939     26.618     -3.160    
 Female College Grad. G85  1.383     -5.902     -2.025     -3.812    
One-Child Certificate R. G86  -0.542     1.420     -0.112     1.295    
 For Husband's Agri.      B7       B8       B8        
INTRCPT2 G80     0.057 *     0.076     0.043     -0.006 
Female Occup. Partici. G81     -0.141     -0.971     -1.487     -0.420 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G82     2.239     -1.773     -3.157     1.900 
 Total Fertility R. G83     0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G84     -8.940     3.037     4.587     -0.224 
 Female College Grad. G85     1.866     -7.984     -7.662     -9.255 
One-Child Certificate R. G86     0.283     2.697     1.636     2.448 
 For No One-child  B8    B8    B9    B9   B9    B9   B9     
INTRCPT2 G90  0.257 *  0.261 *  0.644 *  0.714 *  0.537 *  0.880 *  0.319  0.127 
Female Occup. Partici. G91  0.232  0.295  2.014  2.273  0.430  1.441  1.024  1.696 
 0-year-old Mortality R. G92  -1.713  -1.975  -21.552  -25.496 *  -18.478  -31.151 *  -3.414  -4.580 
 Total Fertility R. G93  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G94  -6.677  -5.891  44.952  60.969  36.316  71.195  17.961  5.644 
 Female College Grad. G95  -2.346  -1.790  -13.827  -13.662  -8.042  -8.045  -4.382  -5.293 
One-Child Certificate R. G96  0.976  0.819  -0.204  -1.141  -1.059  -1.335  -0.763  1.459 
Female Divorce R. G104       3.915    9.024    7.227    11.965    -5.550    -3.588   
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Table 6.11 (Continued)
         
         
China All  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
    For Number of Boys         B10    B10   B10    B10   B10   B10  
              INTRCPT2  G100          0.259 *    0.264 *     0.216 *       0.267 *       0.049        0.053 * 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G101        0.131   0.184    -0.147    -0.020    0.351    -0.023  
o-year-old Mortality R. G102         -0.637   -1.304    -1.711    -2.375    1.221    0.733  
Total Fertility R. G103          0.000   0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000  
Female Divorce R. G104         3.915   9.024    7.227    11.965    -5.550    -3.588  
Female College Grad. R. G105       -0.599    0.196    1.271    3.102    -1.959    0.837  
 One-Child Certificate R. G106       0.446    0.117    -0.389    -0.560    0.879    0.256   
 For Childbirth with Quota   B9    B9    B11    B11   B11    B11   B11   11.000  
INTRCPT2 G110 -0.347 *  -0.345 *  -0.759 *  -0.772 *  -0.678 *  -1.098 *  -0.086    -0.151 * 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G111 1.188  1.194  1.900    1.954    2.733    2.576    -0.966    -0.133   
 0-year-old Mortality R. G112 -10.870 *  -10.940 *  -5.944  -7.191  -2.281  -11.758  -3.976  -4.721 
 Total Fertility R. G113 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R. G114 14.245  15.011  -22.709  -14.989  -33.630  -26.330  12.472  11.108 
 Female College Grad. R. G115 -0.658  -1.223  16.465  15.371  14.743  17.201  2.234  -2.279 
One-Child Certificate R. G116 0.579  0.693 -3.857 -3.902 -3.463 -9.870 * -0.757  -0.412 
Note: * p<.05 
 
Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
 
 
 
Table 6.11 
To begin with, let’s look at Table 6.11. Because I center the independent 
variables in the individual-level equations about their corresponding provincial or county 
means, so their new means are zero (Arnold 1992; Bryk and Raudenbush 1992). This 
makes the intercepts(G00 or γ00) in the HGLM models the grand mean of the log of the 
number of children ever born, or log odds of being sterilized, for Chinese married 
women with values of zero on all the predictors. By way of illustration, consider Chinese 
non-Han women living in rural area and married less than 14 years, have zero schooling 
(as does her husband), is 16 years of age, has non-three-generation familial structure 
status, non-agricultural occupation status (as does her husband ), one-child certificates, 
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and no experience of childbirth within quota. The γ00 coefficient for the CEB Model I in 
is 0.903. For sterilization models, the γ00 coefficient is -0.733 in Model I. We can convert 
it into a “predicted probability” using this formula,  
1 / ( 1+ exp {- predicted log-odds coefficient}) 
The probability of being sterilized for Chinese married women or her husbands 
with average values on all the predictors is .32. For wife’s sterilization status, the 
coefficient in Model I is -0.96, so the probability for wives being sterilized is 28%. The 
coefficient in Model I for husband’s sterilization is -1.835, so the probability for wives’ 
husbands being sterilized is 14%.  
The G01(γ01 ) coefficient through the coefficient G06(γ06 ) are the main effects of 
the level-2, contextual variables on the dependent variables. In CEB models, 0-year-old 
mortality rate (G02) and one-child certificate rate (G06) passed the significance test. The 
higher the percentage of 0-year-old mortality rate in a province, the higher a province’s 
average expected log of women’s CEB. The association agrees with the proffered 
hypothesis. The lower the percentage of one-child certificate rate in a province, the 
higher a province’s average expected log of women’s CEB. This is in agreement with 
the hypothesis, as well. In husband’s sterilization Model II, Female Occupation 
Participation Rate is significant. That means that the higher the percentage of Female 
Occupation Participation Rate in a province, the higher a province’s average expected 
log odds of husband’s sterilization. We can say this represents a consequence of a rise in 
women’s status.  
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G10, G20 to G110 are the main effects of the level-1 variables on the dependent 
variables. For CEB models in Table 6.11, all individual-level variables pass the 
significance test, the same as in Table 6.4 for the individual-level Poisson analysis. Even 
the relationships of association of coefficients with CEB are identical to the individual-
level Poisson analysis. Three-Generation Familial Structure still acts negatively on CEB, 
which is against the hypothesis. 
The γ10 coefficient is 0.112, i.e., odds ratio= e0.112 =1.19. This is the main effect 
of rural status on the log of children ever born. So we could say that in comparing two 
women with a difference of rural status, the rural woman is predicted to have 19% more 
hildren ever born than the non-rural woman, controlling for the other variables. 
Regarding the two main indices of women’s status, the γ30 odds ratio of wife’s 
educational level is 0.98, i.e., e-0.022. Comparing two women with a difference of one 
year in schooling, the woman with more schooling is predicted to have 2% fewer 
children ever born than the other woman. The γ80 odds ratio of Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation is 1.08, so, after controlling for the other variables, farming women will 
have 8% more CEB than non-farming women. Concerning the two policy variables, the 
γ90 odds ratio of No One-child Certificate is 1.29; that is, after controlling other variables, 
women who have not accepted a One-child Certificate will have 29% more CEB than 
those with the certificate. The γ110 odds ratio of Experience of Childbirth with Quota is 
0.71; hence, after controlling other variables, women with Experience of Childbirth with 
Quota will have 29% fewer CEB than those without. 
c
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For G10, G20 to G110 of three sterilization status models, all of them for male 
il to pass the significance tests, except for Numsterilization models fa ber of Boys and 
erience of Childbirt th Q S g y ’ or hus a  e o a l 
does not pass the significance test in these three kinds of models. Regarding Agricultural 
n status,  wife’s ultural Occ pation s s (γ80) in sterilization status 
tisticall ig fica . e c f ient s 0.274 ming wife 
r husband be sterilized that are 0.274 higher 
on-farming wife. The odds ratio of Wi 's Agricultural Occupation is 1.32; so, 
lling fo riables, fa ing women will have 32% higher 
f the c le’s being sterilized than non-farm ng wo en’s status 
 an im ssive ro  n the sterilization m
e a be  owin . 
As in the logistic analysis, where I discuss why the two policy variables of the 
tificat d expe nce of c ildbir  within q ota show results contrary to 
pothesis that they increase sterilization rate, such unexpected results are again 
 Table 6 . The γ90 odds ratio of No ertificate in wife 
71 (exponentiating the coefficient 0.537); that is, after 
lling for the other variables, wom n who have not accepted a One-child Certificate 
more likely to be steri ized than those w γ110 odds ratio of 
Experience of Childbirth with Quota in Model II of male steriliz tion models is 
significant at 0.86 after exponentiating the coefficient -0.151; therefore, after controlling 
Exp h wi uota. urprisin l , wife s b nd’s ducati n l leve
Occupatio only  Agric u tatu
model is sta y s ni nt  Th oe fic  i . It means that the far
would have log odds of having herself or he
than the n fe
after contro r the other va rm
probability o oup i men. Wom
does not play pre le i se odels. However, the two policy 
variables hav tter sh g  
one-child cer e an rie h th u
the hy
observed in .11 One-child C
Sterilization Model Is 1.
contro e
are 71% l ho have. The 
a
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for the other variables, women w th with quota will have 29% 
less probability of ha ing nds han those witho
The rest of the coefficients represent the cross-level interactions involving the 
les on the lope f the in vidual variables on fertility. As I have pointed 
ious cha  a dis tive c tributio  of this dissertation that is not found in 
of cross-leve teraction effects. However, overall, there 
are not many interaction coefficients passing the significance tests. In CEB models, the 
ient is -1 , which d es rea  the sign ican evel. Th  is the cross-level 
olvin  th  Fem lle  radu i  Ra f le el var le on h
e’s edu o al lev l on CE . ere it significant, it would suggest that for 
e of 1 n Fema  College adua on Rate  a p vince, t slop of 
onal e n the o um er of children ever born would be decreased by 
means that when women live in a province with higher women’s educational 
e dep ing effect of her hoolin  level on CEB will decease. This is 
t the hypothesis that Female College Grad e women’s 
EB.  
44 coefficient is -22.44. This interaction engages the Female Divorce Rate 
on CEB. It indicates that fo
male Divorce Rate in a province, the slope of Han’s status on the log number of 
decrea  22.44. It denotes that Han women have less depressing effect of 
nce where there is a stronger trend to end 
marriage by divorce. It is against the hypothesis. Also on Han status, One-Child 
ith experience in childbir
v their husba  t ut. 
level-2 variab  s s o  di
out in prev pters, tinc on n
other studies is the estimation l in
γ35 coeffic .459 o ch if t l is
interaction inv g e ale Co ge G at on te o v -2 iab  t e 
slope of wif cati n e B  W
every increas % i  le  Gr ti  in ro he e 
wife’s educati lev l o  l g n b
1.459. That 
attainment, th ress sc g
agains uation Rate will help decreas
number of C
The γ
aggregate variable on the slope of Han status r every increase 
of 1% Fe
CEB would se by  
her Han status on the number of CEB in a provi
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Certificate Rate has a positive cross-level effect on the slope of Han status on CEB. 
Understandably, the Han status of Chinese women has a greater depressing effect on 
CEB when they live in a province with more successful promotion of the One-Child 
Certificate. 
On Three Generation Familial Structure, the γ64 coefficient of cross-level effect 
of Female Divorce Rate is 31.2. It connotes that the lowering effect of Three Generation 
Familial Structure on CEB will be stronger when a province has a higher divorce rate. 
This is against the hypothesis. The γ112 cross-level effect of 0-year-old Mortality Rate on 
the dec
 
ectation. 
Regarding the cross-level effects in the sterilization status models, the γ23 of 
Total Fertility Rate of level-2 variable has a negative effect on the enhancing slope of 
marital years over 14 years on the probability of having women and her husbands being 
sterilized or having women themselves being sterilized. So when women of marital years 
over 14 years live in a province with a higher total fertility rate, they and their husbands, 
or they themselves, will have a lower sterilization rate than those also with marital years 
more than 14 years not living in provinces with higher total fertility rate. This is in 
agreement with the hypothesis because total fertility rate should have a negative 
relationship with sterilization status. The γ92 of 0-year-old Mortality Rate in husband’s 
models significantly and negatively affects the enhancing effect of No One-child 
lining effect of Childbirth with Quota on CEB is negative; therefore, women 
participating in a local quota arrangement will be likely to have a higher number of CEB
where her province has a higher 0-year-old Mortality Rate, which falls within the 
hypothetical exp
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Certificate on the sterilization status of women and their husbands as couples and as 
wives separately. It is comprehensible that in the provinces with a higher 0-year-old 
Mortality Rate, the contextual effect of needing more childbirth to counteract the higher 
infant mortality rate will retard the pro-sterilization trend. The γ116 of One-child 
Certificate Rate of provincial level significantly impairs the decreasing effect of 
experience of childbirth within quota on wife’s sterilization. It is also logical that in the 
provinces with a higher One-child Certificate Rate, the contextual effect of abiding by 
the one-child policy appears to break the anti-sterilization trend, even though women 
might live in a local area with diverse alternative ways to control fertility. 
 
Table 6.12 
As mentioned before, in Table 6.12, I choose those marital years less than 14 
years in 1988 China data. In this younger population, the γ00 coefficient for the CEB 
Model I is 1.92, and for Sterilization models, the γ00 coefficient is 0.269 in Model I and 
Model II. Using the same formula--1 / ( 1+ exp {- predicted log-odds coefficient}), we 
convert it into a “predicted probability.” The probability of being sterilized for Chinese 
married women or her husbands with average values on all the predictors is .57, which 
was higher on the previous table. For wife’s sterilization status, the coefficient in Model 
I is 0.23, so the probability for wives’ being sterilized is 56%. The coefficient in Model I 
for husband’s sterilization is 0.04, so the probability for wives’ husbands’ being 
sterilized is 51%.  
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Table 6.12 Multilevel Analyses: Effects (Gamma Coefficients) of Individual and Provincial 
Characteristics on the Likelihood of Number of Children Ever Born and Being Sterilized: 1988 
China Data—Marital Years Less Than 14 Years. 
 
China Marital Years Less Than 14  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 For INTRCPT1   B0    B0    B0    B0    B0    B0    B0    B0  
INTRCPT2  G00 1.920 *  1.920 *  0.269 *  0.269 *  0.230 *  0.230 *  0.040 *  0.040 *
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G01 -1.064  -1.066  -0.352  -0.352  -0.678  -0.679  0.322  0.322 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G02 19.065 *  19.171 *  -1.719  -1.703  -1.580  -1.569  -0.142  -0.135 
 Total Fertility R.  G03 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G04 -39.921 *  -40.255 *  -0.934  -0.968  0.463  0.449  -1.328  -1.371 
 Female College Grad. R.  G05 7.239  7.243  -3.131  -3.142  -1.958  -1.961  -1.152  -1.152 
One-Child Certificate R.  G06 -3.927 *  -3.908 *  -1.222  -1.215  -1.299  -1.297  0.060  0.062 
 For Living in Rural Area   B1    B1   B1   B1   B1    B1    B1   B1  
INTRCPT2  G10 0.059  0.134 *  0.019  0.049 *  0.015  0.029  0.004  0.019 *
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G11 1.161  1.856  -0.153  -0.202  -0.037  -0.176  0.002  0.036 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G12 -0.923  -0.655  1.179  1.334  -0.161  -0.434  0.416  1.412 
 Total Fertility R.  G13 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G14 -22.537  2.236  -1.126  2.522  0.335  6.594  0.329  -3.221 
 Female College Grad. R.  G15 3.777  7.019  0.269  0.350  0.379  0.208  -0.017  0.027 
One-Child Certificate R.  G16 -1.892  -3.222  -0.024  -0.297  -0.167  -0.413  -0.019  0.098 
 For Wife's Education    B2      B2      B2      B2     
INTRCPT2  G20 -0.040 *     -0.012 *     -0.013 *     0.001    
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G21 0.245     0.059     0.100     -0.023    
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G22 -1.681     0.264     0.062     0.121    
 Total Fertility R.  G23 0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000    
 Female Divorce R.  G24 -0.295     -1.244     -0.875     0.060    
 Female College Grad. R.  G25 -2.460     -0.416     -0.246     -0.142    
One-Child Certificate R.  G26 0.205     0.071     0.035     0.018    
 For Husband's Education       B2      B2       B2      B2  
INTRCPT2  G20    -0.051 *     -0.007     -0.008     0.002 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G21    0.354     -0.039     0.010     -0.042 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G22    -0.499     0.735     0.602     0.060 
 Total Fertility R.  G23    0.000     0.000     0.000     0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G24    -4.311     -1.661     -0.970     -0.418 
 Female College Grad. R.  G25    -0.625     0.610     0.501     0.060 
One-Child Certificate R.  G26    0.012     -0.054     -0.023     -0.037 
 For HAN Status   B3    B3   B3   B3   B3    B3   B3   B3  
INTRCPT2  G30 -0.144 *  -0.135  0.056 *  0.057 *  0.042  0.047  0.010  0.011 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G31 0.412  0.355  -0.708  -0.713  -0.634  -0.720  0.049  0.086 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G32 8.238  6.939  3.923  4.078  4.805  5.178  -0.219  -0.374 
 Total Fertility R.  G33 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G34 -40.512  -34.788  1.719  1.024  2.463  -0.132  -0.059  0.416 
 Female College Grad. R.  G35 0.612  -0.498  -2.968  -3.266  -3.046  -3.249  -0.522  -0.597 
One-Child Certificate R.  G36 5.840  5.816  1.153  1.322  1.824  1.998  -0.121  -0.135 
 For Wife's Age   B4    B4   B4   B4   B4    B4   B4   B4  
INTRCPT2  G40 0.066 *  0.066 *  0.017 *  0.018 *  0.015 *  0.015 *  0.003 *  0.003 *
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G41 0.068  0.048  0.001  -0.003  -0.019  -0.023  0.020  0.020 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G42 -0.416  -0.296  -0.214  -0.206  -0.215  -0.206  0.010  0.006 
 Total Fertility R.  G43 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G44 1.585  0.991  0.200  0.155  0.363  0.311  -0.197  -0.163 
 Female College Grad. R.  G45 0.191  0.262  -0.378  -0.356  -0.269  -0.254  -0.101  -0.098 
One-Child Certificate R.  G46 -0.253  -0.236  -0.045  -0.043  -0.052  -0.050  0.006  0.006 
 For 3-Gen. Familial Structure    B5    B5   B5   B5   B5    B5   B5   B5  
INTRCPT2  G50 -0.631 *  -0.620 *  -0.063 *  -0.062 *  -0.051 *  -0.048 *  -0.012  -0.012 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G51 0.345  0.414  0.121  0.137  0.448 *  0.483 *  -0.355 *  -0.340 *
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G52 -12.672 *  -13.729 *  -0.191  -0.550  -0.521  -0.969  0.388  0.322 
 Total Fertility R.  G53 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 Female Divorce R.  G54 39.374  49.217  -0.251  1.928  2.022  4.914  -2.317  -2.054 
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Table 6.12 (Continued) 
 
ildren Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife China Marital Years Less Than 14  Ch Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
fect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II Ef
 Female College Grad. R.  G55 -4.157  0 6  0.288  0.010  -3.316  0.953  .65 0.607  0.596 
One-Child Certificate R.  G 1.774  1.693  0.10 0.060  0.1  0.092  3  -0.063 
ead Children        B B   B6    B6     B6  
G60       - .114 *  - *  - *  -0.104  -0.00   -0.007 
artici. R.  G61       0.190  0.188  0.295  0.310  -0.053  -0.059 
 G62       647  1.512  0.2  0.059  0.524 1 
      000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0 
       -  -1.186  -0.025  -1.574 1.604 
. R.       3  1.304  1.5  1.941  -0.456 0.260 
      023  0.854  0.2  0.128  0.415 3 
B6      B7      B7     B7  
G70 6 *  04   0.0    0.018  
0.466     -0.251    -0.056  
- 08     161     -0.672    1.376  
0.000     000     0.0    0.000  
19.361     375     4.8    -4.729  
4.896         -0.852    -0.041  
-2.260         -0.260    0.145  
       B6      B7       B7      B7  
 G70   0.11    0.01  0.02  0.004 
.    - 38        -0.218   0.095 
   4.239     0.540     0.52   0.010 
  0.000     0.000     0.00   0 
.   - 086     3.937     -3.943   0.265 
  5.081     0.171     0.153   0.010 
   - 77     0.063    0.065     0.001 
e  B7   B7   B8   B8   B8    B8   B8  
G80 6 50 *  0.17  0.18 *  0.159 * 0.16  0.01 3 
 51 3  0.377  0.34  -0  -0.125  0.40 7 
6  6.58  - .468  -4.481  -2   -3.162  -1.323  -1.150 
 G83 0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
. -33.550  -36.260  7.753  7.12  4.940  4.930  2.96 9 
3  2.50  -  -  -1   -1.647  -1.80 1.757 
6  - 59  -  -  -0 1  -0.754  0.15  0.154 
      B9   B9   B9    B9   B9  
G90     0.11  0.12 2 * 0.10  0.01 7 *
artici. R.  G91     - .068  -0.066  -0  -0.175  0.111 1 
ortality R.  G92       -1.371  -  -1.138  -1.164  -0.176 0.184 
      0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 0 
      3.647  3.766  3.637  3.712  -0.134 0.325 
. R.  G95       -  -  -0.003  0.007  -0.483 0.469 
      - .498  -0.518  -0.531  -0.542  0.048 3 
B8    B8   B10   B10   B10    B10  10.000   B10  
 G * 0  0.119 0  *  -0.10  -0.016 * .016 *
rtici. R. 2 1  0.371  0.38  0.511  0.53  -0.154 0.142 
2  -27.566 *  -27.468 *  -  -  -0.558  -0.716  -0.845 0.850 
3  0  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.0  0.000  0.000  0.000 
4  48.944  46.839  -  -2.927  -4.884  -4.430  2.328 8 
5  - 55  - 66  2.242  2.084  2.0  1.940  0.199 0 
6  7  1.091  -  - -0.380  -0.372  -0.151  -0.140 
56 
 
6  
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B6  6 6 For Number of D
 INTRCPT2  0 0.114 0.105 7*
 Female Occup. P
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 0.38
 0-year-old Mortality R. 
 Total Fertility R. 
6.30 3 4 .993
 Female Divorce R  G84 5 4  2.11
 Female College Grad. R.  G85 0.95 9 3.681 3.377 .805
2
3  -
One-Child Certificate R.  G86 0.16 0.0 0.509 0.587 .7 9 
For Number of Boys   
 
   B9 
 INTRCPT2   
  
9 * 0 *  0.10  3 * 7 *  0.01
 Female Occup. P
o-year-old M
0 .181  0.11
1.421  -
Total Fertility R. 
Female Divorce R. 
 G93 
 G94 
 0.00
 -
Female College Grad 0.454 
0
0.418  -
 One-Child Certificate R.  G96 
  
 0.05
 For Childbirth with Quota  
INTRCPT2 
 
100  
1  
-0.496  -0.5 1 *  -0.118 * - *  -
6 
.102 2 
4 
*  -0
Female Occup. Pa  G10 2.11  2.05  -
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G10 1.398 1.494  -
 Total Fertility R. 
 Female Divorce R. 
 G10 0.00 00 
 G10
 G10
3.149  2.51
 Female College Grad. R. 3.5 4.5 94  0.15
One-Child Certificate R.  G10 0.82 0.487 0.466  
Note: * p<.05 
 
Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
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Among the main effects of the level-2 variables on the dependent variables in 
CEB models, fro he G01(γ01 ) coefficient to G06(γ06 ), 0-year-old mortality rate (G02) 
and one-child certificate rate (G06) pass the significance tests and have the same 
association with CEB, as in Table 6.11. In addition, Female Divorce Ra  becom s 
nt and th her e ercentage of female divorce rate in a province, the lower 
ected log of women’s CEB. This is in agreement with the 
o c xtual v riables show direct significant effects on three of the 
on statu odels. 
rdin e main effects of the level-1 variables on the dependent variabl s, all
ts G , G20  G100 i  e C ficance tests either 
 or Mo II. Th relation ps o ose 
  
10, 0 to G1 0 of thr e steril ation status models, most of them
lts as in ble 6.1 . Howe er, for wife’s education in this younger population, 
icantly af ct th steriliza o va b , un ik  T le .11. p ific lly e 
ent is 012 in he coup  sterilization model, and -0.013 in the wife 
od o the  That means that 
ing r vari bl co paring two wom n with 
e wo n with one more schooling year will be .99 as likely as the one with 
oling year to h ve eithe  her co ple or herself be sterilized. Wife’s age in 
tion changes its negative association relation with couple’s and 
wife’s sterilization in Table 6.11 to positive. This means that for women with marital 
m t
te e
significa e hig th p
a province’s average exp
hypothesis. N onte a
sterilizati s m
Rega g th e  
the coefficien 10 to n th EB models pass the signi
in Model I del e shi f coefficients with CEB are identical to th
in Table 6.11.
For G  G2 1 e iz  have the 
same resu  Ta 1 v
they signif fe e ti n ria le l e in ab  6  S ec a , th
γ20 coeffici  -0.  t  le
sterilization m el. S  γ20 odds ratios for both are around 0.99.
after controll othe a es, m e a difference of one year in 
schooling, th ma
one less scho a r u
this younger popula
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years less than 14 years, comparing two women with a difference of one year in age, the 
older woman would be 1.02 as likely as the younger woman to have been sterilized. 
Compared with Table 6.11, the cross-level interactions of the level-2 variables on 
the slope of individual variables on fertility lose several significant variables. The 
instances are in CEB models, the γ35, Female College Graduation Rate on the slope of 
wife’s educational level, the γ44 of Female Divorce Rate and γ45 of Female Divorce Rate 
on Han status, the γ52 of 0-year-old mortality rate on wife’s age, the γ64 of Female 
Divorce Rate on Three Generation Familial Structure, the γ92 of 0-year-old Mortality 
Rate in Model II of couple’s and wife’s sterilization models on No One-child Certificate, 
and the γ116 of One-child Certificate Rate on Childbirth with Quota in wife’s 
sterilization model. 
The two cross-level effects that now emerge as significant in Table 6.12 are γ51 
of Female Occupation Participation Rate
 
and γ52 of 0-year-old Mortality Rate on Three 
Generation Familial Structure. The γ51 has positive effect on the slope of Three 
Generation Familial Structure in wife sterilization model; that is, women living in the 
three-generation familial structure in a province with higher Female Occupation 
Participation Rate will have a lower wife sterilization rate than those also living in the 
three-generation familial structure in a province with lower Female Occupation 
Participation Rate. However, the γ51 has a negative effect on the slope of Three 
Generation Familial Structure in the husband sterilization model; that is, women living 
in a three-generation familial structure in a province with higher Female Occupation 
 
  
224
Participation Rate will lower the reducing effect of familial structure on husband 
sterilization rate as compared with those also living in a three-generation familial 
structure in a province with lower Female Occupation Participation Rate. This may be 
explained as follows: when people in China perceive in the surrounding context that 
more women are going out to work like men, women’s status rises and she no longer has 
to shoulder the full responsibility for ending fertility. We see this trend in the γB01 
Bcoefficient of the direct effect of level-2 Female Occupation Participation Rate on 
fertility, even though they are not significant. Three-generation familial structure, 
however, demonstrates this contextual effect. We can suppose that the parents of the 
couples may facilitate the wives’ asserting their rights on issues of ending fertility. So 
both of the γB51 Bcoefficients B Bon the wife sterilization and husband sterilization status fall 
within hypothetical expectation. 
The γB52 Bof 0-year-old Mortality Rate on the depressing effect of Three Generation 
Familial Structure on CEB is negative; hence, women in a province with higher 0-year-
old Mortality Rate can lessen the decreasing effect of three-generation familial structure 
on CEB. From the γB02B of level-2 effect of 0-year-old Mortality Rate has a directly 
affirmative effect on CEB; this result is not surprising. 
 
Table 6.13 
In Table 6.13, I select women who live in rural China in1988. In this population, 
the γB00 Bcoefficient for the CEB Model I in is 2.91, and for the couple sterilization models, 
the γB00 Bcoefficient is 0.357 in Model I and Model II. We change it into a “predicted  
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Table 6.13 Multilevel Analyses: Effects (Gamma Coefficients) of Individual and Provincial 
Characteristics on the Likelihood of Number of Children Ever Born and Being Sterilized: 1988 
China Data—Living in Rural Area. 
 
China Rural  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I   Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
For INTRCPT1                         
INTRCPT2  G00 2.906 P*P  2.904 P*P  0.357 P*P  0.357 P*P  0.302 P*P  0.302 P*P  0.056 P*P  0.056 P*P 
INTRCPT2  G00 2.906 P*P  2.904 P*P  0.357 P*P  0.357 P*P  0.302 P*P  0.302 P*P  0.056 P*P  0.056 P*P 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G01 -1.240 
P P
 
 -1.247 
P P
 
 -0.374 
P P
 
 -0.374 
P P
 
 -0.887 P*P  -0.888 P*P  0.515 
P P
 
 0.514 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G02 26.053 P*P  26.164 P*P  -1.166 
P P
 
 -1.167 
P P
 
 -1.447 
P P
 
 -1.445 
P P
 
 0.294 
P P
 
 0.310 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G03 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G04 -44.222 P*P  -44.636 P*P  2.699 
P P
 
 2.684 
P P
 
 4.249 
P P
 
 4.195 
P P
 
 -1.592 
P P
 
 -1.663 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G05 10.693 
P P
 
 10.687 
P P
 
 -5.720 
P P
 
 -5.723 
P P
 
 -3.441 
P P
 
 -3.434 
P P
 
 -2.274 
P P
 
 -2.281 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G06 -4.594 P*P  -4.579 P*P  -0.501 
P P
 
 -0.499 
P P
 
 -0.947 
P P
 
 -0.948 
P P
 
 0.435 
P P
 
 0.443 
P P
 
 For Married More than 14 years    B1    B1   B1   B1    B1   B1   B1   B1  
INTRCPT2  G10 0.085 
P P
 
 0.087 
P P
 
 0.052 P*P  0.054 P*P  0.052 P*P  0.053 P*P  0.002 
P P
 
 0.003 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G11 -1.106 
P P
 
 -1.063 
P P
 
 0.221 
P P
 
 0.221 
P P
 
 0.112 
P P
 
 0.103 
P P
 
 0.139 
P P
 
 0.152 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G12 2.981 
P P
 
 3.073 
P P
 
 1.707 
P P
 
 1.704 
P P
 
 0.723 
P P
 
 0.714 
P P
 
 0.945 
P P
 
 0.877 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G13 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 P*P  0.000 P*P  0.000 P*P  0.000 P*P  0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G14 -32.756 
P P
 
 -34.868 
P P
 
 8.033 
P P
 
 8.402 
P P
 
 9.888 
P P
 
 10.508 
P P
 
 -0.490 
P P
 
 -0.402 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G15 -5.224 
P P
 
 -5.325 
P P
 
 -2.977 
P P
 
 -2.887 
P P
 
 -2.909 
P P
 
 -2.832 
P P
 
 -0.477 
P P
 
 -0.485 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G16 3.483 
P P
 
 3.514 
P P
 
 0.214 
P P
 
 0.146 
P P
 
 -0.041 
P P
 
 -0.128 
P P
 
 0.362 
P P
 
 0.339 
P P
 
 For Wife's Education    B2      B2       B2      B2     
INTRCPT2  G20 -0.054 P*P     -0.005 
P P
 
    -0.004 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
   
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G21 0.219 
P P
 
    -0.045 
P P
 
    -0.007 
P P
 
    -0.034 
P P
 
   
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G22 -1.261 
P P
 
    0.595 
P P
 
    0.401 
P P
 
    0.188 
P P
 
   
 Total Fertility R.  G23 0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
   
 Female Divorce R.  G24 1.360 
P P
 
    -1.980 
P P
 
    -1.766 
P P
 
    -0.183 
P P
 
   
 Female College Grad. R.  G25 -4.680 P*P     -0.414 
P P
 
    -0.422 
P P
 
    0.065 
P P
 
   
One-Child Certificate R.  G26 0.159 
P P
 
    0.129 
P P
 
    0.134 
P P
 
    -0.016 
P P
 
   
 For Husband's Education       B2      B2      B2      B2  
INTRCPT2  G20    -0.054 P*P     0.011 P*P     0.008 P*P     0.003 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G21    -0.048 
P P
 
    -0.028 
P P
 
    -0.003 
P P
 
    -0.022 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G22    0.121 
P P
 
    0.163 
P P
 
    0.132 
P P
 
    0.032 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G23    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G24    -0.277 
P P
 
    -0.467 
P P
 
    -0.044 
P P
 
    -0.547 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G25    -3.199 
P P
 
    0.431 
P P
 
    0.124 
P P
 
    0.223 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G26    0.228 
P P
 
    -0.054 
P P
 
    0.042 
P P
 
    -0.079 
P P
 
 For HAN Status    B3    B3   B3   B3    B3   B3   B3   B3  
INTRCPT2  G30 -0.039 
P P
 
 -0.022 
P P
 
 0.067 P*P  0.063 P*P  0.058 P*P  0.060 P*P  0.009 
P P
 
 0.007 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G31 1.573 
P P
 
 0.888 
P P
 
 -0.669 
P P
 
 -0.625 
P P
 
 -0.492 
P P
 
 -0.511 
P P
 
 -0.003 
P P
 
 0.018 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G32 12.850 
P P
 
 15.146 
P P
 
 2.226 
P P
 
 2.023 
P P
 
 1.997 
P P
 
 2.301 
P P
 
 -0.341 
P P
 
 -0.312 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G33 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G34 -76.587 P*P  -82.144 P*P  8.508 
P P
 
 8.542 
P P
 
 10.924 
P P
 
 9.028 
P P
 
 1.334 
P P
 
 1.742 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G35 -12.886 
P P
 
 -16.977 
P P
 
 -3.717 
P P
 
 -3.823 
P P
 
 -3.208 
P P
 
 -3.602 
P P
 
 -0.848 
P P
 
 -0.871 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G36 13.806 P*P  15.559 P*P  0.772 
P P
 
 0.608 
P P
 
 0.957 
P P
 
 1.136 
P P
 
 -0.307 
P P
 
 -0.278 
P P
 
 For Wife's Age    B4    B4   B4   B4    B4   B4   B4   B4  
INTRCPT2  G40 0.102 P*P  0.102 P*P  -0.004 P*P  -0.004 P*P  -0.005 P*P  -0.005 P*P  0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G41 0.021 
P P
 
 0.006 
P P
 
 0.007 
P P
 
 0.011 
P P
 
 0.013 
P P
 
 0.016 
P P
 
 -0.008 
P P
 
 -0.008 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G42 -0.478 
P P
 
 -0.396 
P P
 
 0.010 
P P
 
 -0.012 
P P
 
 0.042 
P P
 
 0.025 
P P
 
 -0.024 
P P
 
 -0.027 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G43 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G44 2.791 
P P
 
 2.339 
P P
 
 -0.503 
P P
 
 -0.434 
P P
 
 -0.570 
P P
 
 -0.507 
P P
 
 -0.041 
P P
 
 -0.044 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G45 0.154 
P P
 
 0.291 
P P
 
 -0.109 
P P
 
 -0.076 
P P
 
 -0.063 
P P
 
 -0.036 
P P
 
 -0.014 
P P
 
 -0.007 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G46 -0.001 
P P
 
 0.019 
P P
 
 0.070 
P P
 
 0.069 
P P
 
 0.062 
P P
 
 0.062 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 -0.001 
P P
 
 For 3-Gen. Familial Structure    B5    B5   B5   B5    B5   B5   B5   B5  
INTRCPT2  G50 -0.472 P*P  -0.470 P*P  -0.175 P*P  -0.176 P*P  -0.150 P*P  -0.152 P*P  -0.024 P*P  -0.025 P*P 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G51 0.614 
P P
 
 0.592 
P P
 
 0.141 
P P
 
 0.152 
P P
 
 0.588 
P P
 
 0.603 P*P  -0.506 P*P  -0.513 P*P 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G52 -10.880 
P P
 
 -10.506 
P P
 
 1.425 
P P
 
 1.191 
P P
 
 1.085 
P P
 
 0.907 
P P
 
 0.367 
P P
 
 0.528 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G53 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
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Table 6.13 (Continued) 
China Rural  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status 
Effect Index Model I   Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 Female Divorce R.  G54 33.549 
P P
 
 28.673 
P P
 
 -11.437 
P P
 
 -8.357 
P P
 
 -9.024 
P P
 
 -7.221 
P P
 
 -2.512 
P P
 
 -3.227 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G55 -3.003 
P
 
P
 
 -3.761 
P
 
P
 
 3.577 
P
 
P
 
 3.447 
P
 
P
 
 2.509 
P
 
P
 
 2.495 
P
 
P
 
 1.137 
P
 
P
 
 1.166 
P
 
P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G56 3.018 
P
 
P
 
 3.226 
P
 
P
 
 0.571 
P
 
P
 
 0.519 
P
 
P
 
 0.592 
P
 
P
 
 0.534 
P
 
P
 
 -0.085 
P
 
P
 
 -0.040 
P
 
P
 
For Number of Dead Children         B6   B6    B6   B6   B6   B6  
 INTRCPT2  G60       -0.084 P*P  -0.082 P*P  -0.073 P*P  -0.071 P*P  -0.012 P*P  -0.011 P*P 
 Female Occup. Partici. R.  G61       0.111 
P
 
P
 
 0.109 
P
 
P
 
 0.200 
P
 
P
 
 0.198 
P
 
P
 
 -0.106 
P
 
P
 
 -0.103 
P
 
P
 
o-year-old Mortality R.  G62       0.964 
P
 
P
 
 0.920 
P
 
P
 
 0.622 
P
 
P
 
 0.628 
P
 
P
 
 0.189 
P
 
P
 
 0.167 
P
 
P
 
Total Fertility R.  G63       0.000 
P
 
P
 
 0.000 
P
 
P
 
 0.000 
P
 
P
 
 0.000 
P
 
P
 
 0.000 
P
 
P
 
 0.000 
P
 
P
 
Female Divorce R.  G64       -0.873 
P
 
P
 
 -0.627 
P
 
P
 
 0.326 
P
 
P
 
 0.219 
P
 
P
 
 -0.428 
P
 
P
 
 -0.401 
P
 
P
 
Female College Grad. R.  G65       1.082 
P
 
P
 
 1.443 
P
 
P
 
 1.045 
P
 
P
 
 1.268 
P
 
P
 
 0.357 
P
 
P
 
 0.348 
P
 
P
 
 One-Child Certificate R.  G66       0.424 
P P
 
 0.335 
P P
 
 0.209 
P P
 
 0.185 
P P
 
 0.078 
P P
 
 0.073 
P P
 
 For Wife's Agricultural Occup.    B6      B7       B7      B7     
INTRCPT2  G70 0.200 P*P     0.050 P*P     0.024 
P P
 
    0.025 P*P    
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G71 1.116 
P P
 
    -0.193 
P P
 
    -0.319 
P P
 
    0.084 
P P
 
   
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G72 -0.001 
P P
 
    1.642 
P P
 
    1.290 
P P
 
    0.648 
P P
 
   
 Total Fertility R.  G73 0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
   
 Female Divorce R.  G74 34.058 
P P
 
    2.365 
P P
 
    2.430 
P P
 
    -1.834 
P P
 
   
 Female College Grad. R.  G75 1.438 
P P
 
    -1.627 
P P
 
    -0.962 
P P
 
    -0.828 
P P
 
   
One-Child Certificate R.  G76 -1.576 
P P
 
    0.275 
P P
 
    0.226 
P P
 
    0.190 
P P
 
   
 For Husband's Agri. Occup.       B6      B7      B7      B7  
INTRCPT2  G70    0.139 P*P     0.002 
P P
 
    0.001 
P P
 
    0.002 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G71    -0.705 
P P
 
    -0.236 
P P
 
    -0.201 
P P
 
    -0.017 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G72    10.540 P*P     -0.080 
P P
 
    -0.093 
P P
 
    -0.027 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G73    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
    0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G74    -46.252 P*P     -6.018 
P P
 
    -6.980 
P P
 
    0.780 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G75    4.379 
P P
 
    -1.878 
P P
 
    -1.589 
P P
 
    -0.400 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G76    1.549 
P P
 
    0.721 
P P
 
    0.592 
P P
 
    0.148 
P P
 
 For No One-child Certificate    B7    B7   B8   B8    B8   B8   B8   B8  
INTRCPT2  G80 0.787 P*P  0.771 P*P  0.170 P*P  0.173 P*P  0.155 P*P  0.155 P*P  0.008 
P P
 
 0.014 
P P
 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G81 -0.425 
P P
 
 -0.436 
P P
 
 0.052 
P P
 
 0.013 
P P
 
 -0.460 
P P
 
 -0.467 
P P
 
 0.350 
P P
 
 0.348 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G82 12.995 
P P
 
 12.920 
P P
 
 -4.416 
P P
 
 -4.268 
P P
 
 -3.332 
P P
 
 -3.585 
P P
 
 -1.612 
P P
 
 -1.733 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G83 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G84 -27.705 
P P
 
 -39.279 
P P
 
 0.566 
P P
 
 -1.653 
P P
 
 -2.423 
P P
 
 -3.897 
P P
 
 3.791 
P P
 
 3.683 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G85 9.067 
P P
 
 10.789 
P P
 
 -3.001 
P P
 
 -2.756 
P P
 
 -1.387 
P P
 
 -1.296 
P P
 
 -1.866 
P P
 
 -1.909 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G86 -1.110 
P P
 
 -1.168 
P P
 
 -0.071 
P P
 
 -0.105 
P P
 
 -0.372 
P P
 
 -0.395 
P P
 
 0.307 
P P
 
 0.268 
P P
 
For Number of Boys         B9   B9    B9   B9   B9   B9  
 INTRCPT2  G90       0.051 P*P  0.051 P*P  0.041 P*P  0.041 P*P  0.010 P*P  0.010 P*P 
 Female Occup. Partici. R.  G91       -0.001 
P P
 
 0.003 
P P
 
 -0.088 
P P
 
 -0.085 
P P
 
 0.085 
P P
 
 0.083 
P P
 
o-year-old Mortality R.  G92       -0.137 
P P
 
 -0.111 
P P
 
 -0.274 
P P
 
 -0.243 
P P
 
 0.218 
P P
 
 0.227 
P P
 
Total Fertility R.  G93       0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
Female Divorce R.  G94       -1.653 
P P
 
 -1.975 
P P
 
 -1.536 
P P
 
 -1.887 
P P
 
 -0.812 
P P
 
 -0.847 
P P
 
Female College Grad. R.  G95       -0.005 
P P
 
 0.144 
P P
 
 0.301 
P P
 
 0.360 
P P
 
 -0.298 
P P
 
 -0.298 
P P
 
 One-Child Certificate R.  G96       -0.168 
P P
 
 -0.174 
P P
 
 -0.250 
P P
 
 -0.231 
P P
 
 0.098 
P P
 
 0.098 
P P
 
 For  Childbirth with Quota     B8    B8   B10   B10    B10   B10   B10   B10  
INTRCPT2  G100 -0.572 P*P  -0.576 P*P  -0.180 P*P  -0.182 P*P  -0.163 P*P  -0.164 P*P  -0.019 
P P
 
 -0.020 P*P 
Female Occup. Partici. R.  G101 1.717 
P P
 
 1.733 
P P
 
 0.498 
P P
 
 0.503 
P P
 
 0.733 P*P  0.747 P*P  -0.251 
P P
 
 -0.263 
P P
 
 0-year-old Mortality R.  G102 -31.798 P*P  -31.761 P*P  -1.065 
P P
 
 -1.142 
P P
 
 0.004 
P P
 
 -0.125 
P P
 
 -0.914 
P P
 
 -0.797 
P P
 
 Total Fertility R.  G103 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 0.000 
P P
 
 Female Divorce R.  G104 62.192 
P P
 
 60.983 
P P
 
 -7.286 
P P
 
 -5.882 
P P
 
 -10.469 
P P
 
 -9.242 
P P
 
 1.571 
P P
 
 1.382 
P P
 
 Female College Grad. R.  G105 -2.797 
P P
 
 -3.898 
P P
 
 3.256 
P P
 
 3.206 
P P
 
 2.505 
P P
 
 2.346 
P P
 
 0.978 
P P
 
 1.009 
P P
 
One-Child Certificate R.  G106 5.204 
P P
   5.341 P P  -0.421 P P  -0.468 P P  -0.200 P P  -0.234 P P   -0.257 P P   -0.234 P P 
Note: * p<.05 
 
Source: SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 1991 
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probability.” The probability of being sterilized for Chinese married couples with 
average values on all the predictors is .59, which is the highest among the three tables. 
For wife’s sterilization status, the coefficient in Model I is 0.302; so the probability for 
wives being sterilized is 57%. The coefficient for husband’s sterilization is 0.056; so the 
probability for wives’ husbands’ being sterilized is 51%. We can say rural people have a 
higher expected sterilization rate. 
Among the main effects of the level-2 variables on the dependent variables in 
CEB models, from the GB01B(γB01 B) coefficient to G06(γB06 B), 0-year-old mortality rate (G02), 
Female Divorce Rate (G04) and one-child certificate rate (G06) pass the significance test 
and have the same association with CEB as in Table 6.12. The γB01 Bof Female Occupation 
Participation has direct and significant effects on the wife sterilization status models. 
The higher the female occupation participation rate in a province, the lower a province’s 
average expected log odds of women having been sterilized, which is not against the 
hypothesis. 
Regarding the main effects of the level-1 variables on the dependent variables, 
except for the variable of marital years more than 14, which loses its significant effect in 
the rural group, the other variables of G10, G20 to G100 in CEB models pass the 
significance tests either in Model I or Model II. The relationships of coefficients with 
CEB are identical to those in Table 6.11.  
For G10, G20 to G110 of the three sterilization status models, most of them have 
similar results to those in Table 6.11. However, wife’s education in the previous younger 
population passes the significance test on the Couple Sterilization Model and the Wife  
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Sterilization Model, but fails in the rural group. on the other hand, husband’s education 
affects the couple sterilization model and wife sterilization model, but unlike wife’s 
education, it has a positive effect on the couple sterilization and wife sterilization status: 
specifically, the γ20 coefficient is 0.011 in the Couple Sterilization Model, and 0.008 in 
the Wife Sterilization Model. So the γ20 odds ratios for both are around 1.01. It means 
that after controlling for the other variables, comparing two women’s husbands with a 
difference of one year in schooling, the woman’s husband with one more schooling year 
will be 1.01 as likely as the one with one less year of schooling to have her couple or 
herself be sterilized. This is not what I hypothesized. 
Wife’s age in this rural population changes its positive association with couple’s 
and wife’s sterilization in Table 6.12 to negative, as in Table 6.11. It means that for 
women who live in a rural area, comparing two women with a difference of one year in 
age, the older woman would be around .996 as likely as the younger woman to have her 
couple or herself be sterilized. 
In comparison with Table 6.11, the cross-level interactions of the level-2 variables 
on the slope of individual variables on fertility in Table 6.13 lose several significant 
variables. In addition, the γ52 of 0-year-old Mortality Rate on Three Generation Familial 
Structure fails the significance test. However, as in Table 6.12, the γ51 of Female 
Occupation Participation Rate
 
on Three Generation Familial Structure have different 
directional effects. The interaction strengthens as regards wife sterilization status (i.e., 
making wife’s sterilization less likely, as in Table 6.12), but, on husband sterilization 
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status, the interaction debilitates the effect of the three-generation familial to lower 
husbands’ sterilization. 
The three newly significant cross-level effects in Table 6.13 are the γ72 of 0-year-
old Mortality Rate and the γ74 of Female Divorce Rate
 
on Husband’s Agricultural 
Occupation, and the γ101 of Female Occupation Participation Rate on the Experience of 
Childbirth within Quota. The γ72 has a positive effect on the slope of Husband’s 
Agricultural Occupation in CEB mode, which fits perfectly with the hypothesis, because 
higher 0-year-old Mortality Rate will promote a higher CEB. Through the husband’s 
agricultural job, it should boost this inclination. The γ74 has negative effect on the slope of 
Husband’s Agricultural Occupation in CEB model; that is, women who have husbands 
who work in an agricultural occupation, living in a province with higher Female Divorce 
Rate will have a smaller number of CEB than those whose husbands are also farmers in a 
province with lower Female Divorce Rate. This falls within the hypothesis. In wife’s 
sterilization models, the Female Occupation Participation Rate has a positive effect on 
the slope of experience of childbirth within quota. That is, women, who have experience 
of childbirth within quota, living in a province of higher Female Occupation Participation 
Rate, will have a lower wife’s sterilization rate than those who have experience of 
childbirth within quota living in a province with lower Female Occupation Participation 
Rate. At the macro level, it complies with the hypothesis that Female Occupation 
Participation Rate leads to lower wife’s sterilization rate. 
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The Discussion of Table 6.11, Table 6.12 and Table 6.13, China Data 
Judging from these three HGLM tables using 1988 China data, three groups 
display somewhat different results. Table 6.12 of the younger group looks different than 
the other models, because rural people make up most of the population. It is also possible 
that the level-2 and level-1 variables have insignificant explanatory power for the 
husband sterilization models, because the dependent variable (number of husbands’ 
sterilizations) is less than that of the wife’s.  
Among six level-2 effects, Total Fertility Rate and
 
Female College Graduation 
Rate do not have apparent effects on these models. The two policy variables--No One-
child Certificate and Experience of Childbirth within Quota—show greater statistical 
significance on the sterilization models than do the two women’s statuses—education and 
farming status. Among 23 significant cross-level effects in these three tables, most of 
them come out in accordance with the hypothetical expectations. However, there are five 
significant cross-level effects that run counter to the hypotheses. Included are the 
provincial level Female Divorce Rate interacting with Han status in the whole sample, 
with Han status in the rural sample, and with Three Generation Familial Structure in the 
whole sample. The provincial level Female College Graduation Rate interacts with wife’s 
education in the whole sample, as well as with wife’s education in the rural sample. 
 
Table 6.14 
The 1992 Taiwan data, are analyzed in Table 6.14. As mentioned before, the 
intercepts(G00 or γ00) in the HGLM models for the outcome variable of CEB represent  
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Table 6.14 Multilevel Analyses: Effects (Gamma Coefficients) of Individual and County 
Characteristics on the Likelihood of Number of Children Ever Born and Being Sterilized: 1992 
Taiwan Data. 
 
Taiwan All  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status  
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 For INTRCPT1 B0    tcII                   B0   
    INTRCPT2 G00 0.900 *  0.902 *  -1.040 *  -1.043 *  -1.125 *  -1.129 *  -4.898 *  -4.926 * 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G01 -0.103    -0.106    -0.544    -0.566    -0.534    -0.583    0.953    0.967   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G02 0.002 *  0.002 *  0.003    0.004    0.005    0.005    -0.041 *  -0.041   
Total Fertility  R. G03 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.002    0.002   
Female Divorce  R. G04 -0.024 *  -0.024 *  -0.106 *  -0.107 *  -0.112 *  -0.112 *  0.182    0.164  
Female College Grad. R. G05 -0.917 *  -0.916 *  -5.992 *  -6.033 *  -6.747 *  -6.786 *  5.384    5.228  
For Wife's Education B1        B1      B1      B1     
    INTRCPT2 G10 -0.038 *     -0.078 *     -0.084 *     0.042      
Female Occup. Partici. R. G11 -0.013       0.033       0.066       -0.309      
o-year-old Mortality  R. G12 0.000       0.000       0.000       0.000      
Total Fertility  R. G13 -0.000 *      0.000       0.000       0.000      
Female Divorce  R. G14 -0.002 *      -0.001       -0.001       -0.004      
Female College Grad. R. G15 -0.031       -0.167       -0.326       0.511      
For Husband's Education B1    B1       B1      B1      B1  
    INTRCPT2 G10    -0.031 *     -0.072 *     -0.080 *     0.073  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G11    -0.035       -0.051       -0.059       0.042  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G12    0.000       0.000       0.000       0.003  
Total Fertility  R. G13    0.000       0.000       0.000       0.000  
Female Divorce  R. G14    -0.001       -0.004       -0.003       -0.020  
Female College Grad. R. G15    0.025       -0.155       -0.247       -0.216   
 For   Nowork Status B2    B2    B2    B2   B2   B2   B2   B2   
    INTRCPT2 G20 0.050 *  0.044 *  0.079 *  0.059    0.085 *   0.064    -0.025   -0.033   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G21 -0.107    -0.127   -1.361 *  -1.669   -1.655 *  -1.984   2.972   3.369   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G22 0.000    0.000    -0.003    -0.003    -0.005    -0.005    0.029   0.029   
Total Fertility  R. G23 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    -0.002   -0.002   
Female Divorce  R. G24 0.001    -0.002    -0.025    -0.037    -0.014    -0.023    -0.205   -0.263  
Female College Grad. R. G25 0.432    0.588    3.073 *  3.607    3.035 *   3.623    -1.702   -2.523 * 
 For     Wife's Age B3    B3    B3    B3   B3   B3   B3   B3   
    INTRCPT2 G30 0.030 *  0.034 *  0.075 *  0.083 *  0.069 *  0.077 *  0.116 *  0.115   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G31 0.000    0.003    -0.040    -0.045    -0.027    -0.039    -0.211   -0.133   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G32 0.000    0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000    0.000   0.001    0.001   
Total Fertility  R. G33 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   
Female Divorce  R. G34 0.000    0.000    0.002    0.001    0.002    0.001    -0.013    -0.015  
Female College Grad. R. G35 0.052    0.046    0.285    0.285    0.224    0.252    0.299    0.188   
 For Whether owning Piano B4    B4    B4    B4   B4   B4   B4   B4   
    INTRCPT2 G40 0.024 *   0.009 *  0.230 *  0.216 *  0.216 *  0.211 *  0.404    0.287   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G41 0.107    0.166    0.506    0.724    0.221    0.556    4.566    3.795   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G42 -0.001 *   -0.001    -0.010    -0.012    -0.010    -0.012    0.023   0.016   
Total Fertility  R. G43 0.000    0.000   0.001   0.001   0.001    0.001   -0.003    -0.003   
Female Divorce  R. G44 0.013 *   0.014    -0.015    0.009    -0.009    0.012    -0.145    -0.114  
Female College Grad. R. G45 0.076    -0.221    0.219    -0.180    2.194    1.455    -21.998    -19.733   
 For 3-Gene. Familial Structure B5    B5    B5 *   B5   B5   B5   B5   B5   
    INTRCPT2 G50 0.014 *   0.018 *  0.021    0.027    0.040    0.049    -0.222    -0.216   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G51 0.122    0.141    0.511    0.578    0.528    0.616    -0.252    -0.439  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G52 0.000    0.000    -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    0.001    0.000   
Total Fertility  R. G53 0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000   0.000   
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Table 6.14 (Continued) 
          
Taiwan All  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  Husband Sterilization Status  
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
Female Divorce  R. G54 -0.004    -0.004   -0.005   -0.003   -0.003    0.000   -0.022    -0.029  
Female College Grad. R. G55  -0.244   -0.301  0.950   0.955   1.063   1.128   2.284   1.642 * 
 For   Mainlander Status B6     B6   B6    B6   B6   B6   B6   B6  
    INTRCPT2 G60  -0.124 *  -0.125 * -0.127 *  -0.113 *  -0.262 *  -0.248 *  0.902 *  0.878  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G61  -0.012   0.022  -0.095   -0.001   0.140   0.213   -2.133   -2.795  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G62  0.001   0.001  0.007 *  0.007   0.008 *  0.007   0.024   0.025  
Total Fertility  R. G63  0.000   0.000  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   -0.002   -0.001  
Female Divorce  R. G64  0.004   0.007  0.002   0.010   0.009   0.018   -0.090   -0.072  
Female College Grad. R. G65  0.487   0.360  1.687   1.893   2.243   2.368   -5.927   -4.607 * 
For Number of Dead Children B7        B7    B7   B7   B7   B7   B7   
    INTRCPT2 G70       -0.168    -0.166    -0.131    -0.129    -4.540 *  -4.325   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G71       0.934    1.046    1.159    1.298    2.887    2.900   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G72       0.002    0.002    0.003    0.003    -0.136    -0.120   
Total Fertility  R. G73       0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.004    0.003  
Female Divorce  R. G74       0.150 *  0.153 *  0.123 *   0.127    2.051    1.914  
Female College Grad. R. G75       -11.953 *   -12.781 *  -9.843 *   -10.684    -14.920   -19.303  
 For Wife's Agricultural Occup.  B8        B8      B8      B8     
    INTRCPT2 G80 0.075*       0.423 *      0.460 *     -2.787      
Female Occup. Partici. R. G81 0.180       3.473       3.629 *      3.741      
o-year-old Mortality  R. G82 -0.001       -0.009       -0.007       0.023      
Total Fertility  R. G83 0.000       -0.001       -0.002       -0.004      
Female Divorce  R. G84 0.038 *      0.117       0.081       0.305      
Female College Grad. R. G85 -1.330       -2.079       -1.778       173.392       
For Husband's Agricultural  B8     B7       B8      B8      B8   
    INTRCPT2 G80    0.094 *     0.266 *     0.306 *     -2.561   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G81    -0.301       0.570       0.637       -2.153   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G82    0.000       -0.003       -0.003       0.043   
Total Fertility  R. G83    0.000       0.001       0.000       0.003   
Female Divorce  R. G84    0.028       0.070       0.054       0.077  
Female College Grad. R. G85    -0.336       4.508       5.310       109.217  
 For Number of Boys  B9        B9    B9   B9   B9   B9   B9  
    INTRCPT2 G90       0.622 *  0.636   0.622 *  0.635   0.202    0.215  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G91       -0.541    -0.517    -0.618    -0.602    0.658    0.819  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G92       -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    -0.003    0.002    0.004  
Total Fertility  R. G93       0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000    -0.001    -0.001  
Female Divorce  R. G94       -0.051 *  -0.051 *  -0.049 *  -0.048 *  -0.023    -0.027  
Female College Grad. R. G95          3.222 * 3.050 * 3.245 * 3.096 *  -0.919    -1.590  
Note: * p<.05 
 
Source: TPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
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the grand mean of the log of the number of children ever born, or log odds of being 
sterilized for sterilization status, for Taiwanese married women with average values on 
all the predictors. The γ00 coefficient for the CEB Model I in is 0.900. For Couple 
Sterilization models, the γ00 coefficient is -1.04 in Model I. It can be converted into a 
“predicted probability.” The probability of being sterilized for Taiwanese married 
women or their husbands with average values on all the predictors is .26. For wife’s 
sterilization status, the coefficient in Model I is -1.125, so the probability for wives being 
sterilized is 25%. The coefficient in Model I for husband’s sterilization is -4.898, so the 
probability for wives’ husbands being sterilized is 1%.  
The G01(γ01 ) coefficient to G05(γ05 ) reflect the main effects of the level-2 
variables on the dependent variables. In the CEB models, 0-year-old Mortality Rate 
(G02), Female Divorce Rate (G04) and Female College Graduation Rate (G05) pass the 
significance test. The higher the percentage of 0-year-old mortality rate in a county, the 
higher the county’s average expected log of women’s CEB. The association accords with 
the hypothesis. on the other hand, it has a negative effect on the husband’s sterilization 
status, which is also logical. Regarding the other two aggregate variables with higher 
women’s status implications, higher Female Divorce Rate (G04) and Female College 
Graduation Rate (G05) in a county, the lower the county’s average expected log of 
women’s CEB and the couple’s and wife’s sterilization rate. This is in agreement with 
the hypothesis, as well.  
G10, G20 to G90 are the main effects of the level-1 variables on the dependent 
variables. For the CEB models in Table 6.14, all the individual-level variables pass the 
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significance test. The relationships of coefficients with CEB are similar to those in Table 
6.5 for the Poisson individual-level analysis. The γ10 coefficient is -0.038, i.e., odds 
ratio= e-0.038 =0.96. This is the main effect of wife’s educational level on the log of 
children ever born. Comparing two women with a difference of one year in schooling, 
the woman with one more schooling year is predicted to have 4% fewer children ever 
born than the other woman. The γ20 odds ratio of Nowork Status is 1.05, so, after 
controlling for the other variables, women who are not working will have 5% more CEB 
than working women. The γ30 odds ratio of Wife’s age is 1.03 and the γ40 odds ratio of 
owning piano fails to pass the significance test in the Poisson individual-level analysis 
but, importantly, is 1.02. Unlike China, Three-generation Familial Structure has a 
positive effect on CEB, which supports the hypothesis. The γ50 odds ratio of Three-
generation Familial Structure is 1.01. The γ80 odds ratio of Wife's Agricultural 
Occupation is 1.07; so, after controlling other variables, farming women will have 7% 
more CEB than non-farming women. The γ60 odds ratio of Mainlander is .88; hence, 
Mainlander women will have 12% fewer CEB than non-Mainlander women. 
For G10, G20 to G110 of three sterilization status models, the G10 of wife’s and 
husband’s educational level pass the significance test on the couple and wife models. All 
of them show negative effects. Therefore, women or their husbands with higher 
education will be less likely to have couples’ or wives’ sterilization. The G20 of wife not 
working status will have the couple and the wife 8% more likely to be sterilized than 
those who are working. The G30 of wife’s age has a positive effect on couple and wife 
sterilization status. Owning piano status also has a positive influence on couple and wife 
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sterilization usage, the same as the logistic analysis in Table 6.7. The G50 of familial 
structure fail to pass the significance test, the same as the logistic analysis in Table 6.7. 
Also the same as in Table 6.7, the G60 of Mainlander status has negative effects on 
couple and wife sterilization but positive on husband’s sterilization. Unlike Table 6.7, 
G70 of Number of Dead Children is significant in discouraging husband sterilization, but 
Number of Boys loses its significant effect on husband sterilization. Regarding 
Agricultural Occupation status, wife’s and husband’s Agricultural Occupation status (γ80) 
in couple and wife sterilization status model are statistically significant. The coefficient 
is 0.423 for wife’s agricultural status, which means that a farming wife would have a log 
odds of couple or wife sterilization that is .274 higher than a non-farming wife. Its odds 
ratio of Wife's Agricultural Occupation is 1.52; so, after controlling other variables, 
farming women will have 52% more probability of couple or wife sterilization than non-
farming women.  
Regarding the cross-level interaction involving the level-2 variables on the slope 
of individual variables on fertility, in CEB models, the γ13 of Total Fertility Rate and γ14 
of Female Divorce Rate are significant and influence the slope of wife’s education on 
CEB, and they have the same negative direction. It suggests that for women living in a 
county with higher a Total Fertility Rate, the depressing effect of schooling level on 
CEB will be lower than those living in a county with lower Total Fertility Rate. 
However, strangely, Female Divorce Rate also weakens the negative effect of wife’s 
educational level on CEB. It is against the hypothesis. The same situation is in the γ42 of 
0-year-old Mortality Rate and γ44 of Female Divorce Rate on the slope of owning piano 
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status. For women living in a county with higher Female Divorce Rate, the affirmative 
effect of owning a piano on CEB will be higher than for those living in a county with 
lower Female Divorce Rate. Conversely to the effect of Female Divorce Rate, 0-year-old 
Mortality Rate weakens the supportive effect of owning a piano on CEB. Both results 
are not expected. Female Divorce Rate also functions as a conservative power on the 
slope of wife’s agricultural occupation on the CEB. The γ84 coefficient of Female 
Divorce Rate is 0.038. It suggests that for every increase of 1% in the female divorce 
rate in a county, the slope of wife’s farmer status on the log number of children ever 
born would increase by .038. Female divorce rate is regarded as the women’s status 
index and its direct level-2 (G04) tends to confirm this characterization. It really needs 
further investigation of why the female divorce rate as a contextual variable shows this 
unexpected effect. 
Regarding the cross-level effects in the sterilization status models, the γ21 of 
Female Occupation Participation Rate has a significantly negative effect on the slope of 
no work status in the couple and wife sterilization models. It suggests that for women 
living in a county with a higher Female Occupation Participation Rate, the positive 
effect of no work status on couple and wife sterilization will be lower than those living 
in a county with lower Female Occupation Participation Rate. It falls within the 
hypothetical expectation. Surprisingly, Female College Graduation Rate has a positive 
effect on the slope of no-work status. I expected that it would not support the tendency 
of aiding female sterilization. The γ62 of 0-year-old Mortality Rate has a positive 
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influence on the depressing slope of Mainlander status on couple and wife sterilization 
rate. It is not expected.  
The γ74 coefficient of Female Divorce Rate and the γ75 coefficient of Female 
College Graduation Rate have significant influence on the slope of Number of Dead 
Children on couple and wife sterilization rate, even though they have different directions. 
It indicates that for women living in a county with higher Female Divorce Rate, the 
depressing effect of dead children on couple and wife sterilization will be stronger than 
for those living in a county with lower Female Divorce Rate, after controlling for the 
other variables. Women who have experienced dead childbirths, living in a county with 
higher Female Divorce Rate, will be less likely to use sterilization to end fertility than 
those who lose the same number of children but live in a county with lower female 
divorce rate, after controlling for the other variables. This is an expected outcome. 
However, unlike the Female Divorce Rate, Female College Graduation Rate 
weakens the diminishing effect of dead children on couple and wife sterilization. The γ81 
coefficient of Female Occupation Participation Rate strengthens the positive effect of 
wife agricultural occupation on wife’s sterilization. Neither result was expected. The 
Female Divorce Rate has a negative effect on the slope of Number of Boys, but the γ95 
coefficient of Female College Graduation Rate has a positive effect on the Number of 
Boys. It is expected that Female Divorce Rate will act against the positive effect of son 
preference on couple and wife sterilization. Once in a context where women’s status is 
higher, women may be more likely to escape sterilization. Therefore, it is against 
 
 238
expectation that higher Female College Graduation Rate fortifies the tendency of son 
preference to encourage sterilization of wives. 
 
Table 6.15 
In Table 6.15 are the cases from the 1992 Taiwan KAP data, in which the 
population’s age is younger than 35. The γ00 coefficient for the CEB Model I is 2.158. 
For Couple Sterilization models, the γ00 coefficient is 0.207 in Model I. It can be 
converted into a “predicted probability.” The probability of being sterilized for 
Taiwanese couples under 35 years old with average values on all the predictors is .55. 
For wife’s sterilization status, the coefficient in Model I is 0.199, so the probability for 
wives being sterilized is also around 55. The coefficient in Model I for husband’s 
sterilization is -5.942, so the probability for wives’ husbands’ being sterilized is 0.02%. 
As in Table 6.12 for the younger Chinese group, the log of CEB, the predicted 
probabilities for couple and wife sterilization status for this younger group are greater 
than for the overall group. However, in China younger wive’s husbands have a higher 
predicted probability of sterilization than the overall group. By contrast, in Taiwan the 
sterilization rate of younger wives’ husbands is even lower than for the overall group. 
The G01(γ01 ) to the G05(γ05 ) coefficient are the main effects of the level-2 
variables on the dependent variables. In the CEB models, just 0-year-old Mortality Rate 
(G02) and Female Divorce Rate (G04) pass the significance test. Female College 
Graduation Rate (G05) fails to show significance in this table. The higher the percentage 
of 0-year-old mortality rate in a county, the higher the county’s average expected log of  
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Table 6.15 Multilevel Analyses: Effects (Gamma Coefficients) of Individual and County 
Characteristics on the Likelihood of Number of Children Ever Born and Being Sterilized: 1992 
Taiwan Data—Age Younger Than 35 Years Old. 
 
Taiwan 35yrs Younger
  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  
Husband Sterilization 
Status  
Effect 
Inde
x Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
 For INTRCPT1 B0             
    INTRCPT2 G00 2.158 * 2.158 * 0.207 * 0.207 * 0.199 * 0.199 * -5.942 * -5.712 * 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G01 -0.244   -0.243  -0.098 -0.104 -0.109 -0.115 2.058 2.130   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G02 0.005 * 0.005 * 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.066 -0.046 * 
Total Fertility  R. G03 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001   
Female Divorce  R. G04 -0.064 * -0.064 * -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.022 * -0.023 * 0.164 0.123   
Female College Grad. R. G05 -1.824   -1.842  -0.651 -0.635 -0.682 -0.664 7.644 4.046   
For Wife's Education B1 B1     B1  B1   B1   
    INTRCPT2 G10 -0.112 *   -0.018 *  -0.019 *  0.094   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G11 0.028     0.077 *  0.075 *  0.131   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G12 0.000     0.000  0.000  0.004   
Total Fertility  R. G13 0.000     0.000  0.000  -0.001   
Female Divorce  R. G14 0.000     0.001  0.001  -0.034   
Female College Grad. R. G15 -0.190     -0.156  -0.134  -3.245   
For Husband's Education B1     B1   B1   B1  B1  
    INTRCPT2 G10    -0.090 *  -0.017 *  -0.018 *  0.107  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G11    -0.059   0.022  0.019  0.120  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G12    0.000   0.000  0.000  0.003  
Total Fertility  R. G13    0.000   0.000  0.000  0.000  
Female Divorce  R. G14    0.003   0.001  0.001  -0.022  
Female College Grad. R. G15    -0.071   -0.044  -0.046  -0.373  
 For   Nowork Status B2     B2  B2 B2 B2  B2  B2 B2   
    INTRCPT2 G20 0.161 * 0.152 * 0.016 0.014 0.015 0.013 -0.023 -0.054   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G21 -0.309   -0.352  -0.329 -0.367 -0.363 -0.400 * 5.614 5.529   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G22 0.001   0.001  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.015 0.004   
Total Fertility  R. G23 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001   
Female Divorce  R. G24 0.001   -0.006  -0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.315 -0.355   
Female College Grad. R. G25 0.799   1.049  0.422 0.483 0.360 0.421 2.796 1.396   
 For     Wife's Age B3 B3    B3  B3 B3 B3  B3  B3 B3  
    INTRCPT2 G30 0.104 * 0.113 * 0.022 * 0.024 * 0.021 * 0.023 * 0.227 * 0.206 * 
Female Occup. Partici. R. G31 0.017   0.019  -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.013 0.941 0.802   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G32 0.001   0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001   
Total Fertility  R. G33 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
Female Divorce  R. G34 -0.007   -0.006  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.032 -0.029   
Female College Grad. R. G35 0.080   0.084  -0.113 -0.098 -0.108 -0.094 -1.620 -1.214   
 
For Whether owning Piano
 B4 B4    B4  B4 B4 B4  B4  B4 B4  
    INTRCPT2 G40 0.049   0.015  0.040 0.037 0.036 0.033 0.305 0.326   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G41 -0.352   -0.019  -0.008 0.075 0.021 0.110 -2.302 -2.473   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G42 -0.007   -0.008  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004   
Total Fertility  R. G43 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.004   
Female Divorce  R. G44 0.064   0.065  0.006 0.005 0.008 0.007 -0.243 -0.280   
Female College Grad. R. G45 0.864   0.093  0.143 -0.077 0.403 0.200 -20.912 -26.739   
For 3-Gene. Familial Structure
 B5     B5  B5 B5 B5  B5  B5 B5  
    INTRCPT2 G50 0.069   0.072  0.001 0.003 0.004 0.007 -0.616 -0.567   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G51 0.062   -0.049  0.125 0.096 0.124 0.099 1.657 0.600   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G52 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.013 -0.012   
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Table 6.15 (Continued) 
 
  Children Ever Born  Sterilization Status  Wife Sterilization Status  
Husband Sterilization 
Status 
 
Effect Index Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II  Model I  Model II 
Total Fertility  R. G53 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Female Divorce  R. G54 -0.005   -0.009  -0.003 -0.004  -0.003 -0.004 -0.033 0.062  
Female College Grad. R. G55 -0.068   0.240  -0.587 -0.579  -0.581 -0.567 0.571 1.676  
 For   Mainlander Status B6     B6  B6 B6  B6  B6  B6 B6  
    INTRCPT2 G60 -0.172  * -0.205 * -0.011 -0.013  -0.014 -0.016 0.337 0.265  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G61 0.108   0.246  0.076 0.147  0.085 0.162 -3.144 -3.026  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G62 0.006   0.005  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.012 0.008  
Total Fertility  R. G63 0.000   0.000  0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001  
Female Divorce  R. G64 -0.029   -0.018   0.009  0.011   0.006  0.007  0.529 0.494  
Female College Grad. R. G65 -0.961   -1.034   0.175 0.040 0.274 0.157 -2.404 -5.789   
 For  Number of Dead 
Children 
B7      B7 B7  B7  B7  B7 B7  
    INTRCPT2 G70      -0.028 -0.023 -0.019 -0.013 -6.936 -1.136   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G71      0.080 -0.008 0.084 0.008 0.505 -5.836   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G72      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.237 0.112   
Total Fertility  R. G73      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.020 -0.003   
Female Divorce  R. G74      0.028 0.026 0.027 0.026 2.411 -0.170   
Female College Grad. R. G75      0.418 0.829 0.510 0.905 27.731 -0.500   
 
For Wife's Agricultural  B8      B8  B8   B8   
    INTRCPT2 G80 0.165     0.237  0.244 *  -4.367   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G81 -0.307     0.233  0.169  28.342   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G82 -0.013     -0.004  -0.004  0.161   
Total Fertility  R. G83 0.003     0.000  0.000  -0.017   
Female Divorce  R. G84 0.151     0.021  0.021  -0.697   
Female College Grad. R. G85 -11.453     8.186  7.961  -141.842   
 
For Husband's Agri. Occup.
  B8     B7   B8   B8  B8  
    INTRCPT2 G80    0.309 *  -0.011  -0.004  -4.899   
Female Occup. Partici. R. G81    -1.232    0.084  -0.019  12.892   
o-year-old Mortality  R. G82    -0.001    0.000  -0.001  0.134   
Total Fertility  R. G83    0.001    0.001  0.001  -0.001   
Female Divorce  R. G84    0.042    0.003  0.008  -0.966   
Female College Grad. R. G85    -2.158    2.349  2.618  187.593   
 For     Number of Boys  B9      B9 B9 B9  B9  B9 B9  
    INTRCPT2 G90      0.116 * 0.119 * 0.112 * 0.115 * 0.470 * 0.423  
Female Occup. Partici. R. G91      -0.006 -0.032 0.009 -0.013 -2.313 -2.789  
o-year-old Mortality  R. G92      0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.003 -0.010  
Total Fertility  R. G93      0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002  
Female Divorce  R. G94      -0.013 * -0.012 * -0.013 * -0.011 * -0.033 -0.032  
Female College Grad. R. G95        -0.014 0.034 -0.047 -0.028 4.451 6.988   
Note: * p<.05 
 
Source: TPIFP 1992, and EYRC 1992 
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women’s CEB. Additionally, it has a negative effect on husband’s sterilization status, 
which is also reasonable. The higher the Female Divorce Rate (G04) in a county, the 
lower the county’s average expected log of women’s CEB and the lower the couple’s 
and wife’s sterilization rate. These results agree with my hypothesis.  
The main effects of the level-1 variables on the dependent variables are the G10, 
G20 to G90 coefficients. For CEB models in Table 6.15, several individual-level 
variables fail to pass the significance tests in this younger group. They are Owning Piano, 
Three-generation Familial Structure and Wife’s Agricultural Occupation. This might 
denote that economic affluence, family control and traditional farming life style do not 
have enough influence on fertility for younger people in 1992. The other variables that 
pass the significance tests have the same relationships of coefficients with CEB as in 
Table 6.14. The odds ratio= e-0.112 =0.89 is the main effect of wife’s educational level on 
the log of children ever born. Comparing two women with a difference of one year in 
schooling, the woman with one more schooling year is predicted to have 11% less 
children ever born than the other woman. The γ20 odds ratio of  Nowork Status is 1.17, so, 
after controlling for the other variables, women who do not work will have 17% more 
CEB than working women. The γ30 odds ratio of Wife’s age is 1.11. The γ60 odds ratio of 
Mainlander is .84; hence, Mainlander women will have 16% less CEB than non-
Mainlander women. The γ80 odds ratio of Husband's Agricultural Occupation is 1.36, so, 
after controlling for the other variables, the farming husband’s wife will have 36% more 
CEB than the non-farming husband’s wife.  
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For the G10, G20 to G110 coefficients of the three sterilization status models, the 
G10 of wife’s and husband’s educational level pass the significance test in the couple 
and wife models. All of them show negative effects. The G30 coefficient of wife’s age 
shows a positive effect on couple and wife sterilization status. Regarding Agricultural 
Occupation status, only wife’s Agricultural Occupation status (γ80) in the wife 
sterilization status model are statistically significant. The coefficient is 0. 244 for wife’s 
agricultural status, which means that a farming wife would have a log odds of having 
herself sterilized that is, 0.244 higher than a non-farming one. Its odds ratio of Wife's 
Agricultural Occupation is 1.28, so, after controlling for the other variables, farming 
women will have 28% more probability of herself being sterilized than non-farming 
women. Number of Boys still keeps its significant positive effect on couple and wife 
sterilization. It is compliant with the hypothetical expectation; when Taiwanese women 
have more boys, then they are more likely to end their fertility behavior by sterilization. 
Regarding the cross-level interactions in Table 6.15, for CEB models, 
astonishingly, there is only one significant interaction effect. This is the γ32 coefficient of 
0-year-old Mortality Rate, which has a positive influence on the slope of Wife age. This 
is not against the hypothesis, since the contextual effect of higher 0-year-old Mortality 
Rate should stimulate more fertility for security. Regarding the cross-level effects in the 
sterilization status models, the γ11 coefficient of Female Occupation Participation Rate 
has significantly constructive effect on the slope of wife’s schooling level in couple and 
wife sterilization models. It suggests that for women living in a county with a higher 
Female Occupation Participation Rate, the negative effect of wife’s schooling level on 
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couple and wife sterilization tends to increases in comparison with women living in a 
county with a lower Female Occupation Participation Rate. This is fully supportive of 
the hypothesis. 
The γ21 coefficient of Female Occupation Participation Rate has a significantly 
negative effect on the slope of no work status in the Model II of wife sterilization models. 
It suggests that for women living in a county with a higher Female Occupation 
Participation Rate, the positive effect of no-work status on couple and wife sterilization 
will be less than for those women living in a county with a lower Female Occupation 
Participation Rate, after controlling for the other variables. These associations are 
consistent with theoretical expectations regarding women’s status. Especially, even 
regarding no-work status, women in a context of higher women’s status can refuse to 
shoulder the sole responsibility for fertility control and can, therefore refuse sterilization. 
As in Table 6.14, the Female Divorce Rate still has a negative effect on the slope of 
Number of Boys, but the γ95 coefficient of Female College Graduation Rate fails to be 
significant. This is expected that Female Divorce Rate will act against the positive effect 
of son preference on women’s sterilization. 
 
The Discussion of Table 6.14 and Table 6.15, Taiwan Data 
Generally, for the two groups of HGLM models of the 1992 Taiwan KAP data, 
Table 6.14 does not show many cross-level effects and, Table 6.15 shows less cross-
level effects. Part of this may be because Taiwan counties show a fairly uniform and 
homogeneous level of development; the county thus may not be the optimal contextual 
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unit for multilevel analysis, especially as regards the younger generation. Based onTable 
6.10 for One-way ANOVA Models, it is also significant that the Taiwan models have a 
low amount of variance at the aggregate level. 
Among the 17 significant cross-level effects, there are nine that run counter to 
the stated hypotheses. They are the interactions of Female Occupation Participation Rate 
with wife agricultural occupation status in wife sterilization model of Table 6.14, 0-year-
old mortality rate with owning a piano in CEB model of Table 6.14, 0-year-old mortality 
rate with Mainlander status in couple and wife sterilization model of Table 6.14, Female, 
Divorce Rate with wife education in CEB model of Table 6.14, Female Divorce Rate 
with owning a piano in CEB model of Table 6.14, Female Divorce Rate with wife 
agricultural occupation status in CEB model of Table 6.14, Female College Graduation 
Rate with Nowork status in couple and wife sterilization model of Table 6.14, Female 
College Graduation Rate with number of boys in couple and wife sterilization model of 
Table 6.14, and Female College Graduation Rate with number of dead children in couple 
sterilization model of Table 6.14. 
As stated earlier regarding the younger generation shown in Table 6.15, 
economic power, familial structure, and farming style seem to have lost most of their 
power to influence fertility behavior. Fricke and his associates (1994) also perceived this 
transition in the recent evolution of Taiwanese society. Nonetheless, level-1 wife’s 
education still plays a significant role in CEB, couple and wife sterilization models in 
these two tables. Without doubt, women’s education has a more comprehensive role in 
Taiwan than it does in China. In addition, Number of Boys has more significant effects 
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on sterilizations than Number of Dead Children, which conforms with the findings of the 
logistic analysis, but does not agree with the finding in the survival analysis. In China, 
both variables show similar results. The prevalence of male sterilization in Taiwan is 
much less than in China; consequently, the poor analysis results for the husband 
sterilization models are not surprising. Regarding the level-2 effects, as in the data for 
China, among the five contextual variables, Total Fertility Rate does not have noticeable 
effects on these models. In the final chapter, I will further integrate the findings of this 
chapter and conclude with a discussion of their implications, including possible 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Summary and Conclusion 
China (People Republic of China, PRC) and Taiwan (Republic of China, ROC) 
separated in 1949 when the Communist Party took over control of the mainland, and the 
Capitalist Kuomintang Party withdrew to Taiwan, which Japan returned to China in 
1945 after Japan’s defeat in World War II, thereby ending its fifty-year occupation of the 
island. Subsequently, as described in Chapters II and III of this dissertation, mainland 
China and Taiwan experienced very similar trajectories of development regarding 
women’s status and population transitions. Yet in these dissimilar political regimes these 
similar trajectories resulted from different underlying mechanisms. In China, policy 
promotion by a dictatorial party was a major force that pushed to have women eulogized 
as holding up “half of the sky” (Tuan 1989). In China, also,  the lower fertility rate 
resulted in part from “direct and forceful government intervention” in family planning, 
as well as partly from social and economic development (Poston 1998). A somewhat 
different story unfolded in Taiwan. Chiang (2000) argued that the growth of women’s 
status in Taiwan has inadvertently resulted from the island’s general rise in 
socioeconomic vigor and from liberalizing the political arena. A dropping fertility rate in 
Taiwan resulted from mainly voluntary reductions in family size in response to social 
and economic development (Sun 1984; Feeney 1994; Poston 1998). 
As stated in Chapter I, the specific purposes of this dissertation were (1) to ascertain 
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through contextual analysis with HGLM methods the direct and the cross-level effects of 
province-level and county-level indices of women’s status and development on fertility 
behaviors of individuals in China and Taiwan, (2) to examine with Robust, Poisson, 
logistic, and survival analyses the macro- and micro-level effects of women’s status and 
family structure on the number of children ever born (CEB) and on sterilization status, 
and (3) to conduct a preliminary comparison of how women’s status has affected fertility 
outcomes on both sides of the Taiwanese Strait. 
The theoretical bases of this study are Demographic Transition Theory, the 
Economic/Sociological Synthesis of Easterlin, the New Home Economics of Gary 
Becker, and women’s status theory. By investigating China, the author attempts to 
observe, especially at the contextual level, whether there is a disparity in empirical 
support for the Western perspective of socioeconomically based demographic transition 
versus the Asian perspective of planned demographic transition (Caldwell 1993). The 
main practical strategy of analysis focuses on the effects on fertility of women’s 
education, women’s employment, and family structure, as well as, in analysis of China’s 
data, on the effects of intervention policy. Within this framework, individual data for 
Taiwan are from1992 Seventh KAP (Knowledge, Attitude, and Practice of Contraception) 
Survey (TPIFP 1992) among married women participating family planning and, for 
China, from the 1988 China Woman Fertility Survey (SFPCC 1989). Macro-level data 
for Taiwan’s county-level units are from the the Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book 
1992 for Taiwan (EYRC 1992); for China’s provincial units, the data are from the 1990 
China Population Census for China (NBSC 1991). 
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With respect to the first purpose (identifying multi-level correlates of women’s 
status and fertility behaviors), the analyses show that the contextual characteristics of 
province and county have demonstrable direct and interactive effects on individual 
women’s fertility, as presented in Tables 6.11 through 6.15. Moreover, most of the 
effects tend to conform with the hypotheses proposed in Chapter V. For example, in 
Taiwan, women who do not work outside the home and who live in a county with higher 
female employment are less likely to use sterilization than her counterparts living a 
county with a lower rate of female occupation  (see Table 6.14). Among China’s rural 
population, women whose husbands work in an agricultural occupation and who also 
live in a province with a higher female divorce rate, have smaller numbers of children 
ever born (CEB) than women whose husbands also are farmers but live in a province 
with a lower female divorce rate (see Table 6.13). These findings highlight the value of 
sociological studies of micro-macro linkages to increase our understanding of how the 
social and economic characteristics of the contexts in which individuals live affect their 
behaviors. Without multi-level analysis, we could not obtain the precise and accurate 
representation of those relationships. 
For the six contextual variables included in the multilevel analyses of province-
level units in China and for the five variables used in the county-level analysis in Taiwan, 
I have summarized in Table 7.1 the significant results that have previously been shown 
in Tables 6.11 through 6.15. Total Fertility Rate (TFR) does not have apparent effects, 
because only once in the analyses for each data does the TFR show statistical 
significance. However, based on the caution of Hamilton (1992:92), multicollinearity 
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may lead to neither the slope nor the intercept being individually distinguishable from 
zero. Examining the correlation matrix of Table 6.1 and Table 6.2,  the correlation 
coefficient of TFR and Female Occupation Participation Rate is 0.51 for the China data, 
and there are three correlation coefficients with TFR that are more than or equal to 0.50 
for the Taiwan data. These could be attributed to the poor performance of TFR for these 
two regimes. Hence, the direct and indirect effects of TFR are worthy of being examined 
in future research. 
Most of the unexpected results (i.e., results counter to stated hypotheses) are 
associated with Female Divorce Rate and Female College Graduation Rate. All 
coefficients that did not support the hypotheses are coefficients of cross-level effect. 
In China, three predictors demonstrated expected outcomes: Female Occupation 
Participation Rate, 0-year-old Mortality Rate, and One-Child Certificate Rate. In Taiwan, 
however, the first two variables showed inconsistent results. The third variable was not 
applicable to Taiwan. 
For these contextual variables, cross-level effects on personal fertility behaviors 
were validated more often than direct effects were validated. For example, in Table 6.12, 
Female Occupation Participation Rate affects the slope of Three-generation Familial 
Structure on sterilization usage. I suppose that the contextual effect of the marital 
partners’ mutually observing that women in close proximity to them are going out to 
work may influence each spouse’s sterilization decision by way of the familial structure, 
so that sterilization is more often undertaken by husbands, rather than the husbands’ 
viewing sterilization as solely the contraceptive responsibility of the wife. on the other 
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hand, no significant effect is apparent for Female Occupation Participation Rate alone. 
In addition, Female Divorce Rate has a few significant cross-level effects but, 
confusingly, it too shows variable results. In future research, possible effects should not 
only be considered regarding the female divorce rate, but also for the ratio of female-
male divorce rates. Without more detailed information about the contexts, interpretation 
is difficult regarding how and why these direct and interactive effects work. The 
empirical and quantitative analysis presented here, however, focuses attention on 
promising connections among an almost infinite number of possible relationships. The 
unexpected significant results among the cross-level effects offer guidance for future 
research. 
As for verification of theories, Western demographic transition theory has 
principally relied on contextual variables that are indices of socioeconomic status. But 
the magnitude of the impact in China of government intervention is clearly demonstrated 
by the uniformly significant performance of the One-Child Certificate Rate variable. At 
the contextual level, Western demographic transition theory and Asian demographic 
transition theory both find support in this dissertation’s data on China’s population 
transition. Future studies should include more complete aggregate variables such as the 
size of local family planning budgets and expenditures, the quality and size of local 
family planning staff, and the objective evaluation of effectiveness of local family 
planning. In that way, we can identify more specifically the features of the governmental 
context that are most significant. 
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Regarding the second purpose of this study (i.e., to examine macro and micro 
effects of women’s status and family structure on CEB), in robust regression models in 
Table 6.3, three macro-level variables (Female Occupation Participation Rate, Female 
Divorce Rate, and Female College Graduation Rate) stand out as indicators of women's 
status at the aggregate level. Female Occupation Participation Rate does not have 
significant effects on fertility or sterilization behaviors at either the provincial level in 
China or the county level in Taiwan. Except for its relationship to male sterilization 
status in China, Female Divorce Rate demonstrates expected effects on both sides of the 
Strait.  Female College Graduation Rate shows the expected relationship in Taiwan, but 
in China shows no significant effect on sterilization status and has a positive effect on 
the number of CEB. As mentioned in the review of literature in Chapter IV, that result is 
not surprising, because China is less developed than is Taiwan. 
In the micro-level Poisson analyses, women’s educational level as an indicator of 
women's status is a good predictor of fertility behaviors in both China and Taiwan. All 
the results in my analyses in Table 6.4 and Table 6.5 support the stated hypotheses. The 
wife's educational level is a good predictor for decreased numbers of CEB in China and 
in Taiwan. The educational level of the husband follows the same pattern (see Table 6.4 
and Table 6.5). These findings support the theories of New Home Economics and 
Women’s Status.  
The logistic analyses show that women with higher educational levels are more 
likely to use contraceptive measures other than sterilization, which is the most radical 
and permanent method of contraception. But in both China and Taiwan, the wife’s  
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Table 7.1 Number of Significant Direct and Cross-level Effects of Contextual Variables on 
Individual Fertility Behavior in 1988 China and 1992 Taiwan. 
 
 China  Taiwan 
 
Number of 
Direct 
Effects 
Passing 
significance 
test   
Number of 
Cross-level 
Effects 
Passing 
significance 
test   
Fail to Fall 
within 
Hypotheses  
Number of 
Direct 
Effects 
Passing 
significance 
test   
Number of 
Cross-level 
Effects 
Passing 
significance 
test   
Fail to Fall 
within 
Hypotheses 
Female Occup. 
Partici. Rate 
2  5  0  0  4  1 
 0-year-old Mortality 
Rate 
3  6  0  4  3  2 
 Total Fertility Rate. 0  1  0  0  1  0 
 Female Divorce 
Rate 
2  4  3  3  6  3 
 Female College 
Grad. Rate 
0  2  2  2  3  3 
One-Child 
Certificate Rate 
 
3  3  0       
Total 10   21   5   9   17   9 
Source: TPIFP 1992, EYRC 1992, SFPCC 1989 and NBSC 199 
 
 
educational level has no significant effect on the probability of her husband's 
sterilization. The husband’s educational level affects dependent variables differently in 
China than in Taiwan.  In Taiwan, more highly educated husbands are more likely to 
help their wives choose non-sterilization means of fertility control and are also more 
likely to undergo male sterilization.  In China, however, more highly educated husbands 
are more likely to have wives who are sterilized, but the husband’s educational level is 
not significantly related to male sterilization (see Table 6.6 and Table 6.7).  
Because of the poor classification of occupations in both data pools, analysis of 
women’s employment status was limited overall to the effect of traditional farming. In 
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Taiwan, however, I added a variable of no-work status, because many of the women in 
the Taiwanese data did not work outside the home. In both the macro and micro analyses, 
after controlling for other variables, women working in this traditional occupational style 
were hypothesized as more likely to have conservative fertility behavior than other non-
farming women in Taiwan and China. In the Poisson Models, after controlling for other 
variables, results were as expected, with Taiwanese women who worked only inside the 
home showing a higher probability of self-reporting conservative attitudes about fertility 
and a higher probability of having a greater number of CEB. Identical results were 
significantly associated with the husband’s having an agricultural occupation. 
In the logistic analysis of sterilization status (Table 6.6 and Table 6.7), in Taiwan, a 
wife’s farming is negatively associated with use of contraceptive measures other than 
sterilization; in the China’s wife model, however, no such effect is observed. In Taiwan, 
the no-work status similarly showed no significant relationship with sterilization. In 
China, a husband who farms is more likely to have a wife who is sterilized, or is more 
likely to be sterilized himself. In Taiwan, however,  husband’s farming was not related at 
all to either his own or his wife’s sterilization. At the micro level in both China and 
Taiwan, the two indices of women’s status (educational level and work status) are 
related to fertility behaviors as expected. 
In the survival analysis (see Table 6.8 and Table 6.9), parity was brought in as 
another interesting dimension of fertility analysis. In Taiwan, higher educational levels 
of wives or husbands are, for each of the three childbirth periods, significantly associated 
with lower probability (or risk) of proceeding to the next childbirth. In China, also, 
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higher educational levels of wives and husbands are significantly related to greater 
probability of the first and second childbirths, but not the third.  In China, agricultural-
occupation status shows negative effects on the probability of having a first and a second 
childbirth, but is associated with greater probability of proceeding to a third childbirth. A 
similarly unexpected pattern appears in Taiwan’s parity data: there, agricultural-
occupation status shows a positive relationship with the hazard for the first birth, then 
fails to reach significance for the second birth, then again displays a positive relationship 
for the third birth. So, after controlling for other variables, we can say about the 1988 
China fertility data and the 1992 Taiwan KAP data that when people engaged in a 
farming occupation have the second birth, they are more likely to have the third 
childbirth than are non-farming people. It is not true, though, that farmers are more 
likely than non-farmers to have to either the first childbirth or the second. Because 
survival analysis simultaneously models both time duration and event occurrence, these 
previously unreported and therefore unexpected findings emerge in this study and lend 
further credence to arguments mentioned in Chapter IV that the contextual vectors that 
mediate between women’s status and reproductive choice are diverse and 
multidimensional. 
The third purpose of this study was to conduct a preliminary comparison of the 
effect of women’s status on fertility outcomes for China vis-à-vis Taiwan. Concerning 
employment status, first, because clear-cut occupational classification data were lacking, 
I focused on the traditional agricultural occupation, which is seen primarily in 
conjunction with rural households detached from other social organizations. 
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Consequently, people working in an agricultural occupation are less likely to be exposed 
to modern ideas such as gender equality, retirement management, and up-to-date 
contraceptive measures. Additionally, in Taiwan, persons in farming occupations do not 
participate in the public pension system like persons in other occupations. In China, the 
security previously offered by the commune system is no longer available since the 
demise of communes. So it is not difficult to understand that for security in their old age, 
farmers prefer more children. Similarly, it seems likely that because of limited 
information and resources in rural areas, sterilization for farmers is the most readily 
available and customary contraceptive measure when the farmers have attained their 
desired number of children (especially in view of its promotion by local and national 
family planning programs). The analysis of results comparing fertility behaviors of 
farming households in Taiwan and China reveals no noticeable difference between them.  
The general applicability of the results, however, for comparing the general populations 
of China and Taiwan is severely limited.  That is true because in China most women are 
still engaged in farming (75%, as shown in Table 5.1). Using farming as an occupational 
classification, therefore, subsumes most of the women in China. Conversely, in Taiwan, 
a highly industrialized country, only 3% of women belong in this category. So in future 
study of women’s employment status in Taiwan, a focus on paid employment other than 
farming should yield results more generally applicable to working women.  
In the brief review thus far of the results of this study’s six analyses, the expected 
associations of educational level with fertility and sterilization behaviors are more 
evident in Taiwan than in China. At the macro level, educational status in China is not 
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associated with a smaller number of children ever born (CEB) nor, in macro-level and 
multi-level analyses, is it associated with any particular sterilization pattern. In contrast, 
Taiwan, a country in the ranks of the developed nations, has greater latitude to let 
women use their educational capital to manage their fertility and contraceptive lives. In 
Taiwan, the emerging population problems are the aging population and low fertility, 
rather than a fertility rate that needs to be curbed. Based on the latest statistics from the 
Taiwan Ministry of Interior, the 2003 total fertility rate (TFR) is 1.2, which is much 
lower than the replacement rate. As reported in the 2000 Women’s Marriage, Fertility 
and Employment Survey (Census Bureau, Directorate-General of the Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics [DGBAS], Executive Yuan, Taiwan, R.O.C. 2000), for 
Taiwanese women the correlates of higher women’s educational level are more years 
before marriage, lower (even zero) number of children desired, and a more advance 
maternal age at the time of first childbirth. The principal challenges that Taiwan faces 
concerning fertility are how to encourage married women to have more children in the 
current environment of higher living standards, higher costs of education, more prevalent 
nuclear-family structure, and higher costs of private daycare as a result of the shortage of 
public daycare services. of course, whether other contextual elements, such as 
employment, political participation, marital life, and the legislated protection of 
women’s rights, may also (like educational level) have sanguine effects on fertility in 
Taiwan deserves attention by future researchers. 
China is still a developing country. After Deng Xiaopeng’s economic reforms that 
began during the 1980s, China’s rapid economic growth has brought along with it 
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extensive social development in other respects. For example, education is more 
accessible to women, as is documented in Chapter II. At the individual level (especially 
among younger women) the positive correlation of women’s greater educational 
achievement with lower numbers of CEB and with fewer sterilizations of women is 
undeniably clear in this study (even though in multi-level analysis of the older two 
groups no such relationship is seen). For instance, in the multi-level analysis shown in 
Table 6.12, we see that the wives’ educational level in the younger generation is 
significantly associated with lower incidence of wives’ sterilization. In addition to the 
apparent catalytic effects of socioeconomic development and women’s status in China, 
the silhouette of government interference is also prominent in China’s fertility transition. 
The two individual-level variables dealing with family-planning policy (No One-child 
Certificate and Experience of Childbirth with Quota) are significantly correlated with 
fertility and sterilization outcomes. Moreover, sterilization is not only the most effective 
way of contraception, but it is routinely promoted by government officials, especially 
when localities have limited alternative contraceptive services. The second policy 
variable, One-Child Certificate Rate—a macro-level variable—likewise shows 
significant correlations in macro-level robust analysis and in multi-level analysis. These 
results again affirm that China’s governmentally enforced fertility policy is a successful 
factor in influencing Chinese couples to conform their fertility and contraceptive 
behaviors to it.  
It is worth noting that in Table 6.11, showing the results of the multi-level analysis 
for China, the Female College Graduation Rate has negative interaction effects (G35) 
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with women’s education status on CEB but no such relationship is found in the Taiwan 
data. This suggests that in China, the context of women’s development status functions 
to ameliorate women with better education achievement in that milieu to lower their 
personal fertility behavior. Poston (1998) has stated that the decline in population in 
China can be attributed both to social and economic development and to governmental 
intervention. The empirical findings of this dissertation tell the same story.  
Described as a brutal, coercive policy, the Chinese government’s family-planning 
policy carried out at local administrative levels has been criticized for violating human 
rights, depriving women of choices, and enforcing abortion and sterilization (Aird 1990). 
How to resolve the collision of individual rights with government demographic priorities 
should be based on the tenet that reproductive autonomy is a human right (Freedman and 
Isaacs 1993). In another words, the implementation of governmentally sponsored 
incentives and disincentives designed to influence personal childbearing decisions 
should incorporate an underlying commitment to trusting women, which is the 
fundamental principle of the women-centered approach. The purpose of such a strategy 
is to enable women to have the ability and the authority to take control over their 
reproductive lives, given that they already have access to adequate information and 
appropriate services. The National Population and Family Planning Commission of 
China, in fact, confronted this very issue. Under the heading, “Basic Views and Policies 
Regarding Population and Development,” on its website, the declaration is made, “[T]he 
principle of family planning is to combine governmental guidance with people's 
voluntariness; thereby the basic rights of every individual and every married couple are 
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respected and protected, at the same time the couples are aware of their responsibilities 
and obligations.”(SFPCC 2001) Xie (2000) explained that the demographic orientation 
of family planning in China is shifting toward a service-oriented approach, and that 
women-centered, quality service will be delivered to help the Chinese people have fewer 
births and create further wealth. 
As for the other predictors investigated in this dissertation, familial structure has the 
expected positive effects on the number of CEB in Taiwan, but is not significantly 
correlated with sterilization behaviors. In China, contrary to expectation, three-
generation familial structure has negative effects on number of CEB, an outcome that is 
difficult to interpret. Some empirical studies have, however, pointed out that the lack of 
living space is a constraining factor on the size of Chinese families (Guo 1996). Also, 
the possibility the outcome resulted from inaccurate data sources or from inaccurate 
manipulation of the data cannot be entirely dismissed. Overall, traditional Chinese 
family values remain influential in Taiwanese society. They are, however, losing their 
impact upon the younger generation, as seen in the multi-level analysis in Table 6.15, 
where it fails to pass the test of showing any significant relationship. Regarding son 
preference, in logistic analysis it is clear that the number of boys has a predictable effect 
on whether Chinese and Taiwanese use sterilization to bring about permanent 
contraception or proceed to the second and third childbirth. Because the numbers of 
children were so seriously limited in China, the number of dead children shows 
significant effects in all of China’s analyses, but in Taiwan’s analyses the effects of this 
variable are weaker.  
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Owning a piano, an indicator of wealth in Taiwan, presents a more complicated 
picture. In survival analysis, families who own a piano are more likely to have a first 
childbirth, but not more likely to have more children. In Poisson analysis, also, they are 
not likely to have a greater number of CEB. They are also more likely to have 
sterilization to implement fertility control. The picture about the relationship between 
wealth and fertility we get from the analyses in Taiwan is similar to the explanation of 
Mueller and Short (1983). They argued that the relation is inconclusive because higher 
incomes or greater wealth may lead in various ways to a change in tastes away from 
children and toward competing for material goods, even though such families can well 
afford to have more children. Along ethnic dimensions, Han in China and Mainlanders 
in Taiwan have fewer CEB and higher sterilization frequencies for wives and husbands. 
In both China and Taiwan, without question, the wife’s age is positively related to 
greater numbers of CEB. The positive relationship of wife’s age with sterilization status, 
after controlling for other variables, only appears in the younger generation of China 
(see Table 6.12), which suggests that older Chinese women are less likely to have 
sterilization. In Taiwan, women’s age positively correlates with sterilization usage for 
both wives and husbands. In China, the rural-locality variable has the expected positive 
effects on CEB and sterilization, but in the models of survival analysis it fails to show 
significant effects in the second and the third childbirth periods. Because of the high 
proportion of cases located in rural areas in China’s dataset, in the multi-level analysis, 
both Table 6.11 (for the whole sample) and Table 6.13 (for the rural group) show similar 
results, in contrast with the results in Table 6.12 (for the younger group).  
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At the individual level, fertility decisions probably result from a very complex 
intersection of social, economic, and biological forces. In this dissertation, the empirical 
methods were selected for their efficiency and appropriateness for dealing with the 
specific features of the data being analyzed: Poisson regression, for the count data of 
CEB; logistic regression, for the dichotomous dependent variable of whether or not 
sterilization has occurred; and robust regression, for the small sample size of provincial 
and county units. Survival analysis was used to simultaneously handle interval duration 
and event occurrence for the next childbirth. Multi-level analyses by HGLM identified 
some of the direct and interactive contextual effects, with multi-level Poisson models for 
the count data of CEB, and multi-level Bernoulli models for binary outcomes of 
sterilization. The results of the multi-level contextual analysis of women’s fertility 
behavior offer empirical verification that it is not only influenced by her personal 
characteristics, but also by contextual forces such as observing or imitating behaviors of 
surrounding people and engaging those people in communication. These kinds of 
contextual effects can strengthen or weaken the effects of her personal characteristics on 
fertility and contraceptive decisions. 
 
Future Research Suggestions 
A successful multilevel analysis involves several conditions, some of which are not 
fully met in this study because of limitations of the data. In order to carry out an 
effective multi-level analysis, first of all, selecting an appropriate contextual unit is 
necessary. The accurate specification of the context is crucial, so that researchers should 
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seek to specify the smallest possible social unit that enables them to treat as negligible 
the heterogeneity within those units as regards institutional structures and values 
(Hammel 1990). As argued in Chapter VI, the poor results of cross-level effects in Table 
6.15 may be attributable to the inappropriateness of the county as a unit for the younger 
cohort in Taiwan, which is a largely homogeneous, evenly-developed region. By 
contrast, except for Hainan province, most provinces in China are much bigger than 
Taiwan, and greater diversity within each province is therefore to be expected. No doubt, 
the province unit is a very rough contextual unit.  
It follows that further research is needed to investigate the influence of the choice 
of a specific regional social context on the empirical outcome of the analysis. However, 
it is not easy to understand the processes through which context is related to individual 
action: the greatest barriers are met in trying to “systematically revise the different 
modalities with which the grouped variables are introduced into circular causation 
sequences between micro and macro” (Micheli 1991). The multilevel approach also 
requires a complex, specific survey design that can help researchers explore all possible 
contextual dimensions. Technically speaking, this means that survey designs must be 
more complicated in order to ensure the right sample size to study the hypothesized 
micro-macro relationships between phenomena. So, for example, the models of male 
sterilization in Table 6.10 generally have more contextual variance than other models, 
but because of uneven scarcity of occurrences of male sterilization in the contextual 
units of this study, the association between the predictors and the outcome variable 
cannot be fully established in the analyses in Tables 6.11 through 6.15. 
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Finally, in order to identify the underlying mechanisms and explicate more fully 
how contextual effects operate, researchers might need to go beyond the standard 
geographic descriptors of social contextualization and aim instead at gathering data that 
are more qualitative. Without question, the ultimate challenge for multi-level fertility 
research is to define an appropriate contextual unit that incorporates the specific 
differentiating features of both the country and the culture. For example, Hammel (1990, 
p. 467), claims that a “successful incorporation of anthropological concepts of culture 
into demographic explanation” requires careful ethnography that allows “comparative 
studies of relatively small social units, however large and complex may be the societies 
within which these are embedded.” Accordingly, for example, how long people live in 
the research contexts should be controlled, or data on his or her migration history should 
be collected. Moreover, as in Table 6.11, the γ64 coefficient of the cross-level effect of 
the Female Divorce Rate with Three Generation Familial Structure is positive, which is 
contrary to the hypothesis that areas with higher divorce rate represent high women’s 
status, thus a lower CEB would be expected. Judging from this result, whether people 
use divorce to avoid the limit of one-child-policy to gain more of an opportunity for a 
childbirth is an interesting topic in China. However, without ethnographical data, we can 
not properly address this query. Unfortunately, in this exploratory study, these kinds 
information were not available. As mentioned before, we need more relevantly detailed 
information for the contextual unit. This dissertation can, however, be deemed a 
preliminary roadmap for multi-level analysis in the field of fertility and women’s status. 
From survival analysis that took into account both time duration and event 
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occurrence, we see that the predictors showed their influence on different parities of 
childbirth. How the contextual effects work on the survival analysis results is worth 
consideration in future study; a multi-level hazard analysis needs to be conducted to 
provide more insights into this field. 
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